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SUMMARY 
Effective Coordination for Metropolitan Planning:  
the Case of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region 
 
 
This research employs an institutional perspective to understand patterns of various 
types of metropolitan planning, their effectiveness and application in the Jakarta 
Metropolitan Region (JMR). A core characteristic of metropolitan planning is 
coordination. Coordination in metropolitan regions is recognized internationally as 
complex and difficult. It is also crucial, however, as metropolitan regions, in general, 
do not have a metropolitan government, but are fragmented over several local 
authorities (districts, boroughs, cities, towns, counties, cantons, municipalities, 
regencies or others). When these metropolitan areas face regional problems, such as 
traffic jams, inefficient transport or floods, they will need to address those regional 
problems through working collectively. However, working collectively implies a need 
for effective coordination. 
 
It has been well-established by authors like Richard Feiock that when metropolitan 
government is absent, the organizations involved will need more time, more cost and 
more efforts to collect information, to monitor, to bargain or to enforce in order to 
realize a commitment. Local actors are also more likely easy to enter and to exit any 
coordinative commitment, and cannot mutually enforce each other. As a consequence, 
effective metropolitan planning can be challenging. When commitment or a common 
understanding is difficult to realize, for example in the case of mitigating floods, it will 
increase risks for citizens and impede improvements in quality of life. The 
establishment of effective coordination for metropolitan planning is essential in 
metropolitan regions.  
 
This research focuses empirically on metropolitan planning in the Jakarta 
Metropolitan Region (JMR). The main question is how effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning in the JMR can be explained and its effectiveness improved. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the JMR or the Jabodetabekpunjur (an abbreviation of 
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Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Puncak and Cianjur) has distinct regional 
problems such as floods and traffic jams. To solve those problems, Jakarta needs to 
cooperate with local governments in its surrounding. Similar with other metropolitan 
regions generally, the JMR also does not have a metropolitan government. The JMR 
is fragmented over the province of Jakarta and nine districts surrounding Jakarta, 
which are part of two other provinces. To understand metropolitan planning in the 
JMR, this research highlights two case studies: development of metropolitan 
transportation (presented in Chapter 3) and development of a project to mitigate 
floods in Jakarta (presented in Chapter 4). Due to variations metropolitan planning 
and to obtain a reference on effective coordination, the research first develops a 
framework of metropolitan planning that can assist us to understand principal 
patterns for coordination (presented in Chapter 2). The framework of metropolitan 
planning is then used to structure the case studies and to formulate conclusion and 
policy recommendation in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 2 develops a framework of metropolitan planning. The framework is 
developed to understand patterns of various types of metropolitan planning and to 
examine dynamic shifts in coordination arrangements. Institutional arrangements for 
metropolitan planning tend to shift towards conditions for more effective 
coordination. The literature review includes 96 journal articles and books discussing 
metropolitan planning and coordination over five continents. The journal articles and 
books have been published in the period 1956-2015. The literature review suggests that 
metropolitan planning covers both issues related to the institutional setting of 
metropolitan regions and coordination arrangements for metropolitan planning. The 
institutional setting of a metropolitan region refers to an arena with activities for 
shaping metropolitan governance and for exercising planning policy power for the 
entire metropolitan region.  
 
There are essentially three approaches to developing the institutional setting of a 
metropolitan region, whether through regionalism (merger, consolidation, 
annexation), localism (market approach, each local government works independently) 
or new regionalism (inter-local government cooperation). Coordination arrangements 
include coordination capacity (capacity developed to create coherent plans, policies 
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and strategies for the entire metropolitan region) and coordination mechanisms 
(mechanisms used to implement metropolitan plans, polices and strategies 
collectively). The framework of metropolitan planning is rooted in the Theory of 
Transaction Cost Economics as developed among others by Oliver Williamson. The 
framework consists of the institutional setting of the metropolitan region, described 
generally to cover three approaches (regionalism, localism and new regionalism), and 
nine prototype coordination arrangements (prototype A to I) of metropolitan 
planning. A prototype represents a particular form of governance. A prototype of 
metropolitan planning uses particular main instruments, whether administrative 
control for hierarchical forms of governance (e.g., regulation and formal procedure), 
incentive intensity for market forms of governance (including money, award and 
acknowledgement), or mixed instruments for hybrid forms of governance. Prototype 
A for example implies that metropolitan planning uses a type of master-plan for 
coordination capacity and a formal-continuous coordination mechanism. Prototype I 
indicates a reliance on a strategic plan combined with an informal-discontinuous 
mechanism for Prototype A represents a strongly hierarchical form of governance and 
prototype I represents a market form of governance. Other prototypes (B to H), 
represents hybrid forms of governance. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses metropolitan transportation and related institutional settings of 
the JMR. This study takes the case of the expansion of TransJakarta, the Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT) system owned by the provincial government of Jakarta. The idea behind 
the BRT has been to address traffic jams in Jakarta, reduce private vehicles use, and 
provide better metropolitan transportation. The provincial government of Jakarta has 
developed TransJakarta to serve Jakarta’s citizens through special buses with 
dedicated road lanes. These special buses and dedicated lanes would be expanded to 
surrounding districts of Jakarta to serve commuters who also contribute to traffic jams 
in Jakarta. Improvements by the provincial government of Jakarta to expand 
TransJakarta’s service to the JMR demonstrate a preferred form of metropolitan 
governance. The analysis reveals three improvements: (1) the Megapolitan proposal 
(2005-2007), representing a regionalism approach, (2) the Spatial Plan of the JMR 
(2008-2012), representing localism, and (3) strengthening inter-local governmental 
cooperation, supported by the central government (2012-now), signifying anew 
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regionalism approach. The research found that even though the Megapolitan 
proposal, which relies on the creation of metropolitan government, promises stronger 
effectiveness in developing TransJakarta, it was rejected by the governor of West 
Java, the governor of Banten and finally also rejected by the central government and 
the national parliament. The fundamental idea of the Megapolitan proposal, as 
proposed by the governor of Jakarta, created significant political tension as it would 
reduce authorities of other governors. To minimize this metropolitan political tension, 
a proposal emerged to work on the basis of the spatial plan of the JMR. 
Implementation and development would be conducted by each provincial and local 
government. This second improvement was accepted by the organisations involved 
and gives a base for inter-local government cooperation. However, the analysis also 
shows that this coordination practice turned out ineffective in terms of implementing 
further TransJakarta expansion. A third improvement appeared more effective as 
inter-local government cooperation was accepted more broadly by all organisations 
involved and subsequently succeeded to implement TransJakarta development from 
Jakarta to Jakarta’s surrounding districts.  The chapter concludes that in this case the 
more effective institutional setting of the JMR is in inter-local government 
cooperation supported by central government. 
 
Using the framework of metropolitan planning developed in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 
discusses coordination arrangements of metropolitan planning in the JMR through 
the case of the Ciawi and Sukamahi dams.  The project is located in the regency of 
Bogor, which is working on instructions by the province of Jakarta to mitigate acute 
floods. The collective decision to build this project covers a period of 13 years. The 
main agreement is that organisations involved will share their resources to build the 
dams.  This was designed as an inter-local government cooperation project supported 
by the central governments. The provincial government of Jakarta would share their 
fund to finance land acquisition of the dams. The Ministry of Public Works would 
share funds for the construction of the dams. The provincial government of West Java 
would assist with the land acquisition process. The regency government of Bogor 
would contribute through implementating land acquisition. This chapter revealed that 
the coordination capacity of metropolitan spatial planning for Jabodetabekpunjur 
uses formal regulations as instruments to essentially establish a type of master plan. 
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Coordination mechanisms to implementing the metropolitan spatial plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur use informal-discontinuous mechanisms. These mechanisms 
tend to use incentives to accelerate collective decisions. In addition, coordination 
efforts relied on regulations that would only apply to each organization involved. 
Collective work was encouraged through a range of incentives, both monetary and 
non-monetary. There was no evidence of regulations for resource-sharing for joint 
projects. This coordination arrangement, therefore, can be classified as prototype C of 
metropolitan planning. Prototype C means that the coordination arrangement uses a 
master plan for coordination in conjunction with informal-discontinuous mechanism 
for interaction. Due to lack of regulation on collective action, coordination activities to 
build the dams faced a range of difficulties and delay in preparing the project. It took 
almost two years. In this case uncertainties have contributed to transaction costs. To 
enhance effectiveness, in 2016, the central government took over the allocated funds 
from Jakarta. Following that intervention, central government has engaged in 
financing all costs to build the dams. The chapter points out that, in particular 
uncertainties around asset ownership status and budget transfer diminished 
significantly. This action reduced uncertainty and has enhanced coordination 
effectiveness. The second coordination arrangement refers to prototype B.  
 
Prototype B assumes that the central government has a central role for metropolitan 
planning in the JMR. Such a pivotal role implies that central government should have 
a high financial capacity. It has to be noted that this situation has the potential to create 
uncertainty in the future as central government has financial constraints. Another 
problem embedded in prototype B also emerges. A reliance on a type of master plan 
for the metropolitan area of Jabodetabekpunjur also has weaknesses as it cannot fully 
manage fragmentation and adaptation. Using remediableness criterion, Chapter 5 
asks the question which prototype metropolitan planning may be better than 
prototype B. The chapter proposes prototype E as a coordination arrangement of 
metropolitan planning in the JMR in the future. Prototype E means coordination 
arrangements rely on a type of master-strategic plan for metropolitan coordination 
capacities of Jabodetabekpunjur, together with informal-continuous coordination 
mechanisms. Prototype E asks the central government to develop a mix of formal 
regulation and incentives in order to reduce fragmentation and to enhance 
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adaptability in formulation of the metropolitan spatial plan. Prototype E also asks the 
central government to issue new regulations to safeguard asset ownership status for 
joint-projects or other collective actions. This regulation is predicted will enhance 
inter-local government cooperation and includes co-production with private, non-
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SAMENVATTING 
Effectieve Coördinatie voor Metropolitane Planning: 
De Casus van de Metropoolregio Jakarta 
 
 
Dit onderzoek maakt gebruik van een institutioneel perspectief om patronen van 
verschillende soorten grootstedelijke planning, hun effectiviteit en toepassing in de 
Metropolitane Regio Jakarta (JMR) te begrijpen. Een kernkenmerk van metropolitane 
planning is coördinatie. Coördinatie in grootstedelijke regio's wordt internationaal 
erkend als complex en moeilijk. Het is echter ook van cruciaal belang, omdat 
grootstedelijke regio's in het algemeen geen grootstedelijke overheid hebben, maar 
gefragmenteerd zijn over verschillende lokale autoriteiten (districten, stadsdelen, 
steden, provincies, kantons, gemeenten, regentschappen en dergelijke). Wanneer deze 
grootstedelijke gebieden met regionale problemen worden geconfronteerd, zoals files, 
inefficiënt vervoer of overstromingen, zullen zij deze regionale problemen moeten 
aanpakken door gezamenlijk te werken. Samenwerken impliceert echter een behoefte 
aan effectieve coördinatie. 
 
Auteurs zoals Richard Feiock hebben algemeen erkend dat wanneer een 
grootstedelijke overheid afwezig is, de betrokken organisaties meer tijd, meer kosten 
en meer inspanningen nodig zullen hebben om informatie te verzamelen, te 
controleren, te onderhandelen of te handhaven, om betrokkenheid te realiseren. 
Lokale actoren zijn ook sneller geneigd om in of juist uit een coördinatieve verplichting 
te stappen, en zij kunnen elkaar niet wederzijds tot deelname dwingen. Als gevolg 
hiervan kan effectieve grootstedelijke planning een uitdaging zijn. Wanneer 
betrokkenheid moeilijk te realiseren is, bijvoorbeeld in het geval van het tegengaan 
van overstromingen, zal dit de risico's voor burgers vergroten en verbeteringen in 
leefkwaliteit belemmeren. Het opzetten van effectieve coördinatie voor grootstedelijke 
planning is essentieel. 
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Dit onderzoek richt zich empirisch op grootstedelijke planning in de Metropoolregio 
Jakarta (JMR). De belangrijkste vraag is hoe effectieve coördinatie voor 
grootstedelijke planning in de JMR kan worden verklaard en de effectiviteit ervan kan 
worden verbeterd. Zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 1, heeft de JMR of 
Jabodetabekpunjur (een afkorting van Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Puncak en 
Cianjur) duidelijke regionale problemen zoals overstromingen en files. Om deze 
problemen op te lossen, moet Jakarta samenwerken met lokale overheden in de 
omgeving. Vergelijkbaar met andere grootstedelijke regio's in het algemeen, heeft de 
JMR ook geen grootstedelijke overheid. De JMR is gefragmenteerd over de provincie 
Jakarta en negen districten rondom Jakarta, die deel uitmaken van twee andere 
provincies. Om de grootstedelijke planning in de JMR te begrijpen, belicht dit 
onderzoek twee case-studies: de ontwikkeling van grootstedelijk transport 
(gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 3) en de ontwikkeling van een project om overstromingen 
in Jakarta te ondervangen (gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 4). Vanwege variaties in de 
grootstedelijke planning en om een referentie te krijgen over effectieve coördinatie, 
ontwikkelt het onderzoek eerst een raamwerk dat ons kan helpen de belangrijkste 
patronen voor coördinatie te identificeren (gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 2). Het 
raamwerk voor grootstedelijke planning wordt vervolgens gebruikt voor het 
structureren van de case-studies en het formuleren van conclusies en 
beleidsaanbevelingen in hoofdstuk 5. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelt een raamwerk voor metropolitane planning. Het raamwerk is 
ontwikkeld om patronen van verschillende soorten grootstedelijke planning te 
begrijpen en om dynamische verschuivingen in coördinatie te onderzoeken. 
Institutionele arrangementen voor grootstedelijke planning benadrukken steeds vaker 
de noodzaak voor effectieve coördinatie. De literatuurstudie omvat 96 
tijdschriftartikelen en boeken over metropolitane planning en coördinatie, verdeeld 
over vijf continenten. De tijdschriftartikelen en -boeken zijn gepubliceerd in de 
periode 1956-2015. Het literatuuroverzicht suggereert dat grootstedelijke planning 
betrekking heeft op zowel de institutionele setting van metropolitane regio's als 
coördinatie-arrangementen voor grootstedelijke planning. De institutionele setting 
van een grootstedelijke regio verwijst naar een arena met activiteiten voor het 
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vormgeven van grootstedelijk bestuur en voor het uitoefenen van macht voor de gehele 
grootstedelijke regio. 
 
Er zijn in wezen drie benaderingen om de institutionele setting van een grootstedelijke 
regio te ontwikkelen, hetzij door regionalisme (fusie, consolidatie, annexatie), 
lokalisme (marktbenadering, elke lokale overheid werkt onafhankelijk) of nieuw 
regionalisme (samenwerking tussen lokale overheden). Coördinatieregelingen 
omvatten coördinatiecapaciteit (capaciteit die is ontwikkeld om samenhangende 
plannen, beleid en strategieën voor de gehele grootstedelijke regio te creëren) en 
coördinatiemechanismen (mechanismen die worden gebruikt voor de gezamenlijke 
uitvoering van grootstedelijke plannen, beleid en strategieën). Het raamwerk van 
metropolitane planning is geworteld in de ‘Theory of Transaction Cost Economics’ 
zoals onder andere ontwikkeld door Oliver Williamson. Het raamwerk bestaat uit de 
institutionele setting van de grootstedelijke regio, die in het algemeen wordt 
beschreven via drie benaderingen (regionalisme, lokalisme en nieuw regionalisme) en 
negen prototype-coördinatieregelingen (prototype A t / m I) van grootstedelijke 
planning. Een prototype vertegenwoordigt een bepaalde vorm van governance. Een 
bepaald prototype van grootstedelijke planning maakt gebruik van specifieke 
hoofdinstrumenten, of het nu gaat om administratieve controle voor hiërarchische 
vormen van governance (bijvoorbeeld regelgeving en formele procedures), stimulering 
en marktgeoriënteerde governance (inclusief geld, toekenning en erkenning), of 
gemengde instrumenten voor hybride vormen van bestuur. Voorbeeld A houdt 
bijvoorbeeld in dat grootstedelijke planning een soort masterplan gebruikt voor 
coördinatiecapaciteit en een formeel-continu coördinatiemechanisme. Prototype I 
heeft betrekking op een strategisch plan in combinatie met een informeel-discontinu 
mechanisme. Prototype A staat voor een sterk hiërarchische vorm van bestuur, terwijl 
prototype I marktgeoriënteerd bestuur voorstaat. Andere prototypen (B tot H) 
vertegenwoordigen verschillende hybride vormen van governance. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt grootstedelijk transport en gerelateerde institutionele settings 
van de JMR. Deze studie gaat over de uitbreiding van TransJakarta, het Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT) -systeem dat eigendom is van de provinciale overheid van Jakarta. Het 
idee achter de BRT was om files in Jakarta aan te pakken, het gebruik van individueel 
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transport te verminderen en een beter stadsvervoer mogelijk te maken. De provinciale 
overheid van Jakarta heeft TransJakarta ontwikkeld zodat inwoners van Jakarta 
gebruik kunnen maken van speciale bussen met speciale rijstroken. Deze speciale 
bussen en speciale rijstroken worden uitgebreid naar omliggende districten van 
Jakarta, ten behoeve van het forenzenverkeer. Verbeteringen door de provinciale 
overheid van Jakarta om de dienstverlening van TransJakarta aan de JMR uit te 
breiden, tonen een geprefereerde vorm van grootstedelijk bestuur aan. De analyse 
wijst op drie verbeteringen: (1) het zogenaamde Megapolitan-voorstel (2005-2007), 
met een regionalistische benadering, (2) het Ruimtelijke Plan voor de JMR (2008-
2012), dat staat voor een nadruk op lokalisme, en (3) het versterken van interlokale 
bestuurlijke samenwerking, ondersteund door de centrale overheid (2012-nu), wat 
nieuw regionalisme impliceert.  
 
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat, hoewel het Megapolitan-voorstel, dat afhankelijk is van 
de oprichting van een grootstedelijke overheid, een sterkere effectiviteit belooft bij de 
ontwikkeling van TransJakarta, het werd verworpen door de gouverneur van West-
Java, de gouverneur van Banten en uiteindelijk ook werd verworpen door de centrale 
overheid en het nationaal parlement. Het fundamentele idee van het Megapolitan-
voorstel, zoals voorgesteld door de gouverneur van Jakarta, veroorzaakte aanzienlijke 
politieke spanningen, omdat het de macht van andere gouverneurs zou verminderen. 
Om deze metropolitane politieke spanning te minimaliseren, ontstond een voorstel om 
te werken op basis van het ruimtelijk plan van de JMR. Implementatie en ontwikkeling 
zou worden uitgevoerd door elke provinciale en lokale overheid. Deze tweede 
verbetering werd door de betrokken organisaties aanvaard en biedt een basis voor 
samenwerking tussen lokale overheden. Uit de analyse blijkt echter ook dat deze 
coördinatiepraktijk ineffectief bleek voor de verdere uitbreiding van TransJakarta. 
Een derde verbetering bleek effectiever. Interlokale overheidsamenwerking werd 
breder geaccepteerd door alle betrokken organisaties. Deze samenwerking slaagde 
vervolgens in de implementatie van TransJakarta. Het hoofdstuk concludeert dat in 
dit geval de effectieve institutionele setting van de JMR ligt in een samenwerking 
tussen lokale overheden, ondersteund door de centrale overheid. 
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Gebruik makend van het raamwerk van metropolitane planning uit Hoofdstuk 2, 
bespreekt Hoofdstuk 4 de coördinatie van grootstedelijke planning voor de casus van 
de dammen van Ciawi en Sukamahi. Het project is gevestigd in het regentschap van 
Bogor, dat werkt aan beleidslijnen van de provincie Jakarta om acute overstromingen 
te voorkomen. De besluitvorming om dit project te bouwen bestrijkt een periode van 
13 jaar. De belangrijkste overeenkomst is dat de betrokken organisaties hun middelen 
delen om de bouw van de dammen mogelijk te maken. Het gaat om een 
intergemeentelijk samenwerkingsproject ondersteund door centrale overheden. De 
provinciale overheid van Jakarta zou hun fondsen delen voor de aankoop van grond 
voor de dammen. Het Ministerie van Openbare Werken zou geld beschikbaar maken 
voor de bouw van de dammen. De provinciale overheid van West-Java en het 
regentschap van Bogor helpen bij het proces van grondverwerving. Dit hoofdstuk laat 
zien dat de coördinatiecapaciteit voor grootstedelijke ruimtelijke ordening voor 
Jabodetabekpunjur formele voorschriften gebruikt om een masterplan op te stellen. 
De coördinatiemechanismen voor de implementatie van het grootstedelijke 
ruimtelijke plan van Jabodetabekpunjur zijn vooral informeel en discontinue van 
aard. Deze mechanismen hebben de neiging prikkels in te zetten om collectieve 
beslissingen te stimuleren. Bovendien leidden coördinatie-inspanningen tot 
regelgeving die alleen op elke betrokken organisatie apart van toepassing zou zijn. 
Collectieve inspanningen werden aangemoedigd door een reeks prikkels, zowel 
monetair als niet-monetair. Deze coördinatieregeling kan daarom worden 
geclassificeerd als prototype C van grootstedelijke planning. Prototype C betekent dat 
een masterplan voor coördinatie wordt gebruikt in combinatie met een informeel-
discontinu interactiemechanisme. Wegens gebrek aan regulering liepen de 
coördinatieactiviteiten om de dammen te bouwen een aantal moeilijkheden en 
vertraging op. Het proces duurde bijna twee jaar. In dit geval hebben onzekerheden 
bijgedragen aan transactiekosten. Om de effectiviteit te vergroten, heeft de centrale 
overheid in 2016 de toegewezen middelen overgenomen van Jakarta. Na die 
interventie heeft de centrale overheid alle kosten voor de bouw van de dammen 
gefinancierd. Het hoofdstuk wijst erop dat met name de onzekerheid over de 
eigendomsstatus van activa en de overdracht van budgetten aanzienlijk is verminderd. 
Deze actie reduceerde de onzekerheid en verbeterde de effectiviteit van coördinatie. 
De tweede coördinatieregeling betreft prototype B. 
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Prototype B gaat ervan uit dat de nationale overheid een centrale rol speelt voor 
metropolitane planning in de JMR. Een dergelijke cruciale rol impliceert dat de 
centrale overheid een hoge financiële capaciteit zou moeten hebben. Opgemerkt moet 
worden dat deze situatie het potentieel heeft om in de toekomst onzekerheid te 
creëren, aangezien de centrale overheid financiële beperkingen heeft. Een ander 
probleem van prototype B komt ook naar voren. Een beroep op een soort masterplan 
voor het grootstedelijk gebied van Jabodetabekpunjur heeft ook zwakke punten 
vanwege versnippering. Hoofdstuk 5 stelt de vraag welk prototype van de 
grootstedelijke planning mogelijk beter is dan prototype B. Het hoofdstuk stelt 
prototype E voor als een coördinatieregeling van grootstedelijke planning in de 
toekomst voor JMR. Prototype E betekent dat coördinatieregelingen afhankelijk zijn 
van een soort strategisch plan, samen met informeel-continue mechanismen. 
Prototype E vraagt de centrale overheid om een mix van formele regulering en prikkels 
te ontwikkelen om daarmee fragmentatie te verminderen en het aanpassingsvermogen 
bij het formuleren van het grootstedelijk ruimtelijk plan te vergroten. Prototype E 
vraagt de centrale overheid ook om nieuwe regels uit te vaardigen om de 
eigendomsstatus van activa te behouden voor gezamenlijke projecten of andere 
collectieve acties. Dit zal de samenwerking tussen lokale overheden versterken en 
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Understanding Effective Coordination for Metropolitan Planning in the 
Jakarta Metropolitan Region 
    
  
1.1       Introduction 
  
There has been increasing acknowledgement internationally that urban regions such 
as the Jakarta Metropolitan Region (JMR) require an institutional arrangement that 
prioritizes metropolitan coordination and planning so that it can effectively solve 
crucial regional problems such as traffic jams and floods. Metropolitan planning needs 
the support of surrounding districts, as well as the central government (Giebels, 1996; 
Forbes, 2005; Steinberg, 2007; Silver, 2008, 2014; Salim and Firman, 2011; Rakodi 
and Firman, 2012; Sagala, et al, 2013; Ward, et al, 2013; Rustiadi, et al, 2015; Firman, 
2014). Without effective coordination, the JMR will continue to suffer in terms of 
coherent transport flows and appropriate water coordination, which will have a 
considerable impact on its citizens’ overall quality of life and the regional economy. 
Effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR is required, since local 
governments (the provinces, municipalities and regencies), constituent members of 
the JMR, are fragmented. They have their own local plans, policies or strategies, which 
emphasise the development of each territory, independently of one another. However, 
they demand that a reduction in negative externalities results from local plans, policies 
or strategies produced by other local governments.  
  
Effective coordination is also needed in order to accommodate regional problems 
throughout the multitude of local plans, policies or strategies that local governments 
produce. Moreover, effective coordination is required to encourage and attract local 
governments to participate in solving collective problems facing JMR, in a way that 
minimises free-riding. Transport and water are typical examples of regional and 
collective issues as traffic and water-flows cross local administrative areas. Policy-
making dilemmas such as dealing with negative environmental externalities and free 
riding, therefore, should be addressed through arrangements for inter-local 
coordination and integrated authority (Voogd and Woltjer, 2007). However, urban 
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regions like the JMR typically lack capacity to monitor and enforce policies, plans or 
strategies and also lack financial capacity to develop metropolitan regional 
infrastructures and services that address floods and traffic. When the central 
government faces constraints, central government and the constituents of the JMR 
need to develop effective coordination so that metropolitan planning can take place. 
  
The need for the development of effective coordination for metropolitan planning in 
the JMR is further bolstered by the long time required to reach decisions using existing 
approaches (Simanjuntak, et al, 2012), delays in building infrastructures (Akmalah 
and Grigg, 2011; Simanjuntak, et al, 2012) and uncontrolled land-use change, 
particularly in conservation areas (Firman, 2014; Rustiadi, et al, 2015). The JMR does 
not have a metropolitan regional government (Firman, 2008, 2014); as mentioned 
previously, it is fragmented over the province of Jakarta and nine districts, which are 
formally coordinated by two other provinces (Firman, 2008, 2014; see also Appendix 
1.1). Coordination among them is facilitated by the BKSP Jabodetabekjur (a regional 
agency of JMR), which emphasises inter-local-government cooperation (Firman and 
Dharmapatni, 1994; Firman, 2008). The name Jabodetabekjur is an abbreviation of 
the name of the JMR’s constituents: Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi and 
Cianjur. Inter-local government cooperation in the JMR is framed formally through 
the Law of Local Polity and its derivative regulations. Even though the BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur is accepted politically by the JMR’s constituents, it is perceived as 
being ineffective when it comes to implementing a metropolitan regional plan, 
whether under the old policy of decentralization and local autonomy, which 
emphasised the role of central government (Firman and Dharmapatni, 1994), or under 
the new policy of decentralization and local autonomy, which emphasises the role of 
local and provincial governments (Firman, 2008, 2014).  
  
The coordination problems faced by JMR imply the need for additional efforts to 
accelerate and to create a coherent set of plans, policies and strategies, such as the 
need for more meetings, more information, more monitoring and more enforcement. 
Extra time, extra effort and potentially also extra costs are needed to address the 
coordination for metropolitan planning in JMR. The extra time and effort it takes to 
act point towards the existence of transaction costs (Buitelaar, 2004), an economic 
friction that has different costs under different governance structures (Williamson, 
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1985, 1996). There are essentially three generic governance structures, or forms of 
governance: hierarchies (e.g. regulations, commands), markets (e.g. incentives, 
networks) and hybrid forms of governance (e.g. mixed regulations/commands and 
incentives/networks). Transaction cost can be reduced by shifting governance 
structures (Williamson, 1996, 1999). Based on this understanding, extra time and 
extra effort spent by the organisations involved in coordination for metropolitan 
planning can be reduced with a shift in governance structure. In the case of the JMR, 
it took 13 years to decide collectively to build the project of the Ciawi dam and the 
Sukamahi dam in order to mitigate the impact of floods (Kristanti, 2013) and 24 years 
to build a Mass Rapid Transit in order to reduce traffic jams (Asril, 2015). These time 
frames may have been reduced through a shift to a form of governance that emphasises 
multi-organisation coordination for metropolitan planning.  
  
This PhD research aims to uncover the institutional arrangement most appropriate for 
establishing effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR. An 
appropriate form of governance for metropolitan planning in the JMR perhaps can 
establish more coherent policies, plans or strategies for the entire JMR region, and for 
the organisations involved, by reducing negative externalities, enhancing decision-
making processes and ensuring implementation in less time and with less effort.  To 
identify an appropriate form of governance for metropolitan planning in the JMR, this 
research uses an approach to understanding forms of governance that is rooted in the 
Theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985, 1991, 1996, 1999). To 
operationalize this theory, in order to identify which form of governance is more 
appropriate for implementation in the JMR, the metropolitan regional transportation 
and the case of the project of the Ciawi dam and Sukamahi dam are used as cases. By 
focusing on these two cases, it is hoped that the most appropriate form of governance 
structure for metropolitan planning in the JMR can be uncovered, and the role of 
transaction-cost thinking illustrated.   
   
1.2      Research questions 
  
This research is guided by one main research question:  
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“How can effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the 
JMR be explained and its effectiveness improved?” 
  
This main research question is operationalized through four sub-research questions, 
which are elaborated in the sections below.  
  
1.2.1   The form of governance and its dynamic shifts for metropolitan 
planning 
We have seen that negative externalities and long time frames exist for organisations 
involved in the JMR. This indicates that high transaction costs exist. To address this, 
there needs to be a shift in the form of governance used in coordination arrangements 
in the JMR so that it becomes more appropriate. Theoretically, transaction costs exist 
in every form of governance (e.g. Williamson, 1996). The organisations involved 
search for and establish an appropriate form of governance in order to minimise 
transaction costs, which implies that they change the form of governance dynamically. 
However, some authors reveal various coordination arrangements for metropolitan 
planning and changes, such as Alexander (2002), Salet, et al. (2010) and Xu and Yeh 
(2011). On top of this, a number of authors have contributed to the planning literature 
by discussing transaction costs and forms of governance (for example, Alexander, 
1992, 2001; Lai, 2005; Webster, 1998, 2005, 2008; Buitelaar, 2004; Moulaert and 
Mehmood, 2009). Despite this, we lack clear and comprehensive understanding of 
how forms of governance are applied to metropolitan planning and how dynamic shifts 
can ensure and enhance effective coordination in metropolitan planning. We also lack 
understanding of the sufficient level of support required to establish a particular form 
of governance for metropolitan planning.  
  
To fulfil its aims of uncovering an appropriate form of governance for metropolitan 
planning in the JMR, this research needs a framework that can account for whether 
one form of governance is more appropriate than another. McCarthy (2011) shows that 
organisations involved find it relatively easy to develop a metropolitan regional plan, 
but they much harder to implement it. So, perhaps it is the case that metropolitan 
planning has the number elements, which serve to influence how the organisations 
involved develop a commitment to metropolitan planning and how they address 
collective problems. These elements may in turn affect the type of plan that is adopted 
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by the organisations involved and how the plan is collectively implemented. It is 
assumed that each element involves a different form of governance and shift from one 
form of governance to another. Based on those three considerations (i.e. which form 
of governance is more appropriate, elements involved in metropolitan planning and 
dynamic shifts in forms of governance guiding coordination for metropolitan 
planning), this research proposes the first sub-research question:   
  
“What forms of governance are used and what shifts in their 
application are evident in metropolitan planning?” 
 
1.2.2   The preference for a metropolitan governance approach to analyse 
the JMR  
 
Williamson (1999) shows that for a specific form of governance to be used by 
organisations involved, its acceptance is required. In the context of metropolitan 
planning, this acceptance is realized through their particular preference for 
metropolitan governance. Metropolitan governance may be discussed through three 
academic debates: Localism, Regionalism and New Regionalism (Yaro and Ronderos, 
2011; Xu and Yeh, 2011). The preference of organisations involved in metropolitan 
governance plays a crucial role in the implementation of specific forms of governance 
used in coordinated metropolitan planning (see, for example, Albrechts, et al, 2003 in 
the case of Hannover; Alexander, 2002, 2006 in the case of the Amsterdam 
Metropolitan Region; Cotugno and Seltzer, 2009 in the case of metropolitan Portland; 
O’Leary, 1987 in the case of the Greater London). With these three academic debates 
in mind, to understand the appropriate form of governance in the context of 
metropolitan planning in the JMR, this research needs to first uncover how 
organisations involved accept particular coordination arrangements. This acceptance 
is identified through organisations’ preferred approach to the governing of JMR. To 
identify this preference, this research proposes a second sub-research question: 
  
“What is organisations’ preferred approach to the governing of JMR 
in the context of coordinated metropolitan planning?” 
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1.2.3   Coordinating capacity of metropolitan plans in the JMR  
 
One of the main tasks of metropolitan planning is to coordinate the regional policies, 
plans or strategies that shape the metropolitan region (Alexander, 2002). This 
coordination involves a number of organisations, each of which have their own 
policies, plans or strategies, each of which may be different from one another. Here, 
the crucial issue is how those plans, policies or strategies create and accommodate 
regional perspectives and are coherent with one another and how metropolitan plans, 
policies or strategies can be accommodated into local plans, policies or strategies.  
 
To create coherent plans, policies or strategies for the entire metropolitan region, the 
metropolitan plan should have the capacity to coordinate other plans, policies or 
strategies. Here, the coordination capacity of a plan has resonance with what Healey 
(2006) refers to the as the imaginative power of strategic spatial planning, or the sense 
that a plan should have the capacity to travel and to be translated into others. With 
reference to this research, the coordination capacity of a plan is identified by 
recognizing which form of governance is used to connect the way that particular issues, 
such as traffic jams and floods, are managed in the metropolitan spatial plan of the 
JMR and in local spatial plans. With this in mind, we therefore pose a third -sub 
research question: 
  
“How can the coordination capacity of a metropolitan plan in the 






 1.2.4  The coordination mechanism used to develop regional 
infrastructure projects in the JMR  
Another important task for metropolitan planning is to coordinate the implementation 
of metropolitan plans, policies or strategies to shape the metropolitan region 
(Alexander, 2002). This is often recognized by planners as a black box, wherein a plan 
can be cancelled or postponed (Albrechts, 2006).  When a metropolitan plan is 
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developed, it cannot always be implemented (Abbott, 2005, 2009). Implementation is 
a crucial issue in metropolitan planning, given that many metropolitan regions have 
difficulties implementing metropolitan plans, policies or strategies (see for example 
Balducci, 2003; McCarthy, 2011). Successful implementation involves a number of 
organisations, each of whom must identify what coordination mechanisms can be used 
and the most appropriate form of governance to use.  
 
With that in mind, this PhD research seeks to answer a fourth-sub research question:  
  
“How can coordination mechanisms used for developing JMR 
regional infrastructure projects, be explained with reference to 
forms of governance?” 
  
 
1.3      Research contributions 
  
This research is expected to contribute both scientifically and socially.  
  
1.3.1   Scientific contribution 
This research contributes scientifically in three ways. The first scientific contribution 
is recognition that institutional arrangements for metropolitan planning adopted by 
metropolitan regions are not only “one size fits all”, but also shift dynamically. This 
means that metropolitan region may have a different institutional arrangement from 
another and that they may shift over time. This research creates a framework that can 
systematically identify these dynamic shifts in institutional arrangements for 
metropolitan planning.  
  
The second scientific contribution is to provide a framework to understand the form 
of governance used in metropolitan planning and its dynamic shifts. The framework is 
developed through a literature review, which identifies the elements of metropolitan 
planning and forms of governance used therein. The framework is developed by 
interpreting forms of governance and their main instruments. It is rooted in the theory 
of Transaction Cost Economics (developed by Williamson, 1985, 1996). It is hoped that 
this framework can be used (a) to analyse the particular form of governance used in 
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coordination arrangements directed at metropolitan planning (i.e. plan making 
coordination and plan implementation coordination) and the main instruments used, 
(b) to analyse dynamic shifts in coordination arrangements directed at metropolitan 
planning, and (c) to analyse the most appropriate instruments to enhance effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning. 
  
The third scientific contribution is to develop the coordination mechanism concept, 
which explains how multiple organisations collectively use certain mechanisms to 
coordinate the implementation of a metropolitan plans, policies or strategies. As 
mentioned previously, much of the planning literature discusses the difficulties 
involved in implementing a metropolitan plan (for example McCarthy, 2011; 
Albrechts, 2006). With this in mind, this concept is designed to aid understanding of 
the stages required for project implementation within the context of metropolitan 
planning and to aid analysis of the form of governance used in each stage.  
  
1.3.2   Social contribution 
For a practical point of view, this research is designed to contribute socially. It does so 
in four ways. The first is the identification of coordination problems involved with 
metropolitan planning in the JMR resulting from fragmentation, demand for 
adaptation and lack of regulations. These problems generate difficulties when creating 
coherent plans, policies and strategies and when implementing them. Here, 
coordination problems are identified as organisational uncertainties. This research 
highlights organisational uncertainties that can perhaps contribute to the formulation 
of instruments that are more effective in reducing transaction costs. 
  
The second is the formulation of a number of policy recommendations that can be 
instituted alongside current national-level policies. Current national policies covering 
Indonesian metropolitan regions are laid out mainly in the Indonesian National 
Medium-Term Development Plan 2015-2019 (Presidential Decree No. 2 of 2015), the 
Metropolitan Spatial Plan of the Jabodetabekpunjur (Presidential Decree No. 54 of 
2008), the National Spatial Plan (the Government Regulation No. 13 of 2017) and the 
Law of Local Polity (the Law No. 23 of 2014).  
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This research can be used by policy makers and decision makers, as well as planners 
and bureaucrats, to enhance effective coordination in the JMR and other Indonesian 
metropolitan regions. Due to the demand to create coherent plans, policies and 
strategies for the JMR and to accelerate implementation of these plans, policies or 
strategies, the policy recommendations laid out in this research will encourage central 
government and constituents of the JMR to use the metropolitan spatial plan as a 
formal platform to guide collective decisions for the JMR. This approach uses 
the imaginative power of metropolitan planning (as introduced by Healey, 2006) to 
govern the JMR without integrating the constituents of the JMR horizontally and 
politically. Strong vision and ideas offered in a metropolitan planning can be adopted 
and accommodated in other plans, policies or strategies. These policy 
recommendations also encourage them to use both regulations and incentives, as well 
to attract collaboration involving a broader range of participants, such as private 
companies, non-governmental organisations and citizens, using arrangements such as 
networking or co-production. These policy recommendations also encourage the 
central government to issue new regulations that support resource sharing between 
central, provincial and local governments. Policy recommendations that seek to 
improve existing metropolitan planning are expected to enhance effective 
coordination in the JMR, without changing the regional political configuration, by 
relying on the new policy of decentralization and local autonomy and inter-local 
government cooperation, supported by the central government and private entities. 
  
The third contribution is to provide a framework for the design of appropriate 
institutions directed at metropolitan planning. Metropolitan planning covers the 
institutional setting of the metropolitan region (i.e. metropolitan governance) and 
coordination arrangements used in metropolitan planning. Thus, the framework can 
be used to create or to improve metropolitan planning. It has the potential to be 
applied not only in the JMR or other Indonesian metropolitan regions, but also in 
other metropolitan regions in ASEAN member-states, middle-income countries, 
European countries or in other parts in the world. 
  
The fourth social contribution is to provide another perspective that encourages 
the government to involve private entities and non-government organisations, 
including citizens, in the planning process for the entire JMR and to engage in co-
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production. With this in mind, this research strongly recommends that the 
metropolitan spatial plan should be more strongly developed. This will give it the 
necessary coordination capacity to address fragmentation and adaptation, because it 
will act as a master-strategic plan. This type of master-strategic plan is expected to 
address fragmentation using administrative control instruments (such as through 
regulation and sanction) and to manage adaptation using incentive instruments (such 
as through fiscal compensation, fiscal reward or non-monetary incentive). Incentive 
instruments are designed to be more flexible and adaptable to changes. They are also 
expected to attract more private sector actors, who have contributed to 
building industrial and housing areas, new cities, industrial districts and have 
instituted a new trend of Transit-Oriented Development (TOD). 
  
When effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR increases, 
metropolitan regional transportation can be significantly developed. Bus Rapid 
Transit and other public mass transportation can be developed so that one point can 
be connected to another in a way that does not exclude any one territory of provincial 
or local government. Citizens benefit from this in a number of ways.  For example, 
citizens can enhance their mobility, since traffic jams are reduced and metropolitan 
regional public mass transportation are provided. When effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning in the JMR escalates, acute floods in Jakarta and its 
surrounding districts can be reduced drastically. Flood control measurements can be 
constructed on a bigger scale and with faster completion times. The ministry of public 
works and constituents of the JMR can also share their resources more smoothly. 
Citizens will therefore experience fewer floods, meaning their daily activities are 
interrupted less frequently and the risk to their lives and livelihood is diminished. 





1.4      Research methodology 
  
To answer the research questions, this PhD research applies a qualitative 
methodology. Two methods are used: a literature review and a case study. Prior to 
describing those two methods, this section describes the nature of research design. 
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1.4.1   Research design 
This PhD research is divided into two important parts:  
1. To develop a framework of metropolitan planning. The framework is developed 
first to identify institutional arrangements of metropolitan planning and to 
identify their dynamic shifts. Second, the framework constructed is used to 
identify existing coordination arrangements and to suggest appropriate 
coordination arrangements that can make metropolitan planning in the JMR 
more effective. The framework will be designed to provide options that planners, 
policymakers or politicians can use to guide improvements. This is presented in 
Chapter 2. 
 
2. To deploy this framework, this research relies upon two case studies: 
i. To identify a preferred institutional setting that highlights metropolitan 
governance in the JMR. This case study involves the analysis of regional 
public transportation development and coordination difficulties. This is 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
ii. To identify a form of governance and coordination difficulties associated 
with coordination arrangements directed at metropolitan planning in the 
JMR. This case study involves the analysis of coordination between 
organisations involved in linking the metropolitan spatial plan to local 
spatial plans in order to mitigate acute floods in Jakarta, and coordination 
between the organisations involved in the construction of two dams 
upstream of Jakarta. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
  
The fourth chapter merges the third and the fourth research questions. The framework 
developed on the basis of the literature review, presented in Chapter 2, is expect to 
support the generalization of the cases studies discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
 
For reference, the overall research design underpinning this PhD research is presented 



























1.4.2   The literature review 
The literature review is mainly conducted in order to develop a comprehensive and 
systematic framework of metropolitan planning. This framework is based on the idea 
of different forms of governance. This is presented in Chapter 2. Inspired by a new 
institutional economic perspective (Williamson, 1985, 1996, 1998), the framework 
consists of two arenas. The first involves the institutional setting of the metropolitan 
region (i.e. metropolitan governance). The second consists of coordination 
arrangements of the organisations involved in the development of a coherent strategy 
that links metropolitan and local plans and which coordinates the implementation of 
regional infrastructures. The literature review is aligned with these two arenas. The 
urban politics and governance literature is reviewed to expand upon the first arena. 
The planning and urban development literature is reviewed to expand upon the 
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findings concerning the first arena are developed in a more general way, where 
findings concerning the second are developed in line with three generic forms of 
governance.  
 
Relevant literature was found through a search of online catalogues, mainly Smartcat 
(a search engine of university digital and physical resources, as well as those of other 
libraries worldwide; https://www.rug.nl/library/smartcat/), using a number of 
keywords, such as: metropolitan, metropolitan planning, effective coordination, 
governance, transaction cost, implementation, master plan, strategic plan and spatial 
plan.  
  
1.4.3 The case study 
As mentioned above, this research identifies social phenomena underpinning 
metropolitan planning to obtain effective coordination for metropolitan planning in 
the JMR through a new institutional economic perspective. The new institutional 
economic perspective argues that institutions affect human behaviour when engaging 
in economic activities (Hodgson in Hausman, 2008) and institutions are created to 
reduce transaction costs and risk (Menard and Shirley, 2008).   
 
To understand metropolitan planning in the JMR, this research relies upon case 
studies. The case study is a suitable method for this research, since case studies 
provide an opportunity for the researcher to connect literature and contemporary 
events (Gerring, 2004; Yin, 2014). Work that connects the JMR to the metropolitan 
planning literature is limited, meaning that the case study method can assist our 
understanding.  
 
With that in mind, this research adopts an embedded case study design (Yin, 2014, p. 
50-51) in order to identify institutional arrangements underpinning metropolitan 
planning in the JMR in two cases. The embedded case studies design used are first, 
regional public transportation development, to identify existing and appropriate 
institutional setting (i.e. metropolitan governance) in the JMR (see Chapter 3), and 
second, the case of flood mitigation, to identify existing and appropriate coordination 
arrangements underpinning metropolitan planning in the JMR (see Chapter 4). 
According to Yin (2014), these two cases share a similar context – the institutional 
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arrangements underpinning metropolitan planning in JMR. Regional problems, 
represented by the two case studies, are used to demonstrate that coordination 
difficulties exist and to identify possible improvements for coordination.  
 
These regional problems were selected for a number of reasons: 
1. Regional transportation and flood mitigation are crucial and acute issues for 
the JMR.  
2. Regional transportation development and flood mitigation involves 
the participation of a number of organisations in the JMR covering 
coordination between the core city (Jakarta) and peri-urban (surrounded 
districts of Jakarta) and coordination between downstream and upstream 
areas. 
3. Because they involve a number of organisations, these two cases can be used to 
analyse metropolitan planning in the JMR. Collective actions are important 
issues in addressing regional problems in metropolitan regions (Feiock, 2007, 
2013). 
  
Data for those two cases were collected mainly from the internet and included online 
newspapers, policy documents, regulations, previous studies and in-depth interviews. 
This research uses a triangulation method to construct a comprehensive picture of 
each case and also to confirm the accuracy of collected data (Moran-Ellis, et al, 2006; 
Yin, 2014). Only those that were perceived to have the credibility and who were judged 
to be able to provide accurate information were selected.  Data collected from online 
newspapers was classified into simple groups. For example, in the case of regional 
transportation, data were classified into two big groups: the first related to the issue of 
coordination arrangements underpinning metropolitan planning; the second related 
to coordination arrangements underpinning metropolitan planning, such as public 
services and criminal and labour issues. Then, the first group was divided into three 
further sub-groups, related to Localism, such as the metropolitan spatial plans that 
rely on implementation by local government; Regionalism, such as the “Megapolitan” 
concept; and New Regionalism, related to inter-local government cooperation.   
  
Page 41 of 246 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in each case. For the first case, regional 
public transportation development, interviews are conducted to understand the 
development of an area extension of the Trans-Jakarta Bus Rapid Transit (TJ BRT) 
network from Jakarta’s territory to its surrounding districts. Interviews were 
conducted with several people involved in or who were familiar with the development 
of the plan and from whom information could be sought. Interviewees were officers 
from the regional agency of the JMR (i.e. the BKSP Jabodetabekjur), the Department 
of Transportation and the local development planning agency, several local 
governments, the National Development Planning Agency and the Ministry of 
Transportation. For the second case, flood mitigation, interviews were conducted to 
understand the project of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam. Interviews were 
conducted to obtain data and information related to planning process uncertainties 
accompanying the projects. Interviewees were officers from the local governments 
(province and district), the BKSP Jabodetabekjur, the Ministry of Public Works, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Development Planning Agency. The 
researcher was also invited to attend a focus group discussion facilitated by the BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur, which focused on the preparation of the project of the Ciawi dam and 
the Sukamahi dam.  
  
Qualitative data analysis was used. This research analysed triangulated data using 
several steps: simple coding, ordering events in chronological sequence, classifying 
ordered events based on the literature and analysing events according to the 
framework constructed.   
  
 
1.5 Structure of the dissertation  
  
This dissertation is ordered into the following chapters: 
  
1. Chapter 2, “Developing A Framework to Analyse Effective Coordination for 
Metropolitan Planning and Its Dynamic Shifts” 
This chapter develops a framework to analyse and to improve metropolitan 
planning through identifying forms of governance. The framework is rooted in 
the theory of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1996) and implicates 
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two arenas. The first focuses on the institutional setting of the metropolitan 
region (metropolitan governance) and the second focuses on the form of 
governance (governance structure) underlying various coordination efforts in 
metropolitan planning. The framework can be applied to analysis of 
metropolitan planning, whether for scientific and practical purposes. The 
framework promises to identify various coordination efforts in metropolitan 
planning, not only for the JMR, but also other metropolitan regions in the 
world. 
  
2. Chapter 3, “Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Design: Transportation 
in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region”  
This chapter discusses the institutional setting of the JMR by identifying the 
preferences of the organisations involved in its governance. This chapter uses 
the case of Bus Rapid Transit development as an extension of the metropolitan 
transport system in the JMR. Preferences are identified in line with three 
approaches to metropolitan governance: localism, regionalism and new 
regionalism. 
  
3. Chapter 4, “Coordination Arrangements of Metropolitan Planning to Mitigate 
Floods in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region: the Case of the project of the Ciawi 
Dam and the Sukamahi Dam” 
This chapter discusses coordination arrangements underlying metropolitan 
planning in the JMR, identifying particular forms of governance used to 
develop metropolitan spatial plans and their relation to local spatial plans and 
the development of the dams. This chapter also discusses coordination 
difficulties, which caused delays and cost overruns. Employing the 
comprehensive framework developed in Chapter 2, this chapter identifies and 
describes instruments applied and identifies the existing forms of governance 
and coordination problems that occurred.  
  
4. Chapter 5, “Conclusion and Recommendations” 
This chapter summarises the findings from previous chapters and provides a 
number of recommendations, particularly those that seek to improve 
metropolitan planning in the JMR. Recommendations are proposed by 
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applying the comprehensive framework developed in Chapter 2 and are based 
on the findings from Chapters 3 and 4. This research proposes a shift in the 
form of governance deployed in existing coordination arrangements in order to 
minimise the time and effort expended, as identified in Chapter 4. Reducing 
time and effort will enhance effective coordination for metropolitan planning. 
This chapter also outlines future research agendas that can use the framework 
developed in Chapter 2.  
  




















































































Developing a Framework to Analyse the Effective 




2.1      Introduction 
  
Coordination in the metropolitan region is recognized as difficult and complex (see for 
example, Oakerson and Parks, 1988; Neuman, 1996; Roberts, Thomas and Williams, 
1999; Wheeler, 2000; Hamilton, Miller, Paytas, 2004; Salet, et al, 2003; Abbott, 2009; 
Feiock, 2004, 2007, Healey, 2004; Hults and van Monfort, 2007; Voogd and Woltjer, 
2007; Miller and Lee, 2009; Salet and Woltjer, 2009; Xu and Yeh, 2011). Complex 
coordination is configured through various means and involves different 
organisations, who must coordinate horizontally and vertically, and who each have 
different capacities, strategies, territories and authorities. This coordination is difficult 
because the organisations involved have their own politics, institutional development 
and territories, which in general do not match one another (Wheeler, 2000; Healey, 
2009; Salet and Woltjer, 2009). Those configurations imply the need to exert more 
effort, spend more and do so more frequently to, for example, gather information, 
bargain, monitor, or to create and implement forms of cooperation, engagement or 
other forms of coordination amongst organisations involved in the metropolitan 
region (Feiock, 2013). The organisations involved, including their superior authorities, 
need to create and to establish effective coordination arrangements in order to manage 
resource exchanges more smoothly, including the exchange of information, ideas and 
money. Therefore, the challenge is to identify the most effective coordination 
arrangements for metropolitan regions. 
  
Coordination arrangements for metropolitan regions includes coordination to create 
a plan, a policy or a strategy for the entire metropolitan region that is coherent with 
local plans, policies or strategies and to safeguard, ensure and accelerate the 
implementation of those plans, policies or strategies through to project realization. 
The creation of a coherent plan, policy or strategy is important, since a metropolitan 
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region consists of two or more municipalities, towns or districts, each of which may 
have a different local plan, policy or strategy. A local plan, policy or strategy may 
generate negative externalities or NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) in another territory. 
Negative externalities can stimulate conflict or enhance competition amongst 
neighbouring authorities (Feiock, 2013). However, to create a coherent plan, policy or 
strategy for an entire metropolitan region is also not easy.    
  
The organisations involved, or a superior authority, always shift their institutional 
arrangement to enable more appropriate metropolitan planning, such as in Greater 
London (see for examples O’Leary, 1987; Newman and Thornley, 1997; Rao, 2002) or 
the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area (see for example Alexander, 2002; Janssen-
Jansen, 2011). Overall, there are various coordination arrangements for metropolitan 
planning in one metropolitan region, which shift dynamically over time and which are 
different for every other metropolitan region, such that there is “no one size fits all”. 
When metropolitan planning is not static, it becomes difficult to define effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning, given that effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning perhaps does not have a single definition. We need a 
comprehensive and systematic perspective to frame “no one size fits all” and dynamic 
shifts in metropolitan planning to identify appropriate and effective coordination for 
a particular metropolitan region at a particular time. 
  
However, as explained in Chapter 1, we lack a comprehensive and systematic 
perspective on those coordination arrangements that aren’t “one size fits all” and 
which have different levels of political support, different rules or how they shift over 
time. We need a systematic and comprehensive perspective to assist planners, 
policymakers and politicians to empirically analyse metropolitan planning and how 
organisations coordinate effectively, what instruments are used to encourage effective 
coordination and what level of support is required to establish a particular level of 
coordination. By developing a systematic and comprehensive perspective, we can learn 
lessons learned about shifts in coordination arrangements for metropolitan planning, 
particularly when it comes to what instruments are created and applied and the 
strengths and weakness of those instruments. A systematic and comprehensive 
perspective is also required to provide alternatives for interested parties in order to 
see whether promising improvements can be implemented to enhance the 
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effectiveness of coordination. Coordination effectiveness is an important component 
of appropriate metropolitan planning. A comprehensive and systematic perspective is 
needed so that we can analyse and improve coordination in metropolitan planning.  
  
This research draws inspiration from the New Institutional Economics perspective, 
particularly its discussions on forms of governance, which is rooted in the theory of 
Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985, 1991, 1996, 1998). This can be used 
to develop a frame to analyze “no one size fits all” approaches and dynamic shifts in 
coordination arrangement for metropolitan planning. The focus on forms of 
governance implies discussion on arrangements organisations must use to manage 
resource exchange more efficiently. The arrangement shifts dynamically, as 
organisations involved adapt in order to reduce emerging and increasing transaction 
costs. Here, efficient arrangements are a matter of the form of governance (governance 
structure) deployed. The form of governance and its dynamic shifts are relevant to 
various forms of coordination and their dynamic shifts in metropolitan planning. 
Thus, an approach that focuses on the form of governance is employed to develop a 
systematic and comprehensive framework to analyze metropolitan planning. 
Likewise, this approach is also mainly used in a meso-level analysis of institutional 
design in order to analyse the form of governance more appropriate to multi-
organisation coordination (Alexander, 2006).  
  
This chapter proposes a research question that is what forms of governance are used 
and what shifts in their application are evident in metropolitan planning? The aim of 
this chapter is to develop a systematic and comprehensive framework for specifying 
forms of metropolitan planning and to establish effective coordination. The framework 
developed will also encompass institutional developments in metropolitan regions. 
Here, institutional development is represented by specific instruments created and 
applied by the organisations or authorities involved to establish a particular form of 
governance and thus a particular coordination arrangement for metropolitan 
planning. It is expected that the framework will allow us to: (a) analyze “no one size 
fits all” approaches and dynamic shifts in coordination arrangements in metropolitan 
planning, (b) analyze instruments used in metropolitan planning practice, (c) guide 
prescriptions to improve effective coordination for metropolitan planning, and (d) 
generalize from the case studies. 
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2.2      Method 
  
This research will involve a qualitative literature review. A literature review can be 
defined as: 
  
“A written document that presents a logically argued case founded on a 
comprehensive understanding of the current state of knowledge about a topic 
of study. This case establishes a convincing thesis to answer the study’s 
question.” 
(Machi and McEvoy, 2009, p. 4) 
  
Onwuegbuzie et al. (2012) argue that there are two crucial elements to a literature 
review - analysing and interpreting selected literature in a formal manner. Here, to 
analyse is “to break down a whole into its components or constituent parts and then 
through reassembly of the parts, one comes to understand the integrity of the whole” 
(Schwandt, 2007, p. 6). Interpretation is “the act of clarifying, explicating, or 
explaining the meaning of some phenomenon” (Schwandt, 2007, p. 158). With this in 
mind, this chapter details five steps: (1) searching and analyzing relevant literature to 
identify effective coordination for metropolitan planning (see Section 2.2), (2) 
summarizing the literature (see Section 2.3), (3) reframing metropolitan planning in 
the context of a focus on governance (see Section 2.4), (4) developing a framework of 
metropolitan planning (see Section 2.5) and (5) validating that framework (see Section 
2.6). 
  
2.2.1 Searching relevant literature 
The purpose of the initial search is to find relevant literature on effective coordination 
for metropolitan planning using Smartcat (a university search engine to search 
university libraries and other libraries worldwide and which includes both digital and 
physical resources). This first review focuses on relevant literature from the last 50 
years, between 1963-2012. The first search showed that there were no publications 
specifically discussing this issue (using keywords: “metropolitan planning” AND 
“effective coordination”). To address this absence, the second search used keywords 
“metropolitan planning” OR “effective coordination”. The second search uncovered 
1,102 articles. To reduce duplication and out of context literature, the abstracts of those 
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1,102 articles were reviewed and an additional 58 articles were subsequently chosen 
for further analysis (see Figure 2.1). From those 58 full-text articles, 38 additional 
references were found related to metropolitan governance, planning and spatial 
planning (see Figure 2.1). On that basis, this second review focused on a total of 96 
articles, published over the last 60 years (1956-2015). Using a descriptive analysis (see 
Table 2.1, Table 2.2 and Table 2.3), this chapter found that effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning is not static (see particularly a descriptive analysis in Table 
2.4).  
  
With this in mind, this chapter extended the search for relevant literature for two 
additional reasons (see Figure 2.1): (1) to reframe the metropolitan planning through 
the lens of governance (see Section 2.4) and (2) to validate the framework developed 

















































Method to review the literature to develop a Framework of Metropolitan Planning 
 
Based on the literature review, initial analysis is performed for 96 relevant articles and 
books using descriptive analysis. The descriptive analysis of the literature review is 
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“effective coordination” (1963-2012) in 
Smartcat (N= 1.102 articles) 
Search and review interesting 
references: additional articles + 
books: metropolitan governance, 
planning and metropolitan 
spatial planning (1956-2015) (N 
= 38) 




(N = 96)  
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dynamically 
Search and review additional 
articles + books: Institutional 
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and its implementation  
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Table 2.1 
Research methodologies employed in the literatures reviewed 
 
Methodology 
Number of articles discussing 
coordination in the metropolitan 
region (N = 96) 
Case studies 51 
Literature reviews 6 





Table 2.1 shows four methodologies used in the literature review. Most literature used 




Geography of metropolitan regions discussed in the literature reviewed 
 
Geography 
Number of articles discussing the 
metropolitan region (case studies and 
illustrations) (N=83*) 





South America 1 
 
*from total N = 92 literatures, not all discuss a specific metropolitan region 
 
Table 2.2 shows that the metropolitan planning literature most frequently discussed, 
as case studies or as illustrations, developed countries in North America, Europe and 
Australia. This leads to critical questions, such as: “does metropolitan planning in 
developed countries look the same across cases?” or “to improve metropolitan 
planning, should metropolitan planning in developing countries follow metropolitan 
planning in developed countries?” 
Page 54 of 246 
 
Table 2.3 
Elements of metropolitan planning discussed in the literature reviewed 
 
Elements of metropolitan planning 
Number of articles 
discussing the 
metropolitan region 
(N = 96) 
First, coordination in political institution: 
vertical relation 
3 
Second, coordination in political 
institution: horizontal relation 
23 
Third, coordination to create coherent 
metropolitan policies, plans or strategies 
14 
Fourth, coordination to implement 
metropolitan policies, plans or strategies 
2 





Table 2.3 shows that effective coordination for metropolitan planning is influenced by 
first, efforts of local governments within a metropolitan region to coordinate within 
political institutions to solve regional problems, whether through consolidation, 
merger or annexation of the city centre and its surrounding municipalities or through 
independent work or through inter-local government (inter-municipality) 
cooperation. Here, the crucial concern, which is embedded within those efforts, is 
about a planning process that covers the entire metropolitan region. If it isn’t 
supported by a strong metropolitan government, which results from consolidation, 
merger or annexation, a planning process for the entire metropolitan region may be 
ineffective. The second attempt is through coordination to create coherent policies, 
plans or strategies for the entire metropolitan region. Confronting dynamic changes 
and differences, such as those that exist across territories, strategies, authorities and 
capacities, the crucial concern is about the type of metropolitan plan, policy or 
strategy, whether developed as a blueprint/master plan or as a strategic plan. The 
other attempts are about central/federal or the province/state government 
intervention using laws and formal regulation to affect the implementation of the plan. 
More interestingly, most literature reviewed discuss two or more elements and the 
shifts that are generated by changes in social, politics and economics and institutional 
development.   
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2.2.2 Summarizing the literature 
Guided by descriptive analysis, a summary of the literature review will be presented in 
Section 2.3. The summary will describe the descriptive analysis of elements of 
metropolitan planning presented in Table 2.3. Four elements of metropolitan planning 
will be classified into two arenas of discussion. This summary will highlight three 
crucial aspects of metropolitan planning: coordination of the organisations involved 
to govern a metropolitan region within a political institution, coordination capacity of 
the metropolitan plan, policy or strategy to create coherent plans, policies and 
strategies for the entire metropolitan region and coordination mechanisms amongst 
the organisations involved to implement the metropolitan plans, policies or strategies. 
  
2.2.3 Reframing coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 
through the approach of the form of governance 
Based on the descriptive analysis and summary of the literature review, this chapter 
identifies and distinguishes elements of metropolitan planning, arenas and the scope 
of discussion and academic debates, including how the organisations involved shift 
their coordination arrangements to adapt to new challenges and new opportunities in 
order to keep coordination effective and to manage resource exchanges. There are 
various coordination arrangements involved in metropolitan planning and their 
dynamic shifts are interpreted through the lens of governance structures, rooted in the 
theory of Transaction Cost Economics. Those coordination arrangements will be 
referred to as prototypes of metropolitan planning. This interpretation will be 
presented in Section 2.4.  
  
2.2.4  Developing a framework of metropolitan planning 
The interpretation of various coordination arrangements of metropolitan planning 
with a focus on the form of governance is conducted to frame “no one size fit all” 
metropolitan planning using specific instruments to manage coordination. However, 
we need also to frame dynamic shifts in metropolitan planning, particularly when it 
comes to coordination arrangements. The best way to demonstrate both “no one size 
fits all” and dynamic shifts is by showing how various forms of governance aligned 
with each coordination arrangement and how they shift on a two-dimensional plane. 
This will be presented in Section 2.5. 
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2.2.5  Validating   the   framework   of    metropolitan    planning    that    is  
developed 
After a comprehensive framework of metropolitan planning is developed, we need to 
validate it. To validate the framework, this chapter will identify instruments used for 
metropolitan planning in several metropolitan regions. Validation is required: 
i. To check whether the framework can be operationalized to identify types of 
coordination arrangement (i.e. prototypes) of metropolitan planning by 
recognising instruments used in particular types of coordination capacity 
(development of metropolitan plans, policies and strategies and their 
relation to local plans, policies and strategies) and in the type of coordination 
mechanism used (in the implementation of metropolitan plans, policies and 
strategies). This check will be conducted by analysing three metropolitan 
regions (Amsterdam Metropolitan Area, Greater London and the Portland 
Metropolitan Area), which are discussed in the existing planning literature.  
ii. To check whether the framework can demonstrate clearly the dynamic shifts 
in the form of governance used in multi-organisation coordination for 
metropolitan planning. This check also will be conducted on the same three 
metropolitan regions. 
  
Data for this validation is collected from existing electronic journals from Smartcat, 
related academic books and documents and from official websites of relevant 
metropolitan governments or metropolitan planning organisations, such as 
www.london.gov.uk, www.amsterdam.nl, www.metropoolregioamsterdam.nl (in 
Dutch, translated to English through the Google Chrome) and www.oregonmetro.gov. 
Validation of the framework is presented in Section 2.6. 
  
 
2.3     The literature review: metropolitan planning and effective 
coordination 
  
Metropolitan planning arrangements are not only “one a size fits all”, but also shift 
over time to adapt to dynamic change in social, economic and political factors. 
Metropolitan planning involves multiple organisations in different territories, at 
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different levels and with different authorities, different capacities and different 
strategies. They also need to respond to changes in economics, society and politics.  
 
Based on the literature review, this chapter describes complex coordination in 
metropolitan planning using four elements (see a descriptive analysis in Table 2.3 
above). Those four elements form two major arenas (see Table 2.4 below), which are 
closely linked to one another. The first arena focuses on institutional settings of 
metropolitan regions to establish planning powers for the entire metropolitan region. 
This arena focuses on how the organisations involved govern a metropolitan region. 
The second arena concentrates on the operational institutional setting across the 
metropolitan region, which embodies the use of coordination arrangements to create 
and implement coherent metropolitan policies, plans or strategies for the entire 
metropolitan region.  
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Table 2.4 shows that metropolitan planning has four crucial elements: (1) political 
coordination of vertical relations between the central/federal or provincial/state 
government and local governments, (2) political coordination of horizontal relations 
amongst local governments involved in a metropolitan region, (3) coordination to 
create coherent metropolitan plans, policies or strategies and (4) coordination to 
implement metropolitan plans, policies or strategies. The first two elements establish 
political coordination to govern and to establish planning power for the entire 
metropolitan region. This part will be presented in Section 2.3.1. The second two 
elements establish coordination arrangements of metropolitan planning. This part will 
be presented in Section 2.3.2. 
  
2.3.1  Institutional setting of the metropolitan region (metropolitan 
governance) 
Much of the planning and urban study literature reveals that political institutions 
frame the planning process for the entire metropolitan region and influence local 
governments in a metropolitan region when coordinating politically, the output of 
which significantly influences the planning process for the entire metropolitan region 
(see for example, Newman and Thornley, 1997; Balducci, 2003; Salet, Thornley, 
Kreukels, 2003; Albrechts, et al, 2003; McCarthy, 2011). It mentions that these 
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political institutions connect constitutions, laws and other formal rules to the planning 
process for the entire metropolitan region. The institutional setting of the 
metropolitan region establishes how the metropolitan region is governed through 
formal government institutions and other related institutions, such as those in the 
world of planning or finance. Institutional settings in the metropolitan region 
influence vertical and horizontal relations of the organisations involved. Vertical 
relations between the central/federal government or provincial/state governments 
and local governments and horizontal relations among local governments are 
important (see Hamilton, Miller, Paytas, 2004). Vertical relations determine how the 
national government system works with provincial and local governments, whether in 
centralized, decentralized or mixed system (Hamilton, Miller, Paytas, 2004; Salet, 
Thornley, Kreukels, 2003). Horizontal relations determine how the government 
system provides constraints and opportunities for local governments, as the 
constituents of the metropolitan area, to coordinate, whether through the 
metropolitan government, individual local government or inter-local government 
cooperation. Institutional settings in the metropolitan region represent an acceptance 
of the organisations involved in governing the metropolitan region. Acceptance is one 
important aspect in the creation of efficient and effective coordination arrangements 
for metropolitan regions (see for example Alexander, 2002, 2006; Buitelaar, et al, 
2007; Janssen-Jansen, 2011). 
  
Hamilton, Miller and Paytas (2004) say that local governments are the key block in a 
metropolitan region. Yaro and Ronderos (2011) show that three academic debates 
prevail in discussions on political coordination in metropolitan regions: localism, 
regionalism and new regionalism. In addition, Xu and Yeh (2011) and Salet, Thornley, 
Kreukels (2003) also identify the relationship between political coordination in 
a metropolitan region and in other institutions, mainly those involved in planning. The 
government system provides rules on how the metropolitan region is governed, 
particularly political coordination among the metropolitan region constituents, 
whether through metropolitan government integrating local governments, through 
inter-local government cooperation, or through the individual work of local 
governments in the metropolitan region. It is important to consider the government 
system, since it determines how the metropolitan plan is developed and how it is 
implemented (Salet, Thornley, Kreukels, 2003; Xu and Yeh, 2011).  
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Some authors, such as Zimmerman (1970), Levefre (1998), Oakerson and Parks (1998) 
and Hamilton (2000) argue that the regionalism approach is conducted when local 
governments in the metropolitan region consolidate politically, through annexation or 
merger, and become governed by a metropolitan government. Mitchell-Weaver, et al 
(2000) note that metropolitan regionalism was the first approach deployed in 
response to urban problems in U.S. metropolitan regions. It was first used in New 
Orleans in 1805. Metropolitan government promises to be more effective in developing 
and implementing a metropolitan plan because it has control directly over local 
governments and has the power to issue planning regulations as required (Ostrom, 
Vincent and Charles, 1961; Hawkins, et al, 1991; Carr and Feiock, 1999). When the 
constitution and law, through written articles, provides an opportunity to establish a 
metropolitan government, some politicians and policymakers will attempt to form one 
(Oakerson and Parks, 1998). Planners also support this idea as an ideal political 
structure for the metropolitan region (Healey, 2004). However, they can also abolish 
the metropolitan government constitutionally (see for example O’Leary, 1987). But, it 
is also possible that metropolitan government is avoided because of the accompanying 
loss of legitimacy (Levefre, 1998; Alexander, 2002, 2006).  
  
Coherently, Walker (1987) identifies 17 approaches to metropolitan governance in the 
United States, ranging from the easiest to hardest in terms of the difficulty involved in 
their creation. Some of those approaches influence the practice of metropolitan 
planning. For instance, the joint power agreement approach provides joint planning 
and financing for services to all people inhabiting areas in which the local governments 
are involved. Another example is the three-tiers reform approach, such as in the Twin-
Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul), where the metropolitan council functions as the 
authoritative regional planner and also as coordinator and controller for regional 
large-scale development covering 7 counties and 1 dozen localities. Many other 
examples demonstrate that the metropolitan government is a strong supporter of 
metropolitan planning (see also Marshall, 2000, 2004 for the case of Barcelona; 
Hutton, 2011 for the case of Vancouver; Seltzer and Cotugno, 2011 for the case of Metro 
Portland). The metropolitan government can enhance regional project development, 
such as metropolitan transportation (Frisken, 1991). On the other hand, existing 
formal institutions can also hamper the establishment of inter-local government 
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cooperation, leading to a territorial strategic plan (see, for example, Breda-Vasquez 
and Oliveira, 2008). The existence of the visible metropolitan government provides 
more powerful framing strategies for the metropolitan region constituents. 
  
However, even though the metropolitan government promises to govern more 
effectively (Rao, 2002; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008), not all metropolitan regions prefer to 
be governed by a metropolitan government. When the government system does not 
accommodate the existence of a metropolitan government, local governments sitting 
in the metropolitan region have autonomous authority to govern their territory. They 
have more independence to decide what should be planned or developed, whether 
individually or jointly, with other local governments or with private entities. This 
situation means that metropolitan governance develops without government (Rhodes, 
1996). Where metropolitan government does not exist, national, provincial or local 
rules are applied. These rules dictate how local government coordinate and how deeply 
they can do so, including how local governments or local people establish new local 
governments (Oakerson and Parks, 1989; see also Alexander, 2002, 2006 for the case 
of Amsterdam; Seltzer and Cotugno, 2011 for Metropolit Portland; Garrido, 2007 for 
the Spanish metropolitan regions). There is no single government governing the 
metropolitan region (Phares, 2004). In line with Tiebout’s arguments (1956), each 
local government is responsible for its own development, meaning that local 
governments in the metropolitan region compete with one another. They compete to 
better serve citizens, following the principle of ‘one feet one vote’ (Parks and Oakerson, 
2000).  The metropolitan region is fragmented into two or more autonomous local 
governments, wherein each local government formulates its own local plan, such as 
Greater London in the ‘transition’ period after the GLC was abolished (Newman and 
Thornley, 1997). In this situation, a higher authority provides a metropolitan plan, but 
its relation to local plans is problematic (Bunker and Searle, 2007). 
  
Another approach, emerges when the government system does not accommodate the 
metropolitan government, or when local governments need to enhance 
the effectiveness of metropolitan development without reducing their own authority, 
involves inter-local government cooperation. Inter-local government cooperation is 
established through formal rules, such as: local governments being required to 
cooperate more deeply, but existing formal rules do not provide a chance to establish 
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a metropolitan government (Albrechts, et al, 2003); or existing formal rules encourage 
inter-local government cooperation to govern the metropolitan region (see for 
example de Peuter and Wayenberg, 2007 for the case of Flemish region in Belgium; 
Haveri and Airaksinen, 2007 for the case of Finland metropolitan region). 
  
However, when formal rules to establish inter-local government cooperation are 
absent, the organisations involved are also able to establish forms of inter-local 
government cooperation informally. Inter-local government cooperation is stimulated 
by non-formal rules when: the metropolitan government is rejected by the people, but 
constituent cities/districts of the metropolitan region want to enhance development 
for the entire metropolitan region (Alexander, 2002, 2006; Hauswirth, et al, 2003); 
they want to obtain incentives derived from economies of scale (Hauswirth, et al, 
2003; Otgaar, et al, 2008); or they want to gather information (Feiock, 2009) or are 
motivated by their willingness to cooperate (Douay, 2010 for the case of French 
metropolitan regions).  
  
There are various forms of inter-local government cooperation, ranging from single 
purpose to multi-purpose, consultation to joint-operation, small and large, and those 
which operate at different territorial scales (Hults and van Monfort, 2007). A form of 
inter-local government cooperation implies metropolitan planning. For instance, The 
Regional Council in Finland is a statutory inter-local government cooperation 
authority, whose main task is as the region’s planning and economic development 
organisation (Haveri and Airaksinen, 2007). The Regional Council does not have the 
power to levy taxes, nor does it have regulatory power, but it is in a strong position 
because it can rely on its planning capacity, research expertise, a knowledge base, 
personal influence and networks. Another example is seen in Portuguese metropolitan 
regions, which have established a metropolitan association to accelerate 
implementation of collaborative projects (Rayle and Zegras, 2011). 
  
At an operational level, governing the metropolitan region politically requires multi-
organisation coordination in the plan making and plan implementation process. These 
two kinds of coordination are the main task of metropolitan planning (Alexander, 
2002). This is the arena that Salet and Woltjer (2009) argue must be developed 
intelligently. The organisations involved coordinate to change their ideas and their 
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resource in order to obtain common goals within existing institutions, which in this 
research is referred to as the institutional setting of the metropolitan region. Since 
there are two levels of coordination, plan-making coordination and plan 
implementation coordination, this research refers simply to the coordination 
arrangement. Coordination capacity refers to the type of capacity required by a 
metropolitan plan to coordinate so that local (and provincial) plans are incorporated 
into the metropolitan region. This coordination covers the contents and instruments 
used. The coordination mechanism is a mechanism used by organisations involved in 
the collective implementation of a plan.  
  
2.3.2 Coordination arrangement 
As shown in Table 2.2, two elements, coordination when creating coherent 
metropolitan plan, policy, or strategy and coordination to implement them, are 
referred to simply as the coordination arrangement. Those two elements are the main 
task of metropolitan planning, as identified by Alexander (2002). Both are closely 
linked, but based on the literature review, we can see that each has a different purview.   
 
a. Coordination to create coherent policies, plans or strategies for the 
entire metropolitan region 
A challenge when developing a plan for a metropolitan region is that a planning area 
does not always match with the dynamic development of metropolitan regions 
consisting of two or more territories.  Healey (2004) proposes that a plan should have 
the capacity to be translated into other plans. In the metropolitan region, the core 
focus is on how a metropolitan plan has the capacity to allow local plans to be 
developed coherently, incorporating its contents through certain planning 
instruments. Here, the idea is to integrate the metropolitan region using the 
metropolitan plan. This is a crucial issue. The metropolitan region, consisting of two 
or more local governments, tries to become consolidated through the contents of the 
metropolitan plan. Salet, Thornley, Kreukels (2003) focus on the spatial dimension, 
wherein multi-level governance is involved in order to create a coherent plan, policy 
or strategy. In the context of metropolitan planning, which consists of multiple 
organisations, each with their own plan, policy or strategy, plans covering the entire 
metropolitan region becomes crucial.  
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The literature reviewed discusses some types or characteristics of plans that may be 
appropriately employed in a metropolitan region, such as: (1) a plan that is supported 
by statutory planning legislation (for example Alexander and Greive, 1997; Abbott, 
2009; Bunker, 2012), (2) a plan operated by consensus (Alexander and Greive, 1997), 
(3) planning that has been approached in a policy framework and as the result of 
negotiation rather than through rigid statutory control (Alexander and Greive, 1997), 
(4) strategic spatial planning (Kreukels, 2000; Albrechts, 2013), (5) strategic 
metropolitan planning (Bunker, 2012; Bunker and Ruming, 2010), (6) master 
planning (Albrechts, 2013), (7) zoning (Albrechts, 2013), (8) land use planning 
(Albrechts, 2013), (9) voluntary planning (Abbott, 2009), (10) long-range planning 
(Bunker, 2012), (11) collaborative planning (Bunker, 2012), (12) the need to integrate 
a number of plans in a metropolitan region (Bunker, 2012), (13) blue print plans 
(Bunker, 2012; Allred and Charaborty, 2015), (14) master-plans (Healey, 2006) and 
(15) metropolitan strategic planning (Robert, 1999), (16) allocating-negotiating plans, 
informing-leading plans, regulating-correcting plans and directing-implementing 
plans (Webster, 2005). Each of those plans is used in a certain region and at a certain 
time. Those type of plans point towards different development processes and 
institutions. Each plan uses specific instruments. Since a metropolitan region consists 
of multiple organisations, each of which has different authorities, capacities, 
territories and strategies, the biggest challenge when making a plan faced by a 
metropolitan region is the need to create coherent metropolitan plans, policies, or 
strategies.  
 
b. Coordination to implement metropolitan policies, plan, or 
strategies 
The organisations or authorities involved require particular mechanisms to implement 
a metropolitan plan, policy or strategy collectively or individually, which needs a 
particular form of coordination. This mechanism is discussed by Albrecht (2003) as a 
black box for many planners, wherein a plan that has been formulated can be changed, 
postponed or rejected at the implementation stage (see also Crespo and Cabral, 2010). 
Coordination mechanisms are also a concern in this research, since joint action 
involving multiple organisations takes effort and time (McCaffrey, et al, 1995; see also 
Ansell and Gash, 2008), which has an effect on the effectiveness of metropolitan 
planning. This coordination mechanism connects policies or plans to implementation, 
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particularly when articulating a plan involving the resources of actors or organisations 
involved, whether political, financial or technical (Mevellec and Douay, 2007).  
 
c. Coordination arrangement problems in metropolitan planning  
Based on the literature review, this research identifies difficulties or problems involved 
in coordination in metropolitan planning. Salet and Thornley (2007) argue that 
coordination in metropolitan regions is a complicated multi-scalar game, with many 
impediments and differing values, interests, resources, powers and authorities (p. 
191). Those differences may generate negative externalities or a NIMBY problem in 
other authorities. Abbott (2005, 2009) identifies uncertainty as the main problem 
affecting the effectiveness of metropolitan planning. Abbott (2005, p. 238, 2009, 
p.245) defines uncertainty as “a perceived lack of knowledge, by an individual or 
group, that is relevant to the purpose or action being undertaken and its outcomes.” 
There are five planning process uncertainties: causal, value, organisational, chance 
and external uncertainties (Abbott, 2005, 2009). These uncertainties may cause 
obstacles in metropolitan planning, hampering coordination effectiveness. 
Hampering coordination effectiveness implies an increase in additional costs, because 
of, say, the need for extra meetings, more information gathering and extra monitoring. 
Ruth (1971) refers to these as the costs of uncertainty.  
  
 
2.4 Reframing coordination arrangements in metropolitan planning 
through a focus on forms of governance  
  
Institutional settings in the metropolitan region and coordination arrangements are 
two arenas discussed when identifying effective coordination in metropolitan 
planning. Both arenas contribute to creating effective coordination. The institutional 
setting of the metropolitan region shapes the form of political coordination amongst 
the organisations involved in governing a metropolitan region, because of both vertical 
and horizontal relations (Hamilton, et at, 2004). Vertical relations are those between 
the central/federal government, provincial/state government and local governments, 
whether centralized or decentralized. Horizontal relations are those between local 
governments, whether through annexation, merger, cooperation or working 
independently. The form of political coordination that combines vertical and 
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horizontal relations produces a particular governance approach within a metropolitan 
region, whether (1) through integrating, consolidating or merging the constituents of 
a metropolitan region and establishing or abolishing a metropolitan regional 
government, (2) through establishing inter-local government cooperation (through 
networks) or (3) through the individual work of each organisation (as autonomous and 
independent from others).  
  
The form of political coordination preferred by the organisations involved when 
governing a metropolitan region represents an acceptance by the organisations 
involved of a coordination arrangement for metropolitan planning. The acceptance 
determines how strong planning power is for the entire metropolitan region. When the 
organisations involved seek to govern a metropolitan using the first approach, 
integrating constituents of a metropolitan region, the metropolitan government 
establishes planning authority that has responsibility for developing and 
implementing metropolitan plans, policies or strategies for the entire metropolitan 
region. On the other hand, the third approach creates fragmented planning power in 
a metropolitan region. The second approach can create a planning authority that is 
able to consolidate metropolitan plans, policies or strategies but which may face 
difficulty implementing them due to a lack of enforcement power.  
  
In the operational context, the types of plans discussed in Section 2.3.2 point to three 
general characteristics: rigid, flexible or a mix of the two. These result from specific 
instruments used to apply the plan. A plan that is rigid uses a regulatory system and 
relies upon laws and regulations. A plan that is flexible uses the market system and 
relies upon incentives or potential benefits obtained. In plan implementation, 
difficulties occurred when the organisations involved apply instruments that jarred 
with each other. 
  
Here, acceptance of the organisations involved in a particular institutional setting in a 
metropolitan region and application of coordination arrangements to develop and 
implement a particular metropolitan plan, policy or strategy, demonstrate application 
of a particular form of governance. This approach is rooted in the theory of Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985, 1991, 1996, 1998). The theory of TCE 
provides an explanation for an effective arrangement to manage resource exchange 
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through the use of different and varied forms of governance, to use specific 
instruments, to analyse transaction costs and their sources, to analyse the selection of 
better forms of governance in order to reduce transaction costs (through the 
remediableness criterion) and to propose dynamic shifts to forms of governance. This 
chapter argues that metropolitan planning shifts dynamically because organisations 
involved attempt to manage effective coordination by ensuring that resource 
exchanges are performed with low transaction costs. In order to obtain effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning, this section reframes metropolitan planning 
through the lens of forms of governance. 
   
2.4.1   Form of governance (governance structures), acceptance and shifts 
This section presents three generic forms of governance and specific instruments used 
in each, acceptance of the organisations involved to create particular forms of 
governance, the sources of transaction costs and shifts in forms of governance.  
 
a. The form of governance and instruments used 
A form of governance is an arena of play of the game (Williamson, 1998). A particular 
form of governance, whether based upon hierarchy, markets or hybrids, is established 
under certain formal rules and informal constraints (Williamson, 1998; North, 1990, 
1991; Simon, et al, 1991). Formal rules, provided by constitutions, laws and regulation, 
are used to establish a particular form of governance. Informal constraints provide 
incentives or disincentives for the organisations involved to coordinate or not. There 
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Table 2.5 
Form of governance and its instruments 
No. Form of 
governance 
Instrument 
Administrative control Incentive instensity 
1. Hierarchy ++ 00 
2. Market 00 ++ 
3. Hybrid + + 
 
source: Williamson, 1998 
++ = strong 
00 = weak 
+    = moderate 
 
Table 2.5 shows that hierarchical form of governance rely upon strong administrative 
control and mandatory regulations. It provides a framework for the organisational 
coordination, such as a bureaucracy that uses fiat and budgets (Fukuyama, 2004). 
Hierarchical forms of governance also work with codified directions or formal rules 
written in the constitution, laws and regulations. The main character of hierarchical 
forms of governance is integration.  
  
Market-based forms of governance work on the basis of the strength and intensity of 
incentives. Through incentive intensity, the organisations involved interact and 
coordinate using price mechanisms (Williamson, 1998). Simon, et al (1991, p. 62) also 
reveal that incentives not only relate to monetary value or goods but also to non-
monetary and non-material goods, such as prestige, personal power, pride, patriotism, 
religious feeling, conformity to habitual practices and feelings of participation in large 
and important events. The hybrid form of governance works through moderate 
administrative control and moderate incentive intensity. Identifying the particular 
form of governance and its main instruments are crucial since they are the output of 
the rules of the game and represent how the organisations involved manage resource 
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b. Acceptance of the organisations involved 
The form of governance, whether hierarchical, hybrid or market based, is established 
by the organisations involved seeking to manage resource exchanges efficiently. One 
form of governance is more efficient than another when it has lower transaction cost. 
High transaction costs in the market can be reduced by regulating transactions using 
formal rules. This intervention implies a shift in the form of governance used, from a 
market based form to a hierarchical one. However, a shift in the form of governance 
that is implemented needs acceptance of the organisations involved. This principle is 
known as the remediableness criterion, as discussed by Williamson (1996, 1999). The 
remediableness criterion provides three requirements to implementing an effective 
form of governance: (1) no feasible superior alternative, (2) it can be described, (3) and 
can be implemented with expected net gain that is presumed to be efficient 
(Williamson, 1999, p. 1092).  
 
c. Sources of transaction costs and shift of form of governance 
Williamson (1996) identifies several sources of transaction costs: uncertainty, asset 
specificity and frequency, which all generate obstacles to coordination. When those 
exist, coordination involves more time and effort, which involves greater cost. High 
transaction costs reduce the effectiveness of coordination. Uncertainty is a lack of 
knowledge resulting from shortcomings in the existing system, a lack of 
communication or lack of action. Asset specificity is related to a number of factors, 
such as location, amount and kind of investment. Frequency refers to the number of 
similar transactions performed. High transaction costs can be reduced through a shift 
in the form of governance. To shift the form of governance requires shifting specific 
instruments. To shift specific instruments implies a shift in institution. According to 
North (1991), institutional shift or change is performed through interaction between 
organisations and institutions. Failure to reduce the source of transaction costs 
(uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency) will lead to higher transaction costs. To 
reduce high transaction costs, the organisations involved shift their existing form of 
governance to another form of governance. For example, high transaction costs in 
the market form of governance are reduced through the use of other instruments, 
which establish other forms of governance, whether hierarchical or hybrid in nature.  
 
2.4.2  Reframing institutional settings in the metropolitan region 
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Following the remediableness criterion as a form of political coordination in 
the institutional setting of the metropolitan region represents an acceptance of the 
organisations involved. Acceptance of a form of political coordination is crucial to 
determining planning power for the entire metropolitan region. A form of political 
coordination that establishes a metropolitan government and which integrates all 
constituents of the metropolitan region is expected to lead to more effective 
coordination. However, through the remediableness criterion, the metropolitan 
government perhaps cannot be created, because of insufficient political support from 
the organisations involved.  
  
Through the remediableness criterion, we may also able to explain why some 
metropolitan regions fail to establish metropolitan governments (see for example 
Alexander, 2002, 2006). The metropolitan government, as a reform movement for 
urban institutional development, asks to transfer authority possessed by each 
constituent to the metropolitan government, implying that their authority will be 
reduced. They may reject this proposal to consolidate power and may prefer to opt 
instead for inter-local government cooperation. So, even though a form of political 
coordination promises to contribute to enhancing effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning, it cannot be implemented, since the organisations involved do 
not offer their support.  
 
2.4.3  Reframing coordination arrangements in metropolitan planning 
As discussed in Section 2.3, coordination arrangements have two dimensions: 
coordination to create coherent metropolitan plans, policies, or strategies and 
coordination to implement them. The first is referred to as the coordination capacity 
and the second as the coordination mechanism. This sub-section discusses both in 
order to reframe metropolitan planning through the governance lens. Inspired by 
three forms of governance (hierarchy, hybrids and markets), this section associates a 
type of plan to a form of governance (paying regards to coordination capacity) and 
discusses the type of coordination mechanism necessary for plan, policy or strategy 
implementation. In discussing coordination capacity, this section is inspired by the 
Transaction Cost Theory of Planning (Alexander, 1992) and the theory of TCE 
(Williamson, 1991, 1996). When discussing coordination mechanisms, this section 
refers to the notion of ‘provision process’, introduced by Ostrom, et al (1993). This 
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process is reframed through the governance perspective. Reframing coordination 
arrangements, consisting of coordination capacity and coordination mechanisms, for 
metropolitan planning through the governance lens will produce nine prototypes of 
metropolitan planning (see Table 2.8). 
 
a. Coordination capacity  
The contents of the metropolitan plan translate to local plans, which use the particular 
instruments applied. In this context, relations between the metropolitan plan and local 
plans represent coordination among the agency representing the metropolitan region 
(whether the central/federal government agency, the provincial/state government 
agency or inter-local government agency) and local authorities. Through this 
coordination, the organisations involved conduct resource exchanges, mainly 
involving information. In this context, Alexander (1992, 1994, 2001), drawing upon 
the Transaction Cost Theory of Planning (TCP), discusses two types of plan, the master 
plan, which is associated with hierarchical forms of governance, and the strategic plan, 
which is associated with the market form of governance. Both are located at extreme 
ends of a spectrum. Each type of plan has specific instruments, whether involving 
administrative control or incentive intensity.  
  
The planning literature offers numerous examples of the varied instruments used to 
develop a particular type of plan. Those instruments can be classified into 
administrative control, incentive intensity or a mixture fo the two. For example: (i) 
administrative control includes framing instruments (Macintosh, et al, 2013), fixed 
regulation (zones and overlays; hazard mapping and management plans; non-spatial 
regulatory restrictions; permit requirements and approval conditions; compulsory 
insurance; codes and guidelines; agreements on title; and reserves) and flexible 
regulations (Macintosh, et al, 2013, p. 46), (ii) incentive intensity includes information 
instruments, planning certificates, notation on land title and non-regulatory zones and 
overlays (Macintosh, et al, 2013) and (iii) mixed-instruments include a combination 
parking charges and tariffs. Those instruments are used by a superior agency in the 
metropolitan region to coordinate the constituents of the metropolitan region. The 
superior agency can be a planning agency, non-government agency, the 
central/federal or provincial/state government agency or an agency that has 
the mandate to develop a plan covering the entire metropolitan region.  
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Each group of instruments has specific characteristics, which implies different 
constraints and opportunities for the organisations involved.   
 
i. Type of master plan 
Alexander (1992, 1994) argues that master plans and coordinative plans work 
through hierarchical forms of governance. They use a mandatory framework of 
regulation and rely upon administrative control instruments to manage 
coordination between multiple organisations. These administrative control 
instruments shape behaviours through regulations. Regulations force actors to 
comply with individual plans and a common platform, such as the metropolitan 
plan, policy or strategy. The metropolitan plan, which is formulated as a type of 
master plan or coordinative plan, contains clear directions to be implemented 
in the metropolitan region. It is necessary that these directions are incorporated 
explicitly in local plans, developed by the local governments of the constituent 
metropolitan region. Coordination between the metropolitan plan and local 
plans is supported by administrative control instruments, which force local 
plans to accommodate the contents of the metropolitan regional plan.  
  
This type of master plan is designed to give certainty over what actors should 
and shouldn’t do in the future. It is supported by embedded rules, mainly 
administrative control instruments. The contents should be transferred and 
accommodated in local plans. Local plans contain contents (directions) that are 
formulated in the metropolitan plan. In some countries, for example the U.K., 
those administrative control instruments force local governments to 
accommodate the substance of the metropolitan plan into their local plan. In 
Greater London, boroughs should conform to the Greater London Authority 
(GLA). Conformity processes are regulated by the Town and Country Planning 
Act. When local government fails in this process, the borough doesn’t receive 
specific funds from the GLA. The type of master plan, because it uses 
administrative control instruments, is associated with a hierarchical form of 
governance. The metropolitan plan, which is designed as a master plan, asks 
local plans to follow it. However, applying administrative control to a master 
plan and forcing other plans to follow it completely on the one hand provides 
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certainty, but on the other, reduces flexibility. The metropolitan region is a a 
dynamic space, with new challenges and new opportunities, which requires 
flexibility for adaptation.  
 
ii.  Type of strategic plan 
The metropolitan plan, which is designed as a strategic plan, gives signals to 
others over whether they should follow it or not. This is in line with what we see 
with a traditional strategic plan. When local government perceives that the 
substance of the metropolitan plan is important and promises to benefit them, 
they will accommodate it into their local plans. When the substance does not 
match with their strategy or does not provide benefits, they will not incorporate 
those into their local plan. The strategic plan relies on incentive intensity 
instruments. The incentive is not only related to monetary factors and 
goods, but also refer to pride, religious feeling, enhancing personal power, and 
feeling involved in major and important events (Simon, et al, 1991).  
 
Unlike administrative control instruments, incentive instruments do not 
require the organisations involved to comply formally. Incentive instruments 
give more room and flexibility to others to decide for themselves. They take 
action not based on direction, commands or sanctions, but are motivated by 
potential or actual benefits obtained. So, local governments, as the constituents 
of the metropolitan region, internally translate and calculate signals provided 
by the metropolitan plan. Benefits obtained by following the metropolitan plan 
will incentivise local governments to integrate the contents into their local plan. 
However, this flexibility may reduce certainty in the future. This flexibility may 
also generate wider fragmentation among local governments in the 
metropolitan region. Local plans can differ from one another and from the goals 




iii. Type of master-strategic plan or strategic-master plan 
When addressing the dilemma between the strategic plan and master plan, 
theoretically, a type of plan combining those two characteristics and 
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instruments can be created. This type of plan may be called a master-strategic 
plan or strategic-master plan. Buscher (2014) refers to it as a programme-based 
plan. This type of plan is associated with a hybrid form of governance. This type 
of plan is also referred to by Albrechts (2006) as a new strategic plan. This 
master-strategic plan offers some rigid contents and some flexible contents and 
is also supported by administrative control instruments and incentive intensity 
instruments. A metropolitan plan that is designed as a master-strategic plan 
guides other plans to incorporate its rigid contents and provides flexibility over 
whether or not to follow its more flexible contents.  
  
A reframing of these types of plans through the lens of forms of governance is 
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Table 2.6 
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Dynamic challenges that occur in metropolitan region stimulate the organisations 
involved to adapt. The adaptation may influence them to terminate existing 
instruments used and to apply new instruments. The shift of instruments applied may 
be drastic, which also influences how the organisations involved coordinate.  
  
b. Coordination mechanism 
Albrecht (2006) understands the plan implementation process as a black box, since 
difficulties occur. In this research, this black box is explained with reference to the 
provision process (Ostrom, et al, 1993; Parks and Oakerson, 1989) and form of 
governance (Williamson, 1985, 1996, 1998). Provision processes contain three sub-
processes: the collective decision-making process, the production and finance 
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arrangement process and the financing and regulation process (Ostrom, et al, 1993). 
Ostrom, et al (1993) argues that this provisioning process also contains transaction 
costs. By understanding these three sub-provision processes, we can group these three 
sub-provision processes into two groups: collective decision making and technical and 
administrative processes (formal procedures).  
  
The first group, collective decision making, can be rigid or flexible. A rigid collective 
decision is performed when the source of decisions comes from existing official 
documents, for example, regulatory planning or policy documents. The organisations 
involved consider and confirm this and then accommodate them in their future 
decisions. However, a collective decision can be flexible when issues decided are 
available in existing official documents, but the organisations involved can freely exit 
from decisions already formulated in official documents or where issues decided are 
not available or lacking in existing official documents. The actors or organisations 
involved make collective decisions on the basis of the potential benefit or incentives 
that will be obtained. 
  
In the second group, a formal procedure is mostly rigid. This has an administrative 
and legal effect on how a metropolitan plan is implemented (see Wassenhoven, 2008; 
Breda-Vasquez and Oliveira, 2008; Altes and Tasan-Kok, 2010; Feiock, 2007; 
Andersen and Piere, 2010). This formal procedure is issued by the national, provincial, 
metropolitan or local government. The organisations involved engage in procedures 
to implement collective decisions internally. Depending on the institution that is 
established, in general, procedures should be followed. Breaking the procedures may 
generate violence or illegal action. This presents legal risks to actors or organisations. 
This formal procedure covers, for example, administrative rules on how to govern and 
how to budget, land use regulation, environmental impact assessments as a pre-
requisite before a project begins or a specific permit from neighbourhoods to 
commence a building project. Some of those formal procedures are applied locally, and 
one local government may differ from another in how they go about doing so. To be 
involved in the execution of projects is not easy, since local governments are worried 
that their authority will be reduced (see for example Havery and Airaksinen, 2007).  
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The coordination mechanism is a mechanism required to coordinate the organisations 
involved when implementing a joint policy, joint plan or joint strategy. According to 
the description above, this section reframes plan implementation with reference to the 
form of governance and provision. Thus, three types of coordination mechanism are 
focused upon: (i) collective decision-making and (ii) technical and administrative 
processes. Those three types of coordination mechanisms are: 
 
i. Formal-continuous mechanism 
The formal-continuous mechanism refers to a coordination mechanism within 
a regional plan, collective decision or collective agreement between 
organisations that can be implemented directly, continuously and without 
interruption. Since the provisioning process involves two groups, a plan, 
collective decisions or a collective agreement and collective implementation, 
each of which has different arenas, the provisioning process requires particular 
rules. Those rules are required because the implementation of a plan, collective 
decision or collective agreement impacts on the additional or wider 
involvement of each organisation involved (McCaffrey, et al, 1995).  It requires 
additional resources, such as a budgets or rules (see, for example, Altes and 
Tasan-Kok, 2010). Depending on the existing institutions applied, not every 
form of inter-local government cooperation can frame this continuity process. 
Each organisation involved has internal rules that may present barriers to 
coordination and to cooperating more deeply (Rayle and Zegras, 2013). The 
formal-continuous mechanism contains rules safeguarding the continuity 
process in a plan, a collective decision or a collective agreement when it comes 
to its implementation. 
  
Those rules safeguarding the provision process can be provided through formal 
rules. When the metropolitan region forms a metropolitan government, rules 
required so that the the provisioning process can be created more easily and an 
authority becomes responsible for creating rules. For example, the Spanish 
Basic State Legislation of Local Regime safeguards each municipality involved 
in inter-municipal cooperation in the Spanish metropolitan area to participate 
in collective decision-making (Garrido, 2007). Another example of this 
particular rule is discussed by Havery and Airaksen (2007), who argue that the 
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Finnish metropolitan regions require normative and legal changes to make sure 
project implementation can be realized within the context of inter-municipal 
cooperation. Those formal rules can be created not only by the metropolitan 
government, but also by an upper authority.  
 
ii. Informal-discontinuous mechanism 
The informal-discontinuous mechanism refers to forms of coordination and 
cooperation that take place through market forms of governance. They 
coordinate and are motivated by the potential incentive obtained. Each has 
individual rules, but there is no formal rule that requires them to act 
collectively. This situation motivates them to coordinate on the basis of 
potential incentives obtained. On the other hand, there is a common rule 
framing multiple organisations, but the rule does not fit with a previous 
process, such as a collective decision-making (Altes and Tasan-Kok, 2010). The 
informal-discontinuous mechanism is located in a different, more extreme 
position to the formal-continuous mechanism. The organisations involved 
calculate and compare benefits from incentives obtained and costs expended. 
Coordination and cooperation can be conducted when incentives exceed costs 
and the organisations involved can enter and exit from coordination efforts 
easily. This coordination is established without producing new rules and is 
conducted voluntarily (Feiock, 2007, 2009, 2013). Voluntary cooperation is 
perceived as an efficient form of cooperation (Feiock, 2007). The informal-
discontinuous mechanism thus means that organisations involved use 
incentive instruments to take collective decisions, as well as to implement them. 
Because it relies on incentive instruments, the informal-discontinuous 
mechanism may be the most efficient mechanism when organisations involved 
benefit, without the need to create new rules that reduce individual authority. 
  
However, when the organisations involved find it easy to enter and to exit 
arrangements, it will be difficult to develop collective decisions, agreements or 
a plans. When it comes to implementation, a further difficulty comes from the 
implementation processes, from which it is also easy to exit, which would 
hamper the implementation process. Authorities exit from it because it needs 
more involvement or an increased budget. So, they may expect to receive a 
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particular incentive when they become involved in a collective decision or 
agreement or when formulating a common plan, but the incentive expected may 
not materialise during implementation, which requires higher costs than the 
incentives obtained in the collective decision making process.  
 
iii. Types of informal-continuous mechanism 
The informal-continuous mechanism represents another type of coordination 
mechanism and overcomes the dilemmas associated with the two coordination 
mechanisms described previously. The formal-continuous mechanism may 
provide more certainty in terms of the formal procedures created and which 
match with a dynamic, collective decision, but a formal platform to make 
a collective decision will reduce adaptation. However, the adaptation required 
to make collective decisions and to cope with dynamic challenges and 
opportunities can be provided by the informal-discontinuous mechanism. This 
second coordination mechanism is also lacking in terms of safeguarding a 
collective decision during implementation. The informal-continuous 
mechanism is located between those two type of coordination mechanisms: 
formal-continuous and informal-discontinuous. The informal-continuous 
mechanism provides flexibility in collective decision-making processes but is 
more rigid in the implementation stage. The informal-continuous mechanism 
applies incentive instruments in the collective decision-making process and 
uses administrative control instruments in formal procedures.  
  
A reframing of these types of coordination mechanism through the lens of the form of 
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Table 2.7 











































































































































































++ = strong 
+ = moderate 
1. = weak 
 
c. Prototypes of metropolitan planning 
Based on the description above, the complete coordination arrangement has two main 
forms of governance, which each works to operationalize coordination capacity and 
coordination mechanisms. Given that each coordination capacity and coordination 
mechanism has three choices when it comes to the form of governance involved, there 
are nine models of coordination arrangement. Here, those models are called 
prototypes of metropolitan planning. A particular prototype uses specific instruments 
both in terms of plan making coordination and plan implementation coordination. 
Theoretically, the instruments used in each prototype can be distinguished from one 
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Table 2.8 











Instruments used in coordination arrangement 
in metropolitan planning 
Coordination capacity 






















master plan and 
formal continuous 
mechanism 
hierarchy ++ 0 ++ 0 
2. 
B 




hybrid ++ 0 + + 
3. 
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hybrid + + 0 ++ 
7. 
G 
Strategic plan and 
formal-continuous 
mechanism 
hybrid 0 ++ ++ 0 
8. 
H 




hybrid 0 ++ + + 
9. 
I 




market 0 ++ 0 ++ 
++ = dominant 
+    = moderate 
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2.5      Developing a framework of metropolitan planning through the 
governance lens 
  
Thus far, this chapter has offered a descriptive analysis on metropolitan planning, a 
discussion on various forms of effective coordination and has interpreted them from 
the perspective of different forms of governance, rooted in the theory of TCE. However, 
in line with the aims of this chapter, we need to develop a framework that can 
demonstrate the “no one size fits all” nature and dynamic shifts involved in 
metropolitan planning. This section presents a framework of metropolitan planning 
that is dedicated to filling in for the imabilty to comprehensively identify effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning. As discussed in the previous sections, 
elements, arena and scopes of metropolitan planning are used to develop the 
framework, using three main principles:  
1. Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning in the institutional setting 
of a metropolitan region. 
2. Separation of coordination capacity (types of a plan) and coordination 
mechanism (types of plan implementation coordination), but both are closely 
connected. 
3. Three forms of governance (hierarchy, hybrid and market) are used in both the 
coordination capacity and coordination mechanism.  
 
















The Concept of Metropolitan Planning 
 
 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates a concept of metropolitan planning structure that can be 
used to identify complex coordination in metropolitan planning with reference to 
the form of governance. There are three coordination forms in metropolitan 
planning: 1) political coordination establishing the institutional setting of 
the metropolitan region (metropolitan governance), 2) plan making coordination and 
3) plan implementation coordination.  
  
To demonstrate the dynamic shifts and “no one size fits all” character of metropolitan 
planning for different metropolitan regions and at different times, this section 
develops the framework along two dimensions. As has already been discussed, the 
figure has two levels: the institutional setting of the metropolitan region (metropolitan 
governance) and the coordination arrangements of metropolitan planning. 
Institutional settings in the metropolitan region cover and influence coordination 
arrangements in metropolitan planning. Coordination arrangements of metropolitan 
planning have two scopes: plan-making coordination, which is referred to as 
coordination capacity, and plan implementation coordination, which is referred to as 
the coordination mechanism. Each form of coordination has three generic forms of 
governance: hierarchy, hybrids and markets. Coordination arrangements are 
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presented to combine those two scopes and are coded in alphabetical order (see Table 
2.8). The alphabet represents a prototype of metropolitan planning. The model of 
metropolitan planning is presented in Figure 2.3. It contains two arenas (institutional 
setting of the metropolitan region and coordination arrangements underpinning 



















The Framework of Metropolitan Planning 
 
 
Figure 2.3 promises to identify empirically and systematically the existing 
coordination arrangements in metropolitan planning. So, this figure can be applied to 
trace or to demonstrate dynamic shifts in metropolitan planning and to show that “no 
one size fits all”. This figure also can be used to guide recommendations for 
improvements to metropolitan planning. Improvement covers the 9 options contained 
therein. This figure is referred to in this research as the framework of metropolitan 
planning. The next section will validate the framework through the identification of 
Institutional Arrangement of Metropolitan Planning 
 
Source: developed by author 
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metropolitan planning in three metropolitan regions. Thus, it will discuss how to 
operationalize the framework. 
 
 
 2.6      Discussion and conclusion 
  
Metropolitan planning, which covers multiple territories and multiple authorities, 
involves various coordination arrangements between the organisations involved. This 
generate difficulties when defining effective coordination for metropolitan planning. 
The difficulty increases when metropolitan planning shifts over time. This study 




2.6.1  Discussion 
The framework developed in the previous sections needs to be validated to understand 
how the framework can be used to analyse the ‘no one size fits all’ nature of and 
dynamic shifts in metropolitan planning. Employing the framework developed in 
three metropolitan regions (Greater London, Amsterdam Metropolitan Area, Portland 
Metropolitan Region), the framework successfully demonstrates that metropolitan 
planning is not “one size fits all” and shifts dynamically, as seen in Figure 2.4 (see also 
Appendixes 2-4). Interestingly, those three metropolitan regions applied similar 
prototypes for metropolitan planning in the 1960s-1970’s (prototype I) and more 


































Through analysis of the existing planning literature, Figure 2.4 shows the “no one size 
fits all” nature of and dynamic shifts in the coordination arrangements in metropolitan 
planning in three metropolitan regions, Greater London, Amsterdam Metropolitan 
Area and Portland Metropolitan Region. They created and explored alternatives to 
enhance effective coordination for metropolitan planning. They can change drastically 
or incrementally and they become path dependent. Can those patterns inspire other 
metropolitan regions in the world? 
 
2.6.2   Conclusion 
This research identified that effective coordination for metropolitan planning does not 
have a single definition. Metropolitan planning is thus not “one size fits all” and is not 
static.  Effective coordination for metropolitan planning differs from one metropolitan 
region to another, even from one time to another within the same metropolitan region. 
This shows the difficulty in offering a single definition of effective coordination. In 
Institutional Arrangement of Metropolitan Planning 
 
Portland Metropolitan Region The Greater London Amsterdam Metropolitan Area 
Source: author’s analysis 
Figure 2.4 
Prototypes of international metropolitan planning and its dynamic shifts 
Page 90 of 246 
 
addition, the existing literature discussing metropolitan planning offers different ways 
of identifying effective coordination. So, analysing effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning needs a comprehensive and systematic framework that can 
encompass those variations and dynamic shifts.  
  
To enhance our understanding of effective coordination for metropolitan planning, 
this research has developed a framework of metropolitan planning with various 
coordination arrangements and dynamic shifts. The framework of metropolitan 
planning developed in this chapter provides nine prototypes of metropolitan planning, 
each of which demonstrates a particular form of governance used through its specific 
instruments across two scopes of metropolitan planning: coordination to create 
coherent metropolitan policies, plans or strategies and coordination to implement 
them. Each scope of coordination may have a different form of governance. 
  
Using this framework, effective coordination for metropolitan planning can be 
analysed comprehensively and systematically. Based on this framework, a prototype 
of metropolitan planning represents an empirical type of coordination arrangement in 
a particular metropolitan region and at particular time. The organisations involved, 
who make efforts to keep and to enhance effective coordination in metropolitan 
planning, always change from one prototype to another. Change to another prototype 
implies that instruments also change. This situation demonstrates that metropolitan 




























































Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Design: 
Transportation in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region* 
 
 
3.1 Challenges of Governing Metropolitan Transportation 
 
Transportation issues, such as capacity or extension requirements of road and public 
transport networks, are best resolved at the metropolitan scale and require 
appropriate forms and approaches of governance for resolution. The Jakarta 
Metropolitan Region (JMR) is an example wherein the current governance structure 
is unable to address pressing transportation issues at the metropolitan scale and 
therefore metropolitan governance must be considered. Here, metropolitan 
governance is a crucial point for resolving issues related to metropolitan 
transportation and is defined as the interaction, coordination, and cooperation 
process the involved actors take to provide and produce regional infrastructures and 
services (Feiock 2009, 2013). Comprehensive and integrated transportation services 
and infrastructure require ”good’” governance to overcome their tendency for a 
fragmented and sectorial context, created by the fact that actors involved are limited 
by their own authority and capacity. Differing models of metropolitan governance 
could guide policy makers and urban planners in diverging directions on decisions 
about public transportation networks or toll roads. In other words, metropolitan 
governance influences the delivery of urban planning (Alexander 2006).  
 
A key problem is that metropolitan regions in many countries include autonomous 
local public agencies, which are simultaneously functionally connected through 
transportation. Metropolitan regions do not, as a rule, have adequate institutional 
arrangements for solving and addressing these kinds of regional matters (Miller and 
Lee 2009). The notion of metropolitan governance, therefore, has generated 
fundamental debate, both academically and in planning practice, on the question of 
which institutional arrangements will deliver good governance. Good governance 
issues such as government effectiveness and regulatory quality (Kaufmann et al. 2010) 
 
 
* This chapter has been published at Hidayat Putra, T., Woltjer, J., & Tan, W. G. Z. (2016). 
Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Design: Transportation in the Jakarta Metropolitan 
Region. In Decentralization and Governance in Indonesia (pp. 171-200). Springer, Cham  
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are key to providing and producing transportation services and infrastructures for 
urban areas. 
 
3.1.1 Jakarta Metropolitan Region  
This chapter showcases the institutional preferences of fragmented transportation 
actors in the case of Jakarta Metropolitan Region (JMR) of Indonesia for forming 
appropriate metropolitan governance at the regional scale (see Figure 3.1). The JMR, 
like other regions in the world, generally faces challenges in solving regional problems 
or addressing issues on a regional scale: these include floods, garbage disposal 
management, economic competition, manpower and labour wages, water 
management, and other issues in addition to transportation that involve local 
governments and other regional actors. The JMR suffers from the specific regional 
transportation problem of traffic jams. The worst traffic jams occur in Jakarta, the core 
area of the JMR and the economic, social, and political centre of the region and nation. 
This problem is exacerbated by the high volume of commuters travelling from the 
districts adjacent to Jakarta. The 2004 Study on Integrated Transportation Master 
Plan for Jabodetabek II (SITRAMP) facilitated by Bappenas and JICA, revealed that 
traffic jams generated a total economic loss of IDR 5,500 billion, comprised of IDR 
3,000 billion in vehicle operating costs and IDR 2,500 billion in travel time. Moreover, 
the study also predicted that if the situation does not improve soon, that loss will 
increase to IDR 65,000 billion by 2020, comprised of IDR 36,900 billion in longer 
travel time and IDR 28,100 billion in additional vehicle operating costs. The SITRAMP 
report also recommended several policies, such as (1) promotion of public 
transportation use, (2) alleviation of traffic congestion, (3) reduction of air pollutants 
and traffic noise, and (4) reduction of transportation accidents and improvements in 
security (Bappenas and JICA 2004).  




Map of Jakarta Metropolitan Region and its constituents 
 
Jakarta’s provincial government cannot resolve this problem on its own. It needs to 
coordinate and cooperate with other actor, such as other district governments, other 
provincial governments, and the central government, to reduce traffic caused by 
commuters who come from districts surrounding Jakarta and to develop a regional 
public mass transportation system. Appropriate metropolitan governance is a crucial 
issue because it is not only important to effectively provide and produce a regional 
public mass transportation system, but also to have that arrangement accepted by 
those regional actors from which support is required. In the case of the JMR, the 
establishment of appropriate metropolitan governance is particularly pressing as it 
directly affects the outcomes produced in the transportation system. 
 
Decentralization and local autonomy policies from the early 2000s impacted 
development at the regional scale. At that time, the JMR was even more fragmented: 
it consisted of six non-autonomous districts in the Province of Jakarta and nine 
autonomous districts within two other provinces. These local governments tend to 
focus on development within administrative boundaries, but lack focus on 
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development at the regional scale. This conflicts with transportation issues that are 
typically regional in nature. This kind of fragmentation occurs not only amongst local 
governments, but some evidence suggests that it also occurs amongst central agencies 
managing this region (Kawaguchi et al. 2013). Fragmentation can contribute to 
lowered government effectiveness, which is detrimental for citizens in the region. 
Therefore, a lack of regional development, specifically in metropolitan governance 
issues, should be taken into account.  
 
3.1.2 Appropriate Institutional Design  
Government effectiveness is one dimension of good governance associated with 
discussions about the quality of public services, policy formulation, and 
implementation (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Metropolitan governance arrangements 
should fit contextual circumstances, particularly so that they can enhance government 
effectiveness, including the ability to provide and produce services and infrastructure 
at the metropolitan scale. Furthermore, effective metropolitan governance could 
contribute to sustainable development (Wheeler 2000). Effective metropolitan 
governance could also enhance the quality of metropolitan transportation, ensuring it 
is designed to reduce traffic jams in the JMR, leading to decreased pollution and 
reduced economic loss.  
 
The object of analysis within this case is the extended service area development of 
TransJakarta Bus Rapid Transit (TJ BRT) from within Jakarta’s borders to adjacent 
districts as a measure to deal with JMR’s traffic problems. The service area expansion 
of TJ BRT is a good example, representing intensive debates on the question of what 
could be an effective model of metropolitan governance in the JMR. This 
understanding will lead to a context appropriate institutional design. Institutional 
design analysis is applied to this case study. Metropolitan governance requires 
appropriate institutional design for planning and executing metropolitan 
transportation development, particularly when the provision and production of 
infrastructures and services are fragmented. Institutional design facilitates the ability 
of actors—not only governments, but also others, such as civil societies and private 
entities—to reduce the effect of some institutional barriers to create a situation that is 
more conducive to attaining the formulated goals. Metropolitan governance in the 
JMR consists of local government agencies with mutual interaction and coordination 
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through general legislation. Therefore, the emphasis mainly lies on institutional 
design for macro-level arrangements such as general guidelines, and inter-
organisational arrangements at the meso-levels instead of micro-level arrangements 
such as task forces, working groups, and committees.  
 
Given the growing amount of metropolitan regions in the world, our society needs a 
better understanding of how actors (e.g., local governments, the central government, 
private entities, and civil societies) effectively provide and produce services and 
infrastructures at a metropolitan scale, linking different administrative authorities. In 
a case like the JMR, similar to other metropolitan regions in Indonesia, metropolitan 
governance is not legally clearly defined and the actors involved are often fragmented 
(Firman 2008). Focusing on transportation issues can enhance the understanding of 
appropriate models of metropolitan governance. This can, in turn, be applied to other 
regional issues in the JMR or even other urban areas. This chapter, therefore, proposes 
to explore what could be an appropriate institutional design for governing 
metropolitan transportation in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region. Here, appropriate 
institutional design refers to design that contributes to forming metropolitan 
governance that is accepted politically and can effectively implement policy and 
planning.  
 
3.1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
A qualitative methodology is applied, focusing on the metropolitan transportation 
institution of the JMR and its context of governance to understand what an 
appropriate institutional design could be. Relevant theories on institutional design 
and metropolitan governance were consulted and a proposed framework of 
institutional analysis has been applied to the case of JMR. The proposed framework is 
applied to empirical evidence collected through a triangulation of interviews and 
desktop research of policy documents and previous studies. This is followed by an 
analysis of previous and current institutional arrangements of the TJ BRT expansion. 
The chapter then concludes with discussions regarding what is an appropriate 
institutional arrangement and at what level institutional design is effective. 
 
The TransJakarta Bus Rapid Transit (TJ BRT) is a public transportation solution 
serving a total of 241 km of roadways (Adiwinarto 2013). The TJ BRT is designed to 
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serve the region around Jakarta and resolve transportation problems such as traffic 
jams and citizen mobility (Adiwinarto 2013). The TJ BRT was selected as a case study 
because of its progress made towards full implementation in comparison to other 
systems and, more importantly, the incorporation of inter-jurisdictional issues within 
this process.  
 
Data collection was carried out to obtain relevant data for analysis; desktop data 
collection included internet-based research and in-depth interviews of several key 
experts including: 
1. The Head of the BKSP Jabodetabekjur Secretariat (the regional agency for the 
JMR) 
2. A Section Head at the Ministry of Transport 
3. A Division Head at the National Development Planning Agency 
4. A Division Head at the Transport Department of Jakarta Provincial 
Government 
5. A Division Head at the Transport Department of Tangerang Municipality 
6. A Division Head at the Development Planning Agency of Tangerang 
Municipality 
7. A Division Head at the Development Planning Agency of Depok Municipality 
8. A Section Head at the Development Planning Agency of Bekasi Municipality 
9. A Division Head at the TJ BRT Unit (a Jakarta Public Service Agency). 
 
Most data were collected from online newspapers articles and literature, policy 
documents, and previous research. We reviewed articles published in four online 
national newspapers (Kompas.com, Tempo.co, Detik.com, and The Jakarta Post.com) 
between 2005 and 2013, and collected 49 articles related to the discourse of 
“Megapolitan” (a term for metropolitan governance proposed by the Governor), 
regional spatial planning, and inter-local government cooperation. In addition, we 
reviewed articles published in two online national newspapers (Kompas.com and 
Tempo.co) between 2008 and 2013, and collected 2,454 articles about the TJ BRT. 
While there are many newspapers in Indonesia, only four newspapers were selected 
because they are nationwide and perceived to be credible. The time periods were 
selected based on when the debates had occurred and availability of the article. 
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The collected policy documents vary from planning issues (spatial plan and 
transportation plan) to government arrangements (e.g., Law of Local Polity No. 32 of 
2004). The collection of previous research mostly discusses transportation issues in 
the JMR (e.g., Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [Bappenas] and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency [JICA] 2004, The Coordinating Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, The Republic of Indonesia [CMEA] and JICA 2012, The Institute for 
Transportation and Development Policy [ITDP] studies, and other related academic 
articles). An especially important source is the book written by Sutiyoso, the Governor 
of Jakarta of two terms (1997-2002, 2002-2007). In this book, he explains the 
“Megapolitan” concept that he had proposed to govern the JMR during his 
administration. He attempted to accommodate this concept in the revision of a new 
law on a special status for the Province of Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia. 
Therefore, we treated textual data from this book and relevant information in 
newspapers as main sources to be explored and analysed for the identification of 
preferences and perspectives of relevant actors. The preferences and perspectives were 
classified within the discourse of the Megapolitan concept, regional spatial planning, 
and inter-local government cooperation and then conceptualized within the 
institutional design approach. The research approach was confirmed as part of the 
triangulation method by examining events that occurred (e.g., a political decision 
passed into law, government policies included in regulations, or products like the 
extended development of TJ BRT) and then connecting them to the article stipulated 
in the law or the regulation to be verified. The triangulation process which connected 
newspaper articles, literature, policy documents, and previous research was an 
appropriate and accurate method to confirm the empirical evidence which was then 
identified, classified, and conceptualized. To analyse the collected data, institutional 
analysis framed within the institutional design approach was applied, specifically at 
the macro and meso-levels. Previously identified institutions and the actors’ 
improvements were at the core of our analysis. The analysis also included institutions 
related to current metropolitan transportation in the JMR that may be more 
appropriate for the actors involved. The analysis identified the actors’ preferences and 
perspectives, the events and their relationships, and then constructed, reconstructed, 
and classified them into several parts of analysis.  
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3.2 Combining Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Design 
 
This theoretical framework connecting metropolitan governance and institutional 
design is used to examine the case study. Metropolitan governance literature discusses 
the approaches are that used to develop transportation in a metropolitan region. The 
institutional design perspective facilitates the framing of those approaches into several 
classifications ranging from the macro to the meso-levels. Institutional design is also 
useful as a perspective that supports efforts to transform an idea into implementation 
where improvements made by actors could be identified and mapped systematically. 
Next, the concept and definitions of metropolitan governance and institutional design 
are explained leading towards the theoretical framework used to analyse the case 
study.  
 
3.2.1 Metropolitan Governance  
There are several intensive debates on metropolitan governance: what kind is more 
effective and accepted to implement in a metropolitan region; should that be done in 
a centralized or decentralized manner, or should we use a mix of those approaches; 
and should metropolitan governance be formal, informal, or a mix of both? In practice, 
the discussion about metropolitan governance involves coordination capacity and the 
mechanism preference. Coordination capacity is related to the capacity to address and 
solve the degrees of externalities. Coordination mechanism preference refers to the 
preference for adopting the transaction costs that emerge within the interaction 
between involved actors.  
 
Similarly, there are various definitions of metropolitan governance, covering 
regionalism, localism/public choice and new regionalism (Yaro and Ronderos 2011). 
These variations in definitions are a result of the different focus on which level of scale 
should conduct governance in order to achieve efficiency. The regionalism perspective 
concludes that a metropolitan region, consisting of some basic local governments, 
should be managed by the regional government (Ostrom et al. 1961, Gottmann 1957, 
1995). Proponents of this school of thought argue that efficiency of the provision and 
production of infrastructures and services can be reached if all local governments 
within a region are consolidated to meet economies of scale. This perspective 
encourages the establishment of a strong metropolitan government for a metropolitan 
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region. The second perspective, in contrast to the previous one, is a localism or public 
choice approach that focuses on providing and producing services and infrastructures 
within local government administrative boundaries. Supporters of this idea believe 
that efficiency can be obtained when every local government competes with each other 
to serve their own citizens. Competition among local governments generates the ability 
of people to ‘vote with their feet’ and move easily to another, perhaps better place and 
thus impacting on general elections outcomes (Tiebout 1956). The third perspective, 
new regionalism, promotes inter-local government cooperation and pragmatism (Yaro 
and Ronderos 2011, Savitch and Vogel 2000a; 2000b). With new regionalism, regional 
problems can be solved without reducing the authority of institutional actors involved 
and aid in achieving economies of scale. 
 
The previously discussed perspectives link to other debates on which approach is more 
effective and more accepted for governing a metropolitan region, whether through a 
centralized or decentralized approach. Centralized and decentralized approach 
options have been important since Thomas Jefferson, one of America’s earliest 
leaders, established the idea that a local government has to be independent and 
autonomous to provide space for citizens to participate in democracy, to be active in 
municipal meetings, and to be involved in governance (Hamilton et al. 2004). An 
arrangement or a governance approach that is set up and applied within a country, 
state, or province contributes to how local government functions. In a federal system, 
like the United States, various models of metropolitan governance are generated by 
local government constitutions (Oakerson and Parks 1989, Hamilton et al. 2004). A 
local government constitution provides space to local governments within a region to 
innovate and establish some models of relationships internally and externally. The 
influential factor for these models of metropolitan governance is whether a 
decentralized or centralized governance approach is applied (Hamilton et al. 2004). 
Those approaches are similar in administrative and political considerations, which 
also generate several models of metropolitan governance. To date, at least 17 models 
related to these considerations have been identified (Walker 1987).  
 
Based on economic considerations, the fact that provision and production of 
transportation infrastructure could generate a deeper knowledge about how 
metropolitan actors work to meet citizens’ demands on a metropolitan scale is 
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acknowledged. Provision and production are two important stages in realizing 
metropolitan services and infrastructures. The term provision refers to the 
responsibility for the quality and volume of services (and infrastructures) and ensuring 
that those services are financed and executed (Davey 1993 in Harpham and Boateng 
1997, p. 66). Provision also describes which goods and services are provided through 
public means, which private activities should be regulated, how much public revenue 
should be raised and how to raise it, and how production should be arranged and 
monitored (Parks and Oakerson 2000). The term production refers to infrastructure 
and services are delivered after decisions about volume and quality have been made 
(Davey 1993 in Harpham and Boateng 1997, p. 66) and how to transform input 
resources in a way that results in a product or renders a service (Parks and Oakerson 
2000). The understanding of the differences between provision and production 
becomes more meaningful when faced with a several-decades-long trend in which 
private entities are involved in production and civil societies are included in a public 
debate about the provision of public goods. Osborne (1993) discussed the importance 
of dividing the government’s role into steering and rowing roles with which to enhance 
a government’s performance. He also introduced the idea of an entrepreneur 
government that encourages the involvement of private entities in producing services 
and infrastructures.  
 
This separation triggers a distinction between the role of government and that of 
private entities and civil societies, providing an opportunity to identify different 
understandings about formal, informal, and mixed arrangements. In many countries, 
these arrangements depend on constitutional and related laws that regulate 
democracy, freedom of speech and the freedom to organize transparency, 
accountability, public procurement systems, and other related rules. In a metropolitan 
governance context, this generates formal, informal, or mixed governance 
arrangements that provide and produce metropolitan services and infrastructures.  
 
The actors involved also consider the embedded transaction costs and the degree of 
collective action problems. Transaction costs are a friction of the economy 
(Williamson 1985) and are barriers for inter-local governmental coordination and 
cooperation (Feiock 2009, 2012). Transaction cost can be expressed as the “… 
comparative cost of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under 
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alternative governance structures” (Williamson 1985, p. 2). It is a crucial factor that 
contributes to the form of governance. Two extreme forms of governance are that of 
the competitive market (political and economic) and a single hierarchical 
organisation. The competitive market is when transaction costs are low in impact, 
interdependence, and uncertainty. In contrast, a single hierarchical organisation (i.e., 
the public bureau and the corporate firm) generates a high impact, high 
interdependence, and high uncertainty. This single organisation form is better than 
the competitive market form because it can reduce transaction costs and avoid hazards 
(Alexander 2001).  
 
Within the context of metropolitan governance involving collaborations among 
individual local governments, the consideration of transaction costs is related not only 
to the forms of governance, but also to the considerations around entering or exiting 
any collaboration. High transaction costs occur when an arrangement has 
consequences that include eliminating independent authorities such as centralization, 
disrupting current governance activities, creating uncertainties about the balance of 
authority among actors, and shifting the inter-organisational problem to an intra-
organisational problem (Whitford 2010 in Feiock 2013, p. 400). In addition, in spite 
of the fact that the establishment of a regional authority enhances efficient urban 
policy, these consolidation efforts have failed in most cases in the United States 
(Feiock 2009). Instead, a collaboration that does not reduce actors’ autonomy is the 
most likely to be chosen. It could be formed as an informal network, a voluntary 
relationship, which, as a consequence, has low transaction costs. This informal 
network both preserves autonomy and makes it easier for actors to enter and exit the 
collaboration (Feiock 2012; 2013).  
 
Moreover, within the context of metropolitan governance, Lowery (2000) emphasized 
the spill-over problems/effects or externalities that could result from local government 
policies that have impacts across jurisdictions. Spill-over problems/effects could also 
be seen as losses or benefits (Ostrom et al. 1961). Furthermore, Feiock (2009) referred 
to spill-over problems/effects as collective action problems that relate to the 
difficulties actors within a region face in matching public goods and services to 
citizens’ demands on multiple scales. Collective action problems are divided into three 
categories: horizontal, vertical, and functional (Feiock 2012). A horizontal collective 
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problem makes it difficult to produce goods and services that cross jurisdictions or 
other boundaries. A vertical collective problem occurs between actors at different 
levels of government who produce similar policy objectives. Finally, a functional 
collective problem is the result of conflicts between service, policy, and resource 
systems that arises due to externalities between policy arenas and functional areas. 
These approaches in representing services and infrastructures that should be provided 
in a region are used in this analysis. The nature of services and infrastructures are an 
important consideration in the analysis of the actors involved when making decisions 
or arrangements (Feiock 2012). 
 
In summation, several aspects that contribute to the metropolitan governance are:  
1. Metropolitan governance approaches (centralized, decentralized, or mixed) 
2. Metropolitan governance arrangements (formal, informal, or mixed) 
3. Coordination mechanisms influenced by the degree of transaction costs 
(high/low) 
4. Coordination capacity to capture collective action problems (externalities or spill-   
over problems). 
 
3.2.2 Institutional Design 
Institutions are important as they dictate the space in which relevant actors consider 
whether to perform an action or not. North (1991) defined institutions as man-made 
constraints that configure social, political, and economic interaction. Institutions 
include both informal constraints (e.g., sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes 
of conduct) and formal rules (e.g., constitutions, laws, property rights). North (1991) 
also revealed that institutions provide incentive structure for an economy. Institutions 
are an important element that deserves societal consideration and research focus, 
through, for example, their contribution to the achievement of regional development 
(Rodriguez-Pose 2013).  
 
To understand metropolitan governance, one must consider the specific fit of 
institutions as determined by every aspects of the development of new regional 
services and infrastructure beyond that of the existing natural and man-made 
resources in a region. Actors involved in metropolitan governance consider 
coordination costs when addressing metropolitan-scale issues. Within the 
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metropolitan governance context, planners provide and produce metropolitan 
transportation services and infrastructures to solve problems, such as regional traffic 
jams. The planner’s purpose also requires him or her to pay attention to the 
institutions involved (Alexander 2006). The lack of an institution contributes to the 
ineffectiveness of planning (Gualini 2001). Therefore, a plan needs an appropriate 
institutional design to support its purpose in order to support realization.  
 
Institutional design pertaining to the which, how and what of institutions is required 
to implement a desired outcome (Alexander 2006, p. 4) and is defined as;  
 
the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organisational structures 
that will enable and constrain behaviour and action so as to accord with held 
values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks. 
 
It ranges from the macro to the meso and on to the micro-level. At the macro-level (the 
highest level), governance (constitution and related laws) is the main issue. 
Governance is not only government, but also the relation and form of all the actors 
involved. In some instances, discussions at this level also include a programme, 
project, or policy with an impact that is felt nationwide or even over a larger area, such 
as the Code of Hammurabi, the Code of Napoleon, or Roosevelt’s New Deal 
programme. The body of knowledge of governance at the macro-level that fits with 
planning and institutional design is termed institutional economic knowledge 
(Alexander 2006). At this level, the appropriate question is “what are the appropriate 
forms of governance for the identified task in the relevant context?” (Alexander 2007, 
p. 53). 
 
Discussions at the meso-level of institutional design focus on coordination. This level 
“involves the institutional design of the planning and implementation of structures 
and processes. It also covers the issue of creation or utilization of inter-organisational 
networks, the establishment of new organisations or the transformation of existing 
ones, and the development and deployment of incentives and constraints in the form 
of laws, regulations, and resources used to develop and apply policies, programs, 
projects, and plans.” (Alexander 2006, p.7). Analysis of coordination at this level 
involves inter-organisational coordination, an element for institutional design 
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architecture. This is “the process of concerting the decisions and actions of several—
sometimes many—organisations, for a purpose or undertaking that could not be 
accomplished by any one organisation acting alone” (Alexander 1995, p. 67). In line 
with governance at the macro-level that applies institutional economics, at the meso-
level this is based on transaction cost economics that contribute to the structure of 
forms of governance (Alexander 2006).  
 
Alexander (2006) also mentioned that the planners mostly function at the meso-level 
in the various fields of transportation planning, infrastructure planning, land 
development, housing, social and human services, public-private partnership, local 
economic development, urban revitalization. Within these fields, planners develop a 
plan and ensure its effective implementation within a specific time schedule. Next to 
planners, almost everyone else who has a position that involves managing an 
organisation is responsible for ensuring effective achievement. These processes 
involve institutional design. In addition, the meso-level of institutional design focuses 
on the question “(what)… frameworks, system, or structures ‘fit’ the institutional 
design setting and tasks?” (Alexander 2007, p. 53). 
 
Finally, the micro-level of institutional design emphasizes discussions about agency. 
It includes discussions about intra-organisational design, organisational sub-units 
and small semi-formal or informal social units (e.g., committees, teams, task forces, 
work groups). Agent theory could be useful in the analysis of this level (Alexander 
2006). The application of the analysis at this level could, for example, involve the 
analysis of a contracted bus company’s performance issues in relation to its public 
agency.  
 
Alexander (2006) identified two approaches of institutional design in practice. First, 
institutional design is not like other design activities, such as architecture, that require 
the best knowledge, intuition, and contextual experience. Institutional design should 
be collectively developed (Alexander 2006). Requirements may constrain people’s 
ability to share knowledge, but the three levels of analysis (macro, meso and micro) 
are “technologies” that could assist people in understanding and identifying a problem 
and formulating a solution in a specific context. This technology generates the second 
approach to institutional design: it is an interactive process or dialogue between 
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collective “micro-constitutional” decisions in a much needed heuristic approach 
(Alexander 2006).  
 
3.2.3 Theoretical framework 
The various models of metropolitan governance that exist around the world result 
from the different constitutions and related laws, and different arrangement of actors 
involved in interaction and coordination. Unlike local governments, metropolitan 
regions are not political entities (Miller and Lee 2009). Generally, there is no set 
political structure as a city begins to grow and expand into surrounding district areas, 
becoming a core of a region. Local governments and other actors exist within a region 
and are involved in metropolitan governance. These include the central or federal 
government (particularly in a metropolitan region where the capital state is located or 
in a region of national importance), provincial or state government, private entities, 
and civil societies. Metropolitan governance can involve a wider range of actors 
because the term “governance” has a broader meaning than “government” as it 
includes a decision-making process.  
 
According to literature, there is a correspondence between institutional design and 
metropolitan governance (see Table 3.1). The macro-level of institutional design 
concentrates on discussing governance. Contributing factors include the constitution 
and related laws that link up with the governance institution models (centralized, 
decentralized, or mixed) in a metropolitan region. The macro-level includes 
governance arrangements that can be formal, informal, or mixed. At a macro-level, the 
governance arrangement provides a space for actors to interact, coordinate, and 
cooperate. At the meso-level, the focus shifts to discussing coordination. Contributing 
factors, such as transaction cost theory and inter-organisational coordination 
(Alexander 1998), connect with coordination mechanisms in metropolitan 
governance, which in turn considers both factors. The meso-level includes 
coordination capacity, particularly the capacity to address the magnitude of spillover 
problems. When institutional design is an interactive process, the quality of 
coordination is influenced by the space provided by governance arrangement at a 
macro-level. This illustrates a link between the macro and meso-levels. 
 
 
Page 108 of 246 
 
Table 3.1 





Aspects of Metropolitan Governance Contributing factors 
Macro 
1. Governance approaches (centralized, 
decentralized, mixed) 
2. Governance arrangements (formal, 
informal, mixed) 
Constitution and related laws 
Meso 
1. Coordination mechanism 
2. Coordination capacity 




A theoretical framework combining metropolitan governance and institutions design 
and illustrating their relationship as based on the above discussions is developed (see 
Figure 3.2). Institutional design is an interactive process that may be heuristic and 
contributes to the formation of some aspects of metropolitan governance. Institutional 
design contributes to metropolitan governance, such as through an approach 
(centralized, decentralized, or mixed), or arrangement (formal, informal, or mixed). 
Institutional design also provides coordination capacity for addressing several degrees 
of collective action problems, and accommodating several classes of transaction costs. 
The first two items relate to the macro-level and the latter two relate to the meso-level 
of institutional design. The composite of those aspects influence actors involved to 
develop metropolitan transportation services and infrastructures. Furthermore, 
evaluation of the quality of metropolitan transportation developments provides 
feedback to metropolitan governance. Improvement may be related and impact one or 
more of the aspects that are part of institutional design at the macro-level, meso-level, 
or both.  
 
Page 109 of 246 
 
 
source: Authors as developed from Alexander (2006) 
 
Figure 3.2 
Theoretical Framework combining Metropolitan Governance and Institutional Design 
for transportation development 
 
 
3.3 Transportation in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region 
 
Development of public mass transportation at a regional scale is important for a 
metropolitan region like the JMR. Public mass transportation systems serve an entire 
region’s mobility and support its strategic economic, social, and political roles within 
a national landscape. The development of a better metropolitan transportation system 
in the JMR is crucial as it is an area with acute traffic jams and a worsening situation 
having economic and social impacts. Unfortunately, this situation is compounded by 
the fragmentation of actors that made it more difficult to reach a solution. Many actors 
were involved in metropolitan transportation development in the JMR: the Ministry 
of Transportation, the Ministry of Public Work, the Ministry of National Development 
Planning, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Finance, the Provincial 
Department of Transportation in three different provinces (Jakarta, West Java, and 
Banten), the Provincial Department of Public Work in three different provinces 
(Jakarta, West Java, and Banten), the Regional Development Planning Agency in three 
different provinces (Jakarta, West Java, and Banten), the District Department of 
Transportation, the District Department of Public Work, and the District Development 
Planning Agency in nine different districts (Tangerang Regency, South Tangerang 
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Municipality, Tangerang Municipality in the Province of Banten, and Depok 
Municipality, Bogor Municipality, Bekasi Municipality, Bogor Regency, Bekasi 
Regency and Cianjur Regency in the Province of West Java), the Association of Land 
Transportation Owners and Operators (Organda), and the BKSP Jabodetabek (the 
JMR inter-local government cooperation agency). This fragmentation was also 
reflected in the coordination failures amongst actors involved in the horizontal, 
vertical, and functional aspects of governance (Bappenas and JICA 2004).  
 
The Provincial Government of Jakarta developed a bus rapid transit (BRT) system to 
deal with the above issues. This is a dedicated bus route transportation system 
specifically designed to improve citizens’ mobility in metropolitan areas or large cities 
by increasing frequency and capacity. It functions with dedicated lines or routes 
integrated with designated bus stops, specific type of buses, and programmed 
schedules that link a number of strategic areas within a region, served by an intelligent 
transportation system to coordinate information. The advantages of BRT are (1) 
reduced travel time, (2) the possibility to reduce private vehicle use, (3) reduced air 
pollution, and (4) the possibility to develop a system integrated with other transit 
modes such as a train or light rail. In addition, developing BRT instead of another 
transit mode helps to (1) supports activities in the central business district, (2) be 
implemented quickly and incrementally, (3) be less costly than rail transit, (4) be more 
effectively serve and adapt to different environments between suburban and core 
areas, (5) provide quality performance, (6) be more suited to linking with extended rail 
transit service areas, and (7) be integrated with the environment to foster economic 
development and transit, and pedestrian design (Levinson et al 2002). This explains 
the popularity of BRT around the world in both developed and developing countries, 
such as Ottawa (Canada), Boston (United States), Brisbane (Australia), Amsterdam, 
Eindhoven, Rotterdam, and The Hague (the Netherlands), Bogota (Colombia), 
Guangzhou and Taipei (China), Tehran (Iran), Istanbul (Turkey), Mexico City 
(Mexico), and Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, and Curitiba (Brazil) 
(Hidalgo 2012, Levinson et al. 2002, Veeneman and Koppenjan 2010).  
 
The institutional arrangements of these metropolitan areas that provide and produce 
BRT differ from each other even within the same country (e.g., in the Netherlands). 
For instance, BRT in Bogota, Colombia is mainly managed through a public-private 
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partnership: the central and local governments are responsible for delivering 
infrastructure, busways, and stations, and for planning and controlling operations 
while private entities are contracted to acquire and operate the vehicles and some 
supporting infrastructures (Turner, Kooshian and Winkelman 2012, p. 12). In the 
Netherlands, BRT is managed differently in each of the four cities (Veeneman and 
Koppenjan 2010). In Amsterdam, BRT was developed through close collaboration 
between an operator, the province, and a regional authority with national and 
provincial funding. In Rotterdam, one district (the Municipality of Capelle) plays an 
important role in managing BRT for the regional authority similar to The Hague, 
which as a municipality also takes responsibility for managing the regional authority. 
However, a different type of management is applied in Eindhoven and the Veldhoven 
area. There, the regional authority takes the lead. This is also the case in Boston 
(United States), where the BRT is managed by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority, which operates mass transit services such as buses, streetcars, and rapid 
transit lines, and which contracts Amtrak to operate commuter railroad services 
(Gomez-Ibanez 1996). These illustrations show that there are various models of 
metropolitan governance related to transportation and BRT. 
 
The Jakarta Metropolitan Region had different and dynamic experiences in 
developing its BRT system - TransJakarta Bus Rapid Transit, locally known as the 
busway. This study identifies three phases of improvements for developing TJ BRT 
through (1) the Megapolitan proposal, (2) JMR spatial plan, and (3) inter-local 
government cooperation. These improvements have been identified and examined 
through the lens of institutional design.  
 
3.3.1 Improvement Phase 1: the ‘Megapolitan’ Proposal (2005-2007) 
Traffic jams in Jakarta are a critical and acute problem. Two important studies by 
Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative (INDII), the Australian Aid (AUSAid), CMEA, and 
JICA have identified the cause of the traffic problem to be a result of an imbalance 
between road development on the supply side and growth in the number of daily 
vehicles. These studies predicted that without necessary measures, gridlock would 
occur in 2014 due to the increase in the number of daily commuters from districts 
surrounding Jakarta who work in the Province of Jakarta (CMEA and JICA 2012, 
INDII-AUSAid 2011).  
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In order to reduce traffic jams around the Province of Jakarta, the provincial 
government cooperated with private companies to develop the BRT system. The first 
corridor has been in operation since 2004. While the system was designed to serve 12 
corridors from 2004 to 2007, only 7 corridors were completed. However, Akbar (2012) 
pointed out that the system served around 300 thousand passengers per day in 2012. 
Moreover, this was also an improvement because the regular buses in use before the 
TJ BRT had a number of weaknesses such as not following a predictable schedule, not 
stopping at bus stops, not stopping at all once the bus was full, sitting and waiting to 
collect more passengers delaying those already on the bus, and competing for 
passengers at the curb side in a dangerous way. Moreover, the buses were deteriorated 
thus creating air pollution and serving as sites of petty crime (ITDP 2005). This old-
fashioned bus service was transformed and made more efficient on some routes. It 
successfully supports citizens’ mobility, reduces traffic jams in Jakarta’s main 
corridor, and decreases air pollution. In relation to supporting global sustainable 
development and the clean air campaign, the TJ BRT contributed to the Provincial 
Government of Jakarta, winning the Air Quality Management Champion Award of the 
Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities in 2006 (Soehodho 2011).  
 
Although successful, the TJ BRT only served limited areas of Jakarta, whilst 
commuters from surrounding districts contributed to traffic jams. In response to those 
commuters (see Table 3.2), specifically to reduce the number of private vehicles they 
used, the Provincial Government of Jakarta proposed extending the service coverage 
area by integrating the surrounding district governments under one consolidated 
management. This was an idea, introduced by Sutiyoso, the Governor of the Province 
of Jakarta for two terms (1997-2002 and 2002-2007) as part of the Megapolitan 
concept. In fact, it was a revitalization of an idea proposed by Ali Sadikin, the Governor 
of Jakarta from 1966-1977, to consolidate the region. Sutiyoso (2007) believed that the 
JMR would be better served by one responsible organisation, established to reduce the 
ineffectiveness of inter-local government cooperation. His idea was to integrate the 
region around management of issues, such as transportation, floods, and waste 
management. He later modified it to integrate those issues through regional spatial 
planning. He tried to use this concept to solve traffic jams by expanding service area 
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of mass transit systems (e.g., the monorail and TJ BRT) from within the municipality 
of Jakarta towards other surrounding districts (Sutiyoso 2007).  
Table 3.2 
















West part 247 344 39% Tangerang Selatan 
Municipality 
Banten 
Tangerang Regency Banten 
Depok Municipality West Java 
South part 234 338 44% Bogor Municipality West Java 
Bogor Regency West Java 
Bekasi Municipality West Java 
East part 262 423 62% 




743 1105 49% 
Source:  Adapted from the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 
and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), (JUTPI Study 2012)  
 
 
The Megapolitan concept was inspired by Megalopolis, as introduced by Jean 
Gottmann, (1957) to describe a large region on the north-eastern seaboard of the 
United States where urbanization functionally connected some areas (e.g., Boston, 
New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.). He proposed the establishment of a 
specific institutional arrangement: treating that extensive region as a unit in which 
interstate compacts might arise to solve transportation problems (Gottmann, 1957). 
Sutiyoso’s concept was intended to be accommodated in a new law or an amendment 
of the Law of the Province of Jakarta as the Capital City of the Republic of Indonesia. 
This is classified as a regionalism approach, focused on strengthening a regional 
government (Yaro and Ronderos 2011). 
 
Traditionally, the JMR has been governed through an inter-local government 
cooperation agency: the Badan Kerja Sama Pembangunan Jabodetabekjur (the BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur), formally established in 1993, with an initial stage of this cooperation 
starting in 1975 (BKSP Jabodetabekjur 2007). The BKSP Jabodetabekjur had some 
tasks related to integrating, synchronizing, and simplifying all aspects of programmes. 
It consults with the central government about the development of the JMR and its 
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implementation plan. This task was difficult to achieve because this agency had little 
authority (Firman and Dharmapatni 1994). This region also experiences development 
problems related to having low revenue and excessive charges decreasing its 
competitiveness. During the Suharto era (prior to the reform movement), these were 
not significant problems because the powerful central government could either offer 
political solutions or take over the control. In spite of these weaknesses, the BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur has been politically accepted (Firman 2008). 
 
To overcome the ineffectiveness of the BKSP Jabodetabekjur, Sutiyoso offered four 
options for managing the region. The first option, the Megapolitan concept, was 
realized through a new special province and led by the Governor of Jakarta. The 
second option was to enhance the performance of the inter-local government 
cooperation agency. The third was to allow one of the current ministers in the cabinet 
to lead the region (e.g., the Minister of Public Work, the Minister of Home Affairs, or 
the Minister of National Development Planning), or to allow the president to appoint 
a new minister, the Minister of Megapolitan, to govern the region. Finally, the fourth 
option was to form a new authority that included sectoral authorities such as a 
transportation authority (Sutiyoso 2007). 
 
We have met frequently, but I want to institutionalize and 
strengthen it through the law. The own-local revenue will not 
be taken over, a regent is still the regent, and also the mayor. 
The busway (the TJ BRT) could be proposed to reach 
Tangerang, the monorail to reach Bekasi and the subway to 
reach Depok. (Sutiyoso, the Governor of Jakarta 1997-2002, 
2002-2007, quoted from Mahbub (2006), translated from 
Indonesian) 
 
Sutiyoso argued that this was still a decentralized approach in which local 
governments have their own authority. However, implicit in the proposal was the idea 
that the Provincial Government of Jakarta was designed to become a main actor with 
a role in the entirety of the JMR in providing and producing metropolitan services and 
infrastructures. Based on this designed authority, the Provincial Government of 
Jakarta would extend the services of the TJ BRT and other public mass transportation 
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systems, such as monorail and subway, from within the municipality of Jakarta to 
municipalities in the surrounding districts. To support this idea further and to declare 
his readiness and confidence, Sutiyoso also endorsed the Macro Transport Scheme. 
The success of the TJ BRT development in reducing traffic in the municipality of 
Jakarta was credited as the selling point for this scheme. 
 
Even though some district governments supported the Megapolitan proposal, the 
governors of West Java and Banten rejected it. Both governors perceived it as a 
reduction of their authority, annexing districts into the authority of the Province of 
Jakarta, thus significantly decreasing their own provincial revenue as each district 
contributed significantly through the vehicle tax. Opponents also argued that it is 
better to govern the region through a regional spatial plan than through consolidation 
of the local governments into one authority. They supported the idea in general but 
since regional problems are common problems, these should be addressed with some 
sort of collective action instead of a created metropolitan government that would 
reduce their direct authority.  
 
I absolutely agree if the concept is intended to improve people’s 
well-being rather than take over administration. We have a plan 
and vision for this region, so it will be better if the (Megapolitan) 
concept does not affect the administrative powers. (Danny 
Setiawan, the Governor of West Java from 2003-2008, quoted 
from Sufa 2006) 
 
In the second option, the concept acknowledged existing regional governance but 
unfortunately influential actors had the perception that the mechanisms would reduce 
the authority of local governments. Since the concept did not cohere with other 
existing laws, the proposal was rejected not only by the governors, but also by some 
ministers. This idea actually involved a political reform. The existing law about local 
government (Law No. 32/2004) emphasized the decentralization of local government 
and encouraged inter-local government cooperation in solving inter-jurisdictional 
problems. Finally, this proposal failed politically when the parliament did not turn this 
concept into the new law.  
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Based on an institutional design framework, this proposal tried to improve the 
approach to governance by moving from a decentralized approach to a mixed approach 
with elements of centralization and decentralization. A decentralized approach 
preserves local autonomy with the local government as the main actor in providing 
and producing public goods. A mixed approach promotes the consolidation of local 
autonomy by centralizing power in a single authority at the local government level. 
Regionalism proponents believed that this would enhance effectiveness and efficiency 
because a new, larger entity and a unified organisation would elevate economic scale 
and reduce transaction costs. In spite of these advantages, this Megapolitan proposal 
failed because the improvement needed to transform the metropolitan governance 
model would require a political change. This process also incorporated some efforts 
such as lobbying, an opinion war played out in the newspapers and media, 
demonstrations, intensive debates, and bargaining that could change national or 
regional political configurations. These efforts are classified as having high transaction 
costs. Feiock (2009) mentioned that an action that is perceived to reduce the authority 
of some actors could be classified as a high transaction cost, a barrier to creating close 
coordination amongst metropolitan actors. Moreover, “the transaction costs of 
entering or exiting a relationship are highest with collaborative arrangements 
mandated through governmental authority and lowest with collaborative 
arrangements based on voluntary relationship and social constraints” (Feiock 2013, p. 
401).  
 
3.3.2 Improvement Phase 2: the Spatial Plan of the JMR (2008-2012) 
This analysis is not intended to evaluate the performance of spatial planning, but to 
identify the possibility offered for governing the JMR region. As mentioned before, the 
Megapolitan proposal failed. The actors involved preferred to govern the JMR through 
a spatial plan rather than taking a political approach. At the same time as those 
intensive discussions were taking place, JMR was preparing its spatial plan. It was 
commonly perceived as a tool for mitigating regional floods after a big flood hit the 
JMR in 2002. Both the governors of West Java and Banten encouraged the central 
government to issue this spatial plan. The Minister of Public Work coordinated 
formulation of this spatial plan. Later, in 2008, it was officially launched through 
President Regulation No. 54 (The Republic of Indonesia 2008). The JMR spatial plan 
addresses a number of issues: not only flood mitigation, but also spatial structures and 
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spatial patterns, transportation, and water supply. Related to the transportation issue, 
this plan also organizes public mass transport, such as the BRT, train, monorail, and 
highways. This spatial plan is dedicated to developing a regional transportation system 
that creates synergy among transportation modes while considering the origin and 
destination of central activities in the region (land use).  
 
Merely developing an integrated spatial planning, it is not a 
matter because it does not change an administrative status. 
(Danny Setiawan, Governor of West Java from 2003-2008, 
quoted from Muttaqien (2006); translated from Indonesian) 
 
This spatial plan was perceived as a win-win solution for governing the JMR, when 
compared to the Megapolitan concept. All the involved local governments within the 
region accepted this spatial plan politically because it did not reduce local autonomy 
or the authority of local governments. This presidential regulation gave the Minister 
of Public Work the authority to coordinate technical spatial planning for this region 
and it explicitly accommodates the existing metropolitan governance model. Inter-
organisational coordination and inter-local government cooperation within the region 
are facilitated by an inter-local government cooperation agency. Each local 
government in the region operates this spatial plan and it preserves their autonomy. 
This approach could be classified as localism or public choice (Yaro and Ronderos 
2011). 
 
Interestingly, even though the spatial plan was most preferred by the actors involved, 
the current metropolitan transportation development has been not based on that 
spatial plan. For example, the recent discourses on the monorail development plans, 
such as lines from Cibubur in Depok Municipality to Cawang in Jakarta, and also from 
Sentul in Bogor Regency to Kampung Rambutan in Jakarta, are based on profit 
calculations from a project initiator. These new plans were not provided for in the JMR 
development spatial plan. This spatial plan also did not accommodate the extension of 
the TJ BRT in which its service area was to be operationalized within the border area 
of Jakarta. Furthermore, it did not clearly state which actor was responsible for 
developing metropolitan transport. Despite these gaps, this regional spatial plan was 
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successful in reducing regional political tension and can be seen as a transition that 
generated further improvement. 
 
Planning is a property of organisation and the transaction costs theory of planning 
could explain the link among inter-organisational systems (Alexander 1992). The 
regional spatial plan resulted from a process of coordination between local 
governments within the JMR and the central government. Based on an institutional 
design approach, they are more likely to choose coordination as the discussion core of 
the meso-level. Actors perceived that coordination through regional spatial planning 
development had lower transaction costs than consolidation of the region, which 
reduces the authority of actors involved. Coordination was more accepted than a direct 
political approach. 
 
3.3.3 Improvement Phase 3: Strengthening Inter-Local Governmental 
Cooperation, Supported by the Central Government (2012-now) 
The current metropolitan governance approach in the JMR preserves decentralization 
and local autonomy. This form of metropolitan governance accepts the political role of 
the regional agency (i.e., the BKSP Jabodetabekjur). Fragmented actors prefer to 
apply the regional spatial plan as a tool to improve metropolitan governance. 
Unfortunately, the provided spatial plan still lacks details about developing 
metropolitan transport. This regional spatial plan does not accommodate the extended 
service area of the TJ BRT from within the municipality of Jakarta to adjacent districts 
and does not anticipate the dynamic situation, such as monorail development. Instead, 
it is part of the provision stage. The region requires increased provision and 
production of services and infrastructures.  
 
Recently, extension of the TJ BRT from the municipality of Jakarta to the surrounding 
districts has flourished. The extension is also known as the Busway/the TJ BRT-
integrated Border Transit (locally, APTB = Angkutan Perbatasan Terintegrasi 
Busway). This new TJ BRT serves some corridors that connect Jakarta to some 
strategic locations such as Bekasi Municipality, Bogor Municipality, Bogor Regency, 
Tangerang Regency, and South Tangerang Municipality. It was also designed to cover 
Depok Municipality. Textual data mentioned that the Jakarta Transport Department 
had played a role in implementing this extension, which was made easier after the 
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Governor of West Java encouraged the services of TJ BRT to reach some JMR districts 
in West Java. This request was endorsed at an official BKSP Jabodetabekjur forum 
meeting. The BKSP Jabodetabekjur acted on this request by communicating and 
coordinating transportation agencies in the region. As the owner of TJ BRT, the 
Transport Department of Jakarta is required to meet this demand. This effort was 
supported by the Ministry of Public Work, which also assisted in the building of a new 
line (e.g., one that connected Pulogadung in the Jakarta area to Bekasi Municipality) 
and the Ministry of Transportation which developed supporting facilities.  
 
The current metropolitan transportation developments of the monorail, the TJ BRT 
and other infrastructure developments have been accommodated by the Ministry of 
Transportation. In 2013, the ministry officially launched the General Plan of Public 
Mass Transport Infrastructures in the Jakarta Bogor Depok Tangerang and Bekasi (the 
JMR administration excluding the Regency of Cianjur) (The Republic of Indonesia 
2013). This general plan applies to road-based and rail-based public transit 
infrastructures, multimodal integration, financial requirements (indicative amount), 
financial source arrangements (public and private), and development time horizons 
(2013-2014, 2014-2020 and 2020-2030). This may be the first comprehensive plan 
for public transportation development covering almost the entire area of the JMR. 
 
These extended services demonstrate that the actors involved rely on a meso-level 
improvement focused on coordination effectiveness. When the provision issue is 
clearly accepted by actors involved, the improvement moves to implementation in the 
production stage. The prominent role of the BKSP Jabodetabekjur and the Jakarta 
Transport Department in coordinating the extension of TJ BRT service areas fills a gap 
in the regional spatial plan. That coordination does not require a change of governance 
approach. Moreover, it still preserves local autonomy and uses the space provided by 
the applied governance approach to utilize the opportunity. Based on the political 
consensus in the BKSP forum meeting, the BKSP Jabodetabekjur and the Jakarta 
Transport Department actively play roles in enhancing inter-local government 
cooperation around regional transport. The department arranges and deploys the 
decided-upon tasks to other relevant actors (e.g., it coordinates surrounding district 
transportation departments in preparing bus terminals and dedicated lines within 
their administration). The department also prepares procurement for operators and 
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makes contracts with bus operators (private companies). Therefore, the third 
improvement strengthens the second improvement. Within metropolitan governance 






Findings indicate a need to have an agency that is able and capable of implementing 
the decided-upon tasks. However, it is still unclear whether this is the case, particularly 
in identifying another benefit offered by the Jakarta Transport Department to its 
colleague agencies in districts surrounding Jakarta. This study also found competition 
among actors (e.g., the Ministry of Transport, the Province Government of Jakarta, 
and the regional agency, the BKSP Jabodetabekjur) for extending the coverage area of 
TJ BRT from the province of Jakarta to the region. There is competition between other 
actors: (1) between the Ministry of Transport and the Jakarta Transport Department, 
in terms of the actor responsible for issuing a permit for an inter-provincial bus, such 
as TJ BRT and APTB, and (2) between the Ministry of Transport and the BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur, in terms of the actor responsible for arranging and bundling a 
cooperation agreement for the extended area of TJ BRT and APTB. This competition 
results from a lack of clearly defined organisation around who is responsible for 
regional transportation. However, the findings identify that coordination at the meso-
level of institutional design should be strengthen by the capacity of actors involved to 
achieve the decided-upon task. Findings are summarized in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3 









Result Contributing Factors 
Macro Governance The ‘Megapolitan’ 
concept 
incorporated into an 
amendment of the 
Law of Jakarta  
Regionalism Rejected This political reform generated a high transaction cost. It failed because 
this proposal was perceived to reduce the authority of surrounding local 
governments who would have been impacted by the proposal. 
 
Meso Coordination The Development 












1. This spatial plan does not intervene and reduce the local 
governments’ authority. It supports inter-local governmental 
cooperation. 
2. This plan clearly states that public mass transportation would be 
built to connect Jakarta to surrounded districts. 
3. This plan lacks any accommodation of the extended development 
of TJ BRT from within the municipality of Jakarta to surrounding 
districts. 
4. This plan has no clearly defined institution that is responsible for 
developing regional public mass transportation systems. 
5. Although there are gaps, this spatial plan succeeded in decreasing 
regional political tension and may also generate further 
improvement. 
 
Meso Coordination Strengthened inter-
local governmental 
cooperation and 
supported by the 







1. The governance approach that preserves local autonomy has not 
been changed. 
2. As an inter-local government cooperation agency, the BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur is an organisation that is accepted politically by 
local governments and has a specific role in the provision stage 
of metropolitan transportation decision. 
3. The BKSP Jabodetabekjur is also active in coordinating and 
deploying decided-upon tasks to other agencies in the region. 
4. There is strong support from the central government. 
 
 (Source: authors) 
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3.5 Appropriate Governance for Metropolitan Transportation 
 
This chapter has discussed initiatives of actors involved in providing and producing 
metropolitan transportation through good governance and appropriate institutional 
design. Good governance for metropolitan transportation turned out to typically 
include improved government effectiveness through supra-local cooperation and 
improved regulatory quality for regional coordination. The JMR case study points to 
three actual efforts or phases in policy practice to establish appropriate institutional 
arrangements. The first effort involved the Megapolitan concept, which attempted to 
improve the governance approach in the JMR. The second effort implied improvement 
through formulating a formal regional spatial plan. The third effort was enhanced 
inter-local governmental cooperation supported by the central government. Two later 
improvements occurred at the meso-level, with a focus on coordination.  
 
3.5.1  Effective governance and regional coordination 
The notion of institutional design was used to identify and classify the three initial 
improvements. The first improvement was proposed through the macro-level of 
institutional design, while the second and third improvements were proposed through 
the meso-level of institutional design. This study suggests that improvements at the 
meso-level, focusing on inter-organisational coordination, are more preferable than 
improvement at the macro-level, which focuses on general governance guidance. 
Coordination is perceived to incorporate fewer transaction costs than comprehensive 
governance reform. Governance reform in the context of urban transportation is 
generally perceived to reduce local autonomy and involve high transaction costs, 
which are barriers for cooperation (Feiock 2009). The JMR case suggests that 
government effectiveness (i.e., in the actual development of metropolitan 
transportation infrastructure and services) lies in improved regional coordination.  
 
Four factors contributing to the current development of TJ BRT were also identified:  
1. the governance approach preserving local autonomy has not changed,  
2. the role of the BKSP Jabodetabekjur as the inter-local government cooperation 
agency for the JMR is accepted politically by local governments and it has a 
specific role in the provision stage of metropolitan region transportation 
decision making,  
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3. the BKSP Jabodetabekjur is also active in coordinating and deploying decided-
upon tasks to other agencies in the region, and  
4. there is a strong support from the central government.  
 
3.5.2 Appropriate Institutional Design 
Based on those factors as indicated by the findings and the analysis, the appropriate 
institutional design for metropolitan transportation development in the JMR is as 
follows:  
1. At the macro-level, governance involves a mix of decentralized and centralized 
approaches, which is acknowledged by local government authorities and 
supported by the central government. The governance arrangement should also 
be an informal arrangement. This means that provisional decisions are facilitated 
by a public entity (in this case, the BKSP Jabodetabekjur), which then is further 
implemented in the production stage by another entity, in this case local 
governments (the Provincial Government of Jakarta/the Jakarta Transportation 
Department and surrounding district governments of Jakarta). 
2. At the meso-level, the coordination mechanism preferred by actors involved in the 
region is inter-local government cooperation that is supported by the central 
government and the regional agency. This mechanism is perceived to generate 
lower transaction costs than regional integration. The required coordination 
capacity mainly involves capacities to address collective action problems. These 
capacities refer to the nature of metropolitan transportation services and 
infrastructures, covering mixed externalities of actors involved, resulting from 
horizontal, vertical, and functional externalities.  
 
Even though the actors see meso-level improvements as more probable than macro-
level improvements, there are actually other options at the meso-level. One alternative 
improvement would establish coordination for strategic decisions and 
implementation. This would however require an agency with the ability and the 
capacity to deploy the previously decided-upon tasks to other agencies and to establish 
implementation commitments from the other agencies. Therefore, the institutional 
design required to support planners in safeguarding effectiveness and realizing plans 
is not only located in arrangements at the macro and meso-levels, but also in the 
capable actor. Even though the existing Law of Local Polity (the Law No. 32 of 2004), 
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the government regulation of local government cooperation (Government Regulation 
No. 50 of 2007) and other ministry decrees promote inter-local government 
cooperation, this study demonstrates that political and legal aspects should be 
followed up by capacity building for coordination and cooperation. It is important to 
remain aware that an actor’s capacity could also be supported by private entities (in 
this case, bus operators).  
 
According to the forms of governance derived from the transaction cost theory, this 
theory suggests that a unified and hierarchical governance arrangement that 
integrates horizontally or vertically within a single organisation could be created to 
minimize transaction costs among actors involved (Alexander 2001). In the case of TJ 
BRT development, this could involve high transaction costs due to actors who are 
politically fragmented. To reduce high transaction costs, the Government of Jakarta 
proposed the Megapolitan concept as an embodiment of the single organisation, but 
the other actors rejected this concept because they believed it reduced their authority. 
This shows that the unified and hierarchical form could not be implanted in the JMR. 
 
Regarding the role of appropriate institutional design, this chapter concludes that in 
governing metropolitan transportation in the JMR it may enhance coordination and 
cooperation (see Table 3.4). Closed coordination and cooperation for the region 
involves four actors: local governments, the central government, the regional agency, 
and private companies. They could divide roles that connect them through two 
functions: provision and production. Provision refers to decision-making, 
arrangement, and regulation (Ostrom et al. 1993). Regional decisions and 
arrangements are the responsibility of the regional agency while regulations consisting 
of regional policy and planning rest with the central government. Production refers to 
implementation and execution to realize services and infrastructures. Local 
governments and the central government take the role of implementation and 
execution as supported by private companies selected through a legal procurement 
mechanism stipulated in public-private partnership. In this stage, attention should be 
paid to the role of a local government agency that are be capable of translating 
decisions into execution. This agency coordinates and cooperates with other agencies 
in other local governments to implement regional decisions. Actor coordination and 
participation are, therefore, crucial factors as well. (Voogd and Woltjer 2007). 
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Table 3.4 
Appropriate Governance for Metropolitan Transportation in the JMR 
Elements Roles and Actors 
Actors 1. Autonomous local governments (provincial, municipalities, and 
regencies) 
2. The regional agency (inter-local governmental cooperation agency/the 
BKSP Jabodetabekjur) 
3. The central government 





1. Regional decisions and arrangements= the regional agency 
2. Regulations (policy and planning) = the central government 
Implementation 
(production) 
1. Execution = local governments and the central government 
2. Private companies’ support in operating the implementation 
Source: authors 
 
3.5.3 Metropolitan Transportation Governance: Meso-level Institutional 
Arrangements and Actor Coordination 
Finding proper fit in terms of governance and institutional arrangements is an 
essential component of metropolitan governance debates (Alexander 2006, 2007, 
Marsden and May 2006, Rodriguez-Pose 2013). This is important when sustainable 
transportation systems are desired (Rietveld and Stough 2004). The JMR covers a 
large service area that crosses over a multitude of constituent municipalities, 
regencies, and provinces, and only serves to compound the issue of finding a good fit. 
This is a crucial factor when considering the context specificity of a region is related to 
the appropriate institutional arrangement (Stead 2003). The analysis suggests that i) 
improvements at the meso-level of institutional design are more readily accepted and 
effective than improvements at the macro-level and ii) the appropriate institutional 
design for governing metropolitan transportation in the JMR requires enhanced 
coordination and cooperation amongst four important actors - local governments, the 
regional agency, the central government, and private companies. These findings, 
therefore, offer valuable lessons to focus on meso-level institutional arrangements and 
actor coordination for metropolitan regions around the world that suffer from similar 























































































Coordination Arrangements for Metropolitan Planning to 
Mitigate Flooding in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region: 






This chapter seeks to discuss coordination arrangements designed to mitigate 
flooding in Jakarta and the problems associated with them. This chapter analyses an 
illustrative case using the framework developed in Chapter 2, which focuses on the 
form of governance (i.e. governance structure) and which is rooted in the theory of 
Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985, 1991, 1996, 1998). The framework 
focuses on institutional setting in the metropolitan region (i.e. metropolitan 
governance) and nine coordination arrangements (or prototypes) of metropolitan 
planning. The previous chapter discussed the metropolitan governance approach used 
in the case of transportation in the JMR, wherein we saw an emphasis on 
decentralization and inter-local government cooperation, supported by central 
government and private entities. With that in mind, this chapter focuses on 
coordination arrangements for flood protection and the dams in the JMR. 
  
This chapter seeks to identify the particular form of governance used in coordination 
arrangements for metropolitan planning in the JMR designed to mitigate floods in 
Jakarta and the organisational uncertainties that occur as a result. It uses the case of 
the project of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam. The particular form of governance 
used in coordination arrangements is identified using two steps. First, identification 
of the instruments used by the multitude of organisations involved in decisions to 
create coherent policies, plans or strategies and whether or not to build the dams and 
incorporate such policies into the metropolitan spatial plan for 
the Jabodetabekpunjur (which cover nearly the whole area of the JMR) and local 
plans, policies, or strategies. This is referred to as coordination capacity. Second, 
identification of the instruments used by the multitude of organisation involved in the 
implementation of those policies, plans, or strategies. This is referred to as 
the coordination mechanism. The instruments used highlight how the organisations 
Page 130 of 246 
 
involved manage resource exchanges, whether using market based (incentive, 
networks), hierarchical (regulations) or hybrid (mixed between incentive/networks 
and regulations) forms of governance.  
  
This chapter will show that instruments used to establish a specific form of governance 
to manage resource exchange amongst organisations (information, idea and money) 
are crucial to creating effective coordination for metropolitan planning. Inappropriate 
instruments or a lack of instruments will lead to ineffective coordination. Ineffective 
coordination manifests itself in additional effort, time and costs, which Buitelaar 
(2004) calls transaction costs. In the case of the dams, there is a debate over whether 
to include the technical and administrative processes involved in the development of 
the metropolitan spatial plan and provincial and local spatial plans. This points 
towards problems with creating coherent plans, policies or strategies for the entire 
metropolitan region. The implication is that organisations involved needed 13 years to 
take the collective decision to build the dams, even though the dams are not 
accommodated in the metropolitan spatial plan. Moreover, once the collective decision 
was made, the organisations involved also took 3 years to to start construction. This 
extra time was needed because transaction costs existed. This chapter analyses the 
main coordination instruments used and the uncertainties that they bring, which 




4.2      Research Question 
  
The framework developed in chapter two contains nine prototypes of metropolitan 
planning, corresponding to the nine coordination arrangements involved. In 
particular, this chapter seeks to identify prototypes of metropolitan planning in the 
JMR and the coordination problems that result. It is argued in this chapter that 
identifying a prototype for metropolitan planning is important, since it represents the 
main instruments underpinning various types of coordination capacity and 
coordination mechanisms involved in metropolitan planning. This chapter will 
answer sub-research questions 3 and 4 (see Chapter 1). The identification of existing 
instruments used in coordination arrangements for metropolitan planning and 
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identification of the corresponding coordination problems will highlight the failures 
of existing instruments and show what new instruments are needed. We will see that 
there is a choice between rigid or flexible instruments. The framework developed in 
Chapter 2 guides us in identifying which instruments enhance coordination in the 
context of metropolitan planning.  
  
This chapter attempts to answer two sub-research questions: 
1. “How can the coordination capacity of metropolitan plan in the JMR be 
explained with reference to the form of governance adopted?” 
2. “How can coordination mechanisms used for developing JMR regional 
infrastructure projects, be explained with reference to forms of governance?” 
 




 4.3      Research design and methodology 
   
This chapter relies upon a qualitative case study. Case studies are a method to 
understand social phenomena (Yin, 2014). Metropolitan planning, which is a social 
phenomenon that involves a multitude of actors and organisations is suitable to this 
kind of case study. This research seeks to identify how organisations involved in the 
JMR coordinate to create coherent plans, policies and strategies and make and 
implement collective decisions. It also seeks to identify organisational uncertainties, 
which bring about the need for extra effort and extra time and hamper effective 
coordination. 
  
4.3.1   Case selection 
The project of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam were selected as case studies. 
They were chosen because they represents: (1) metropolitan planning in the JMR, 
wherein multiple organisations create coherent policies, plans or strategies in the 
metropolitan spatial plan and local spatial plans and implement metropolitan policies, 
plans or strategies (2) resource sharing among multiple levels of government agencies, 
namely central government (the Ministry of Public Works), provincial governments 
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(Jakarta and West Java) and district governments (the regency of Bogor), (3)  flood 
mitigation efforts at the metropolitan region scale, wherein the dam development 
connects different strategies, policies and plans downstream (in Jakarta) and 
upstream (in the regency of Bogor) and across one core territory (Jakarta) and others 
surrounding territories (the regency of Bogor and the province of West Java), and (4) 
a coordination problem - it took 13 years to build the dam, which implies ineffective 
coordination and inflated costs.  
  
4.3.2  Research design 
This chapter operationalizes the framework of metropolitan planning developed in 
Chapter 2, which mainly seeks to analyse the form of governance used in various 
coordination arrangements of metropolitan planning. These are referred to as 
prototypes of metropolitan planning. It also seeks to analyse the dynamic shifts in 
coordination arrangements used in metropolitan planning. Coordination 
arrangements for metropolitan planning consist of coordination capacity inherent 
in the metropolitan plan, policy or strategy and the coordination mechanisms in place 
to implement it. Data were collected between January 2014 and October 2016 and 
analysed (a) to allow for a chronological description of the case study, (b) to identify 
existing forms of governance relevant to the coordination capacity and coordination 
mechanism in the context of the Jabodetabekpunjur and construction of the dams, 
and (c) to identify coordination problems and things that require additional time and 
effort, plus the means through which organisations seek to respond to them.  
  
Coordination is at the heart of metropolitan planning and is shaped by the instruments 
used. Instruments, whether they rely on incentives, administrative control or a 
mixture of the two, are used to manage resource exchanges. According to New 
Institutional Economics, coordination instruments are represented by the form of 
governance used, whether market based, hierarchical or a hybrid of the two. In this 
research, the form of governance used is represented by the prototypes of 
metropolitan planning developed in Chapter 2. A prototype therein uses a typical form 
of governance, which is developed from the particular instrument inherent in each 
type of coordination capacity and in type of coordination mechanism. Instruments 
used can in different ways (see Table 2.8 in Chapter 2). 
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This chapter seeks to study the coordination arrangements used in the context of 
metropolitan planning in the JMR to mitigate floods in Jakarta. The selected case 
study is described chronologically and qualitatively in order to identify instruments 
used in the coordination capacity and the coordination mechanism and coordination 
problems that abound. The coordination problems that are highlighted point towards 
a lack of existing prototypes to manage resource exchanges in the organisations 
involved.  
  
4.3.3  Data Collection 
Data were collected from several sources:  interviews, direct quotes from online 
newspapers, regulations and previous studies. These were selected in order to 
ensure triangulation of data sources. Triangulation is a method to find different types 
of data (Olsen, 2004). Data was collected so that a chronological, comprehensive and 
accurate account could be formulated. Thus, this research seeks to construct a 
complete story of the dynamic discussions, efforts and events within the organisations 
involved when building the project of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam. 
  
This research collects data from multiple sources: direct quotes from online 
newspapers, in-depth interviews, official studies, policy documents, regulations 
and other information presented in online newspapers. This data is used to 
identify the instruments used to shape coordination and which affect the coordination 
capacity and coordination mechanisms in the organisations involved. When it comes 
to coordination capacity, the data collected is used to identify the instruments that are 
used to translate the strategies, plans or policies formulated in the metropolitan spatial 
plan into local spatial plans amongst constituents of the JMR. When it comes to the 
coordination mechanism, the data collected is used to identify the instruments used to 
implement the metropolitan strategy, plan or policy. The instruments used with 
respect to coordination capacity and coordination mechanisms identified in this 
research guide our understanding of the particular form of governance used with 
regards to coordination capacity and coordination mechanisms. Understanding both 
allows us to identify the particular prototype of metropolitan planning used in the 
JMR. 
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To identify the existing coordination problems that increase the time, effort and costs 
involved, this chapter collects statements from recognized individuals, such as 
governors, from online newspapers and other quotes representatives from those 
organisations that were involved. It seeks to identify discrepancies between those 
statements and existing regulations and conflict amongst existing regulations. 
Additional time and effort is required to allow for more up to date and accurate 
information to be obtained before the organisations involved make a decision, to allow 
for bargaining before organisations involved make joint investments or enforce and 
implement commitments made. This research found that coordination problems were 
generated by fragmentation amongst policy entities, which Abbott (2005, 2009) 
classifies as organisational uncertainty.  Abbott (2009) defines organisational 
uncertainty as “uncertainties about the future intentions, policies, plans, and actions 
of organisations in the planning environment. Metropolitan areas are complex multi-
organisational environments” (p. 505). 
  
In this research, organisational uncertainties are identified from statements by 
interviewees that point towards a lack of information that brings about 
difficulties predicting the time, costs and efforts needed in the future. The statement 
would suggest a lack of or conflict amongst existing instruments or a lack of 
responsibility of other actors or organisations. In the interviews, I saw that this lack, 
absence or conflict of existing instruments influenced the work of the organisations 
involved, but interviewees didn’t know of a better response. When interviewees were 
government officers, this problem resulted in organisational uncertainty. For 
example: “..now we can understand the current situation. (About) authority, whose 
authority? This (the dam) is the central government’s authority. (But,) why should the 
provincial government of Jakarta spend much money (for the dam)? Someone 
suggests to us to give us a grant from central government. Was this country upside 
down (because a sub-national government gives financial support to the national 
government)? My question is, is this cooperation?” (a quotation from interview 
P21).  The highlighted statement above shows organisational uncertainty and points 
towards confusion amongst organisations involved in administrative and budget 
processes. Statements were checked and validated by the researcher with other 
sources, such as policy documents, regulations, direct quotes from online newspapers 
and with other policymakers. Discrepancies between these sources also show that 
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organisational uncertainty exists. Based on the framework developed in Chapter 2, 
collected data were classified into coordination capacity and coordination mechanism. 
Particular data collected for coordination mechanisms then were coded into 
two groups: first, collective decision making processes and second, technical and 
administrative processes. 
  
Effective coordination is coordination that involves less time, fewer costs and less 
effort. It is argued in this research that when existing instruments cannot cope with 
organisational uncertainties, the time, costs and effort required will increase. Mack 
(1971) argues that uncertainty generates uncertain costs. Williamson (1985, 1996) 
argues that uncertainty is one of the sources of transaction costs. High transaction 
costs will reduce effective coordination for metropolitan planning. However, this 
research did not measure transaction costs quantitatively, in term of how much money 
was spent. It is frequently difficult to measure transaction costs, given that they are 
not explicitly stated (Buitelaar, 2004; McCann, et al, 2005). Where it was difficult to 
collect data, this research elicits understanding of transaction costs from statements 
by interviewees, such as, “it needs a long time and a long (process)..” or “we invite 
them” (R11, 2014). These statements suggest that additional time and effort is required 
to transfer ideas or to encourage resource exchanges. So, here in this research, 
transaction costs are represented by additional time and efforts. 
  
In addition, to identify potential transaction costs, this research looks for a lack of, or 
conflict between, existing formal rules and data obtained from in-depth interviews 
and from direct quotes in online newspapers that suggest that extra time and effort is 
required in the future. For example: “Later, they (provincial parliament members) will 
make a decision whether to approve or not, won't they? Therefore, at the plenary 
meeting, we invite them, we involve them. At the moment of the signature ceremony 
of the Memorandum of Agreement, we also involve the Speaker (of the Provincial 
Parliament), because, during the budget process and execution, the implementation 
will also involve them” (a quotation from interview R11). The statement highlighted 
above suggests potential transaction costs, such as costs related to coordination and 
organising future meetings. 
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Interviewees and those quoted in online newspapers were those who knew about and 
were involved in the project of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam. 
They were identified in the first stage of data collection, which involved document 
analysis of online newspapers. Interviewees were officers from the Ministry of 
National Development Planning/the National Development Planning Agency, the 
Ministry of Public Works (the Major Agency of Ciliwung Cisadane River 
Basin/MACCRB), the Ministry of Home Affairs, the provincial government of Jakarta, 
the provincial government of West Java, the regency government of Bogor and the 
Secretariat of the BKSP Jabodetabekpunjur (see Appendix 4.1). The second stage 
involved in-depth interviews with open questions (see Appendix 4.2). Through these 
in-depth interviews, we were able to construct a chronological, empirical case 
study and to identify organisational uncertainties as the source of transaction costs, 
which bought about coordination problems. This research relied on information from 
a range of online newspapers, mainly kompas.com, detik.com and tempo.co (see 
Appendix 4.3), and selected quotes from high-profile individuals, such as ministers, 
the directorate general, the governor, the vice governor, the regent (the mayor in rural 
districts) and local citizens. Direct quotes collected were used to identify the source of 
transaction costs and to construct the empirical case study. Other data was collected 
from relevant regulations (see Appendix 4.4) and relevant official studies (see 
Appendix 4.5). 
  
4.3.4  Analysis 
This research analyses the coordination capacity of the metropolitan spatial 
plan and analyses the coordination mechanism of the organisations involved in the 
construction of the dams using qualitative data analysis techniques. Qualitative data 
analysis was conducted in two stages. First, to identify the main instruments used to 
manage the coordination capacity of the metropolitan spatial plan influencing local 
spatial plans and to identify organisational uncertainties that resulted in coordination 
problems (see Section 4.5). Second, to identify the main instruments used to 
coordinate the organisations involved in the dam-building projects and 
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4.4  Introduction to the case study 
  
This chapter presents and analyses coordination arrangements associated with 
metropolitan planning in the JMR using a case study. The case study will focus on how 
various organisations coordinated in order to mitigate flood risk in Jakarta by sharing 
their resources to build the Ciawi and Sukamahi dams in another territory of Jakarta. 
It also focuses on the organisational uncertainties that existed and how they led to 
coordination problems. Flooding is an acute problem in Jakarta (Caljouw, Nas and 
Pratiwo, 2005; Steinberg, 2007; Akmalah and Griggs, 2011; Ward, et al, 2013) which 
needs to be overcome because of the impact it has on the economy, the hundreds of 
lives lost and the hundreds and thousands of evacuees it brings about (Bappenas, 
2007; Sagala, et al, 2013). To understand the cross-border and multi-organisation 
coordination involved in mitigating flooding in Jakarta, the case study analyses the 
development of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam. These will be discussed in 
terms of two scopes of coordination arrangements:  
1. Coordination capacity, or how the organisations involved create coherent 
policies, plans and strategies for the JMR to mitigate flooding in Jakarta 
through by developing spatial plans associated with the two dams (see Section 
4.5). 
2. Coordination mechanisms, or how the organisations involved coordinate 
to develop the two dams collectively through resource sharing, both in the 
decision making stage, but also during implementation (see Section 4.6). 
  
4.4.1 Initial coordination to develop the project of the Ciawi dam and the 
Sukamahi dam 
The need for the (new) Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam stemmed from the (old) 
Ciawi dam. Acute floods in Jakarta generated proposals for comprehensive solutions 
to mitigate floods that relied upon a strategy that focused on mitigation in Jakarta and 
upstream. Based on the work of JICA (1997), a dam located upstream of Jakarta was 
proposed in order to reduce rainwater flow to Jakarta. In 2001 the 
provincial government of Jakarta proposed to central government that the (old) Ciawi 
dam, which is located in the regency of Bogor, in the province of West Java, be 
constructed. However, the local community and the local legislature in the regency of 
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Bogor was against the idea. Accordingly, the central government postponed the 
project. Other concerns that led to it being postponed were a lack of financial capacity, 
reluctance from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors and different 
perspectives on its value for money. Later, when the provincial government of Jakarta 
perceived that the central government did not support development of the Ciawi dam, 
the governor of Jakarta, Mr Sutiyoso, in 2005-2007 proposed the Megapolitan 
concept, which proposed that the megapolitan government of the JMR would be 
better able to build the (old) Ciawi than central government (Sutiyoso, 2007, p. 125; 
see also Hidayat Putra, Woltjer and Tan, 2016). However, the concept failed. Then, in 
2008 the next governor of Jakarta, Mr Bowo, also attempted to develop the dam. He 
asked central government to accommodate the Ciawi dam in the metropolitan spatial 
plan. By doing so, it was hoped that central government would offer its support for the 






















Source: the Ministry of Public Works, 2013, p. 65 
 
Source: personal collection 
Figure 4.1 
The Jakarta showcase flooded in 2013 
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The last major flood in Jakarta happened in early 2013 and saw many roads flooded, 
including famous landmarks such as Bundaran HI (the Indonesia Hotel Circle) and 
all its axis roads (see Figure 4.1). Bundaran HI is well known and in one of 
the premium locations in Jakarta. This major flood stimulated the new governor of 
Jakarta, Mr Widodo, to revitalize an old proposal to build the (old) Ciawi dam. The 
governor asked the central government to support and to accelerate the (old) Ciawi 
dam construction. 
 
The (old) Ciawi dam was one of a number of flood mitigation projects prepared by the 
central government. However, there was 
a debate over whether to build the Ciawi 
dam or not. Those debates had both 
technical and social elements.  In early 
2014, after 13 years of discussion, debate 
and research, the decision was taken to 
build the Ciawi dam by sharing the 
resources of organisations involved. 
However, the decision was also taken to 
build two smaller dams: the (new) Ciawi 
dam and the Sukamahi dam (see Figure 
4.2). The organisations involved and 




The Organisations Involved and Their Committed Contribution 
to Build the Ciawi Dam and the Sukamahi dam 
No. Organisation Committed Contribution 
1. The central government (the 
Ministry of Public Works) 
Construction and its cost 
2. The Provincial Government of the of 
Jakarta 
Land acquisition cost 
3. The Provincial Government of the 
West Java 
Organize land acquisition process 
Box 1 
 
Actually, the (old) Ciawi dam was planned to 
substitute an original project, a new canal in the 
upstream area of Jakarta connecting the Ciliwung 
river and the Cisadane river. This new canal would 
have been located in the municipality of Bogor, 
and would transfer rain water from the Ciliwung 
river to the Cisadane river. This idea was rejected 
by citizens in the downstream area of the Cisadane 
river, citizens who live in the regency of Tangerang 
and those in the municipality of Tangerang. 
Citizens rejected the plan because they did not 
want the transferred rain water to flood their area. 
As a result of this rejection, the central 
government developed an alternative plan to 
reduce water volume flowing to Jakarta by 
changing the new canal project to the (old) Ciawi 
dam, upstream of Jakarta. 
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No. Organisation Committed Contribution 




Table 4.1 demonstrates how governors, regency and decision makers (i.e. the director 
general) from the central government supported and offered a commitment to build 
the dams by encouraging inter-local government cooperation. They committed to 
contributing resources to build the dams. However, there had been dynamic debate, 
discussion and research before they offered these commitments (see Section 4.5). 
Even though the dam falls under the authority of central government, for a number of 
reasons central government itself didn't build it, mainly because of a lack of financial 
capacity. The governor of Jakarta didn’t propose to build the dam using Jakarta’s 
budget or on the basis of the Megapolitan concept, but decided to assist central 
government to support the financing of land acquisition for the sites of the dam and 
asked the governor of West Java and the regent of Bogor to manage the land 
acquisition process (see Section 4.6). Jakarta, which has a huge annual budget, didn’t 
seek to expand its power or annex the regency of Bogor in order to mitigate its flood 
risk, but preferred instead to encourage inter-local government cooperation. Because 
of the failure of the Megapolitan proposal, the organisations involved preferred to 
govern the JMR using inter-local government cooperation supported by the central 
government and private entities. 













4.4.2  The Indonesian planning system and implementation in the 
metropolitan region 
 
The Indonesian planning system is decentralised, allowing for local autonomy. It is 
comprised of three systems: a spatial planning system, a development planning system 
and a budgeting system. The spatial planning system, which is formally enacted in 
Law No. 26 of 2007 on Spatial Planning, asks each province and each district to 
develop their spatial plan for their administrative territory. However, the law also 
dictates that the Indonesian central government must develop a national spatial plan, 
an island spatial plan and a strategic area spatial plan. The JMR is one of Indonesia’s 
strategic areas (see the Government Regulation of 2008 on the National Spatial Plan 
in Appendix X), meaning that central government has responsibility for developing 
the metropolitan spatial plan for the JMR. As a result, metropolitan planning for the 
Figure 4.2 
The Location of the Ciawi Dams 
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JMR is governed by three spatial plans: (1) the Jabodetabekpunjur, covering almost 
all areas of the JMR, (2) the spatial plan of the provinces (the province of Jakarta, the 
province of West Java and the province of Banten) and (3) the spatial plan of the nine 
relevant districts. Alongside the national government, provincial and district 
governments develop their own strategic areas. Both sub-national 
governments (provinces and districts) prepare a spatial plan for strategic areas and 
detailed-spatial plans. The detailed-spatial plan is developed when the contents 
of the spatial plan still cannot be operationalized, such as to guide zoning or as a 
technocratic base to issue permits for land development and construction. 
  
Implementation of metropolitan planning is influenced by the national development 
planning system, which was formally enacted through the Law No. 25 of 2004 on the 
National Development Planning System and by the budget system, which is formally 
enacted through Law No. 17 of 2003 on the Finance State. According to the Law on the 
National Development Planning System, the spatial plan is treated as one of the inputs 
for development plans. The development plan consists of a vision, mission, strategy, 
programmes, projects, expected outputs and outcomes and an indicative budget. The 
development plans are developed to systematically integrate the long-term 
development plan (the planning period is 20 years), the medium term development 
plan (5 years) and the government work plan (1 year). According to both laws, the 
Government Work Plan (the Indonesian annual development plan) contains details on 
the projects to be financed in the next year’s budget and serves as an input for the 
budget plan. So, for the implementation process, the planned projects need to be 
accommodated in both the development plan and budget plan. The final decision over 
financing the projects is decided in the budget meeting between the executive and the 
legislative in parliament. 
  
Since the Indonesian metropolitan regions do not have a regional political structure 
or a legitimate metropolitan government, there is not specific development plan for 
the metropolitan region. Due to the absence of this regional political structure, the 
development plan of the metropolitan region, as well as the metropolitan budget plan, 
is fragmented across every single constituent authority in the metropolitan region. 
Facilitated through national policies on decentralization and inter-local government 
cooperation, collective decisions for metropolitan regions are discussed in 
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coordination meetings of organisations involved and accommodated in respective 
development and budget plans.  
  
In general, provincial and local governments use annual budgets to implement a plan, 
policy or strategy. This annual budget comes from inter-governmental transfers, local-
owned revenue and other financial sources. These financial sources are governed by 
Law No. 33 of 2004 on Financial Balance between the Central Government and Local 
Polities. Law No. 33 of 2004 regulates how each province and local government receive 
funds and generate revenue. There is not a specific policy that obliges central 
government to provide inter-governmental funds for a region or to a constituent of a 
metropolitan region. 
  
4.4.3 Institutional setting of the JMR 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutional setting of the metropolitan 
region influences the preference of the organisations involved and the governance 
approach that they take.  Acceptance of the organisations involved is crucial aspect in 
creating a particular coordination arrangement for metropolitan planning. As 
regulated by the Indonesian Constitution and the Law of Local Polity, each district and 
each province in the JMR is an autonomous entity, and since the Indonesian system 
does not recognize the metropolitan regional government, the JMR does not have a 
metropolitan regional government. With that in mind, as discussed in Chapter 3, an 
effort to integrate and to establish a metropolitan government in order to enhance 
effective coordination for the entire JM through the Megapolitan idea was rejected. 
The organisations involved in the JMR preferred to govern the metropolitan region 
using inter-local government cooperation, supported by the central government and 
private entities.  Inter-local government cooperation is accepted by the organisations 
involved because it does not reduce the authority of constituent provinces in the JMR.  
The preference for this metropolitan governance approach in the JMR was used by the 
new governor of Jakarta to realize proposals to build the dam in the regency of Bogor 
to reduce floods in Jakarta. In 2014, the governor of Jakarta received support from the 
central government, the governor of West Java and the regent of Bogor to build the 
dams.  
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4.5      Analysis of the coordination capacity of the metropolitan spatial 
plan, the Jabodetabekpunjur 
  
Coordination capacity is the first of the two scopes of coordination arrangements 
underpinning metropolitan planning. Coordination capacity is analysed to identify 
how organisations involved coordinate to create coherent policies, plans or strategies 
for the entire metropolitan region. In the JMR, the coherent policies, plans and 
strategies are represented by coherent content in the metropolitan spatial plan 
(covering Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, Puncak, Cianjur) and the content 
of other relevant spatial plans, including the spatial plans of the autonomous provinces 
and districts in the JMR. The current metropolitan spatial plan was enacted by 
presidential regulation in 2008. It manages almost all areas in the JMR, although not 
all areas in the district of Cianjur are covered. Puncak is not an autonomous district, 
given that it spans part of the regency of Bogor and a part of the regency of Cianjur, but 
it is mentioned explicitly in the metropolitan plan to demonstrate a strong concern for 
environmental issues and land-use changes in Puncak. Land-use change in Puncak 
was understood to contribute to the floods in Jakarta. 
  
Based on the framework developed in Chapter 2, coordination capacity is represented 
by the type of plan, whether a master plan using administrative control instruments, 
a strategic plan using incentive instruments, a master-strategic plan, a strategic-
master plan or a programme-based plan, using mixed-instruments. In this 
section, the issue of coordination capacity of the metropolitan spatial plan 
is discussed in order to see how the organisations involved coordinated to mitigate 
flood risk in Jakarta and create policies that allowed for construction of the dam.  The 
coherent policy, plan or strategy for the entire JMR in the case of the dam development 
can be achieved when a decision to build or to not build the Ciawi dam was 
accommodated in the metropolitan spatial plan and other relevant spatial plans (i.e. 
the spatial plan of the province of West Java and the spatial plan of the regency of 
Bogor).  
  
4.5.1   Type of existing metropolitan spatial plans  
On the basis of the data collected, this study showed that (1) the existing metropolitan 
spatial plan had a legal status that was enacted through presidential decree, (2) the 
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existing metropolitan spatial plan gives guidance and regulations that informs spatial 
plans in relevant districts and provinces in the JMR (i.e. it is a hierarchical plan), (3) 
spatial plans, particularly those in the districts (whether municipality and regency), 
give legal certainty for land development (i.e. they are a regulatory plan), and (4) the 
existing metropolitan spatial plan does not have a time limit, but instead is reviewed 
once every five years. With these four factors in mind, this section argues that the 
metropolitan spatial plan is a type of master plan that all constituent authorities 
must consider when developing local spatial plans.  
  
Given that it is a master plan, the central government uses administrative control 
instruments through a hierarchical process to develop the metropolitan spatial plan. 
The spatial plan of the provincial government has legal status as a provincial 
government regulation (perda provinsi). The hierarchical process means that the draft 
of the spatial plan of the province should be consulted first by central government. 
Consultation is conducted in coordination with the National Spatial Planning 
Coordination Agency (BKPRN, Badan Koordinasi Penataan Ruang Nasional) before 
being deliberated by the provincial parliament. The spatial plan of 
the districts (whether regency and municipality) has legal status as a district 
government regulation (perda kabupaten/kota). To prepare the spatial plan for the 
districts, the district government should consult the provincial government (i.e. the 
Provincial Spatial Planning Coordination Agency) to gain approval 
before it is deliberated by the district parliament. 
  
Importantly, the spatial plan of the district is used as a legal base to regulate land 
development and to issue building permits for new physical development. New 
development requiring a building permit should ensure that the new development has 
been accommodated in the existing spatial plan. When the new development is 
important, but was not previously incorporated into the existing spatial plan, the 
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4.5.2 Coordination problems occurring in the master plan when 
creating coherent spatial plans for the entire JMR 
a. Fragmentation 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the JMR does not have a metropolitan regional government 
and is fragmented into several autonomous provinces and districts. Moreover, since 
the new policy of decentralization and local autonomy was implemented in 2001, 
fragmentation of the JMR increased (see Appendix 1.1). Administrative control 
instruments are used to manage coordination in the case of fragmentation in the JMR. 
However, even though coordination capacity between the metropolitan spatial plan 
and other relevant spatial plans has been designed as a type of master plan that 
uses administrative control instruments to establish a regulatory plan within the 
entire JMR, the organisations involved had different responses to proposals to build 
the (old) Ciawi dam. Those responses to the (old) Ciawi dam development are 




















Configuration of spatial plans in the JMR to address flood in Jakarta  
A 
The Metropolitan Spatial Plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur (2008) 
(no accommodate the Ciawi dam) 
B 
The Spatial Plan of the  
Province of Jakarta (2012) 
(Demand the Ciawi dam,  
but not stated in spatial plan) 
C 
The Spatial Plan of the  
Province of West Java  
(2010) 
(Accommodate  
the Ciawi dam) 
Vertically, coordination capacity of metropolitan spatial plan of 
Jabodetabekpunjur is regulatory plan or master plan 
Horizontally, coordination capacity of 
local spatial plans of the Jabodetabekjur 
constituents Jabodetabekpunjur are 
strategic plan 
C1 
The Spatial Plan of the  
Regency of Bogor 
(2008) 
(Not accommodate  
the Ciawi dam) 
Vertically, coordination 
capacity of metropolitan 
spatial plan of 
Jabodetabekpunjur is 
regulatory plan or master 
plan 
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Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between spatial plans in the JMR and shows the 
different responses of the organisations involved when seeking to create coherent 
plans, policies or strategies governing the dams. The metropolitan spatial plan (A on 
Figure 4.3), enacted in 2008, does not accommodate the (old) Ciawi dam because the 
central government decided not to build the (old) Ciawi dam. Because the 
metropolitan spatial plan was designed as a master plan, it should be followed by all 
relevant spatial plans, including Jakarta’s spatial plan (B on Figure 4.3). In the case of 
the (old) Ciawi dam, the metropolitan spatial plan was followed by the spatial plan of 
the regency of Bogor (C1 on Figure 4.3), which was also enacted in 2008. The spatial 
plan of the regency of Bogor followed the decision by central government to not 
accommodate the (old) Ciawi dam. Thus, neither spatial plan accommodates the Ciawi 
dam. The configuration shows the existing administrative control instrument’s success 
in managing coordination between the central government and the regency. 
  
In addition, the regency of Bogor also thought that proposals to develop (old) Ciawi 
dam were the remit of the governor of Jakarta. The Ciawi dam was not perceived as a 
centrally strategic project. This was discussed by one interviewee, who said: 
  
“... It had been planned that there was to be the Ciawi dam in local regulation 
number 17.  Spatial planning? It was included, we had tried to accommodate 
it. The idea to build the dam had arisen. When we revised the spatial plan of 
1998, we asked the provincial government, we also asked the central 
government, the Ministry of Public Works. They said, there was not a study 
into it. The Ciawi dam, it has been proposed by Sutiyoso (the Governor of 
Jakarta). It was an idea from the province. Yes, the Governor of Jakarta. (It 
was) an idea of the Governor of Jakarta.  Because of that, we dropped 
the plan. We did not have a reference to the Ciawi dam...” 
(Interviewee L11, 2014) 
  
The statement represents the unclear plans, policies or strategies in place to mitigate 
flooding in Jakarta that resulted from the fragmented strategy employed across the 
JMR. Fragmentation means that each province or district has its own strategy to 
develop in their respective territory. Because of this, the spatial plan of the regency of 
Bogor was developed without accommodating the Ciawi dam. 
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However, the spatial plan of the province of West Java (B on Figure 4.3), enacted in 
2010, has accommodated the Ciawi dam.  The provincial government of West Java, 
where the dam is located, may have had an incentive to be perceived as being 
supportive of flood mitigation in Jakarta. The administrative control instruments 
could not manage relations amongst the two provincial governments to develop the 
spatial plan. The spatial plan of the province of West Java, which was formulated 
based on the autonomous policies and strategies adopted in the province of West Java, 
accommodated insight from previous discussions, such as those surrounding the 
Megapolitan concept. Fragmentation generates difficulties in creating coherent plans, 
policies and strategies for the entire JMR. 
  
b. Adaptation 
This research found that administrative control instruments used in coordination 
capacity come up short when faced with dynamic demands or decisions. For example, 
a new policy developed by the province of West Java, one of constituents of the JMR, 
led to organisational uncertainties. This led to unclear guidance for the organisations 
involved over whether or not to build the dam. In addition, another study conducted 
by the Ministry of Public Works demonstrated that there were many deviations 
between the contents of the metropolitan spatial plan and development on the ground 
(the Ministry of Public Works, 2013). 
  
Dynamic demands, such as the need to develop the dams in order to mitigate floods in 
Jakarta, are not accommodated in spatial plans. Existing spatial plans managing the 
JMR cannot manage changing demands. The organisations involved, facilitated by the 
BKSP Jabodetabekjur, used another forum, coordination meetings, to collectively 
decide whether and how to build the dams. The existing spatial plans cannot adapt to 
change or opportunities very quickly. Thus, they did not use the existing spatial plans 
as a base to take collective decisions. As described later in Section 4.6, when the dams 
were finally built, the relevant spatial plan, i.e. those in the regency of Bogor, the 
province of West Java and the Jabodetabekpunjur, needed to be revised to 
accommodate a new collective decision to build the dams. Even though the spatial plan 
in the province of West Java had already accommodated the Ciawi dam, it too needed 
to be revised, since the dam was separated into two smaller dams and the location was 
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changed. Permits to build the dam cannot be issued before the 
dams are accommodated in the spatial plan. However, any revision of the spatial plan 
requires effort, cost and time (see Section 4.6). As a result, revision of spatial plans 
will delay the development of the dams. 
 
 
4.6 Analysis of the coordination mechanisms used to build the Ciawi 
dam and the Sukamahi dam 
Coordination mechanisms are the second scope of coordination arrangement in 
metropolitan planning. The coordination mechanism is a mechanism required to 
coordinate implementation of a plan, policy or strategy. It can consist of processes that 
connect its contents to the metropolitan spatial plan and its implementation.  
Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993) argue that these processes involve collective 
decision-making, finance and production arrangements and regulatory 
elements.  Following on from this, in this research, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
coordination mechanisms consist of collective decision-making and technical and 
administrative processes. 
  
In the case of the two dams, after long debate, discussion and research, facilitated by 
the BKSP Jabodetabekpunjur, a number of key representatives of the organisations 
involved met on January 20, 2014, in Katulampa weir, in the Regency of Bogor. They 
included: 
1. The Director General of Water Resource Management, the Ministry of Public 
Works, 
2. The governor of Jakarta, 
3. The governor of the West Java, 
4. The regent of Bogor, 
5. The mayor of Bogor, 
6. The vice mayor of Depok, 
7. The vice mayor of Bekasi, 
8. The vice-regent of Bekasi, 
9. The assistant of the provincial government of Banten, 
10. A representative of the state-owned forest enterprise (Perum Perhutani), 
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The Governor of Banten, the Mayor of Tangerang and the Regent of Tangerang were 
invited, but did not attend. That meeting was facilitated by the 
BKSP Jabodetabekjur (Interviewee, R11, 2014). At the meeting, they agreed to 
build the (old) Ciawi dam, which would be modified into two smaller dams, 
the (new) Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam, and would be located higher than the 
(old) Ciawi dam (see Figure 4.2). This change was a technical solution to minimise 
potential hazards or disasters. The proposal to build the (old) Caiwi dam finally was 
approved, albeit with modifications.   
  
4.6.1 Types of coordination mechanism used to build the dams 
Implementation of the metropolitan policy, plan or strategy is recognized as a difficult 
part of metropolitan planning (see for example McCarthy, 2011). Based on the 
framework of metropolitan planning developed in Chapter 2, this chapter divides 
coordination to implement the dam projects into two elements: the first is related to 
collective decision-making and the second to technical and administrative processes. 
To analyse the type of coordination mechanism, this section identifies instruments 
used in each:  
 
a. Collective decisions 
When it came to collective decisions, this study found that instruments used include 
incentive intensity instruments. Incentive intensity instruments were used by the 
organisations involved since the existing regulations or official policy documents that 
applied did not provide guidance for the development of the (new) Ciawi dam and the 
Sukamahi dam. In the case of the two dams, this study found that the collective 
decision taken on January 20, 2014 was intended to address major floods in 2013 and 
in early January 2014. 
 
The organisations and actors involved in the collective decision were driven to 
four incentives: 
1. To obtain political capital, given that they would be perceived as taking the 
matter of flooding seriously. 
2. To obtain political benefits, given that they would be seen to support Mr Joko 
Widodo, the governor of Jakarta and one of the strongest candidates in the 
presidential election in 2014. 
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3. The Ministry of Public Works, the authority that would develop the dams, 
would be supported financially and would benefit from building the dams since 
the provincial government of Jakarta would help to finance the land acquisition 
required.  
4. Since the (old) Ciawi dam would be divided into two smaller dams, the (new) 
Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam, the risk of dam failure was minimised. This 
new plan encouraged the organisations involved to agree on the development 
of the dams. 
 
b. Technical and administrative process 
When it came to technical and administrative processes, incentive intensity 
instruments were again used. Even though each organisation is a government entity 
working in accordance with laws and regulations, since the dams will be developed 
through resource sharing, they need relevant laws and regulations to manage the 
cooperation technically and administratively. However, there are fewer rules framing 
cooperation and which safeguard them, mainly administratively, when sharing 
resources. Rules needed to be made over the ownership status of collective assets, such 
as the dams. Interaction and cooperation, particularly when it comes to managing 
resources, might be bought about by the incentives that they expected to gain (as 
discussed above). 
  
According to the framework of metropolitan planning developed in Chapter 2, 
instruments used in coordination mechanisms show that the organisations involved 
in the JMR use incentive intensity instruments that can be classified as a type 
of informal-discontinuous mechanism. Informal-discontinuous mechanisms 
are associated with market forms of governance. However, within this mechanism, no 
organisations involved can force others to enact the collective decisions that were 
made. Implementation of the collective decision relies on individual policies, 
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4.6.2 Coordination problems that occurred in coordination mechanisms 
associated with the dams 
As mentioned previously, coordination mechanisms relied upon an informal-
discontinuous mechanism and used incentive intensity instruments. The 
organisations involved cooperated on the basis of the incentives they expected to 
receive. However, to make cooperation and resource-sharing work more smoothly, 
the benefit obtained should be more than the cost. In order to anticipate annual floods, 
dam construction should be conducted swiftly. However, the implementation process 
took a large amount of time, which shows that there were shortcomings in the existing 
instruments used. The next section will describe these in more detail.  
 
a. Coordination problems that occurred with existing instruments used in 
collective decision making 
A lack of a metropolitan government and fragmented policies in the JMR influenced 
how the organisations involved made decisions that impacted them and the 
metropolitan region. In addition, the metropolitan spatial plan, enacted in 2008, does 
not accommodate the dams. The (old) Ciawi dam required high levels of investment, 
which meant that the Ministry of Public Works would not finance it. Moreover, the 
dam was vulnerable, since it was located near to an active volcano, Mount Pangrango. 
Donors, non-government organisations and local citizens were also reluctant to build 
a new dam. So, the central government took a decision to not build it. Jakarta though 
was most interested in its construction; the central government, through the Ministry 
of Public Works, also tried to realize the dam. This chapter will show that there were 
four types of coordination at play when deciding on dam development: (i) 
Coordination emphasizing the role of the central government (2001-2008), (ii) 
Coordination led by the metropolitan government of the JMR through 
the Megapolitan concept (2006-2008), (iii) Coordination guided by the metropolitan 
spatial plan of the Jabodetabekpunjur (2008-2014), and (iv) Coordination through 
inter-local government cooperation supported by the central government (2014). As 
mentioned earlier, the first three types of coordination were used to develop the (old) 
Ciawi dam, but failed to lead to agreement.  
  
This chapter shows that efforts to take decisions to develop the dam in the fragmented 
JMR were not supported by metropolitan planning using administrative control 
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instruments. Administrative control instruments regulate each organisation. 
However, those used did not lead to organisations involved seeking out the resources 
necessary to finance the construction of the dam. The Ciawi dam development relied 
on three types of coordination mentioned above: first through the central government 
to finance it, whether through the regular sectoral plan of the Ministry of Public Works, 
second through the Megapolitan government, or third through the metropolitan 
spatial plan. With this in mind, it is argued here that administrative control used for 
metropolitan planning could not overcome the lack of finance. This can be classified 
as a type of organisational uncertainty, because it made development of the Ciawi dam 
difficult. It also bought about uncertainty over the future intentions and actions of the 
organisations involved in the JMR.  
  
However, after 13 years of discussions, debates and research, a fourth type of 
coordination (coordination through inter-local government action supported by the 
central government) finally lead to agreement on the development of the (old) Ciawi 
dam, which would be developed using financial burden sharing and would be built as 
two smaller dams. The main difficulty concerning a lack of finance was solved through 
the organisations involved engaging in budget sharing (as shown in Table 4.1). 
Through budget sharing, investment in the dam was divided into two components: 
the cost of land acquisition and the cost of the dam’s construction. The province of 
Jakarta would provide the budget for land acquisition and the Ministry of Public 
Works would provide a budget for the dam’s construction. The decision was not 
generated by existing administrative control instruments. A lack of a hierarchical form 
of governance provided incentives for the organisations involved to establish a market 
form of governance that relied upon incentive intensity instruments. 
  
Even though the collective decision to build the dam was made using incentive 
instruments, the arrangement bought about legal concerns because the processes 
required for its successful implementation would undermine existing formal rules 
(Kuwado, 2014), particularly concerning the authority to build the dam and authority 
to acquire land. This issue is related to the transfer of Jakarta’s budget to the regency 
of Bogor and the asset status of the dam. The resource sharing arrangement amongst 
local governments and the central government was not known and made it difficult to 
define the precise ownership status of the dam.  
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b. Coordination problems that occurred in the technical and 
administrative processes 
Technical and administrative processes were required to realize the decision to build 
the dams. According to the data collected, including existing regulations concerning 
dams, this chapter identified eleven steps: (1) to develop a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) and a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA), (2) 
to prepare  Feasibility Study (FS), (3) to prepare an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), (4) to develop a Detail Engineering Design (DED), (5) to establish 
the team for land acquisition, (6) to revise the spatial plan of the regency of Bogor, 
(7) to establish the Ciawi dam preparation team (which was proposed by the 
BKSP Jabodetabekjur), (8)  to prepare a budgeting process and budget allocation for 
land acquisition, (9) to determine the financial transfer status of the land acquisition 
process from the provincial government of Jakarta to the regency government of 
Bogor, (10) to prepare a budgeting process for the construction of the dams (11) to 
determine the profit sharing mechanisms, maintenance obligations and ownership 
status of the dams after the construction ends. Some processes required specific 
technical rules, such as developing a FS, EIA and DED. Some processes may also need 
inputs that resulted from other processes, such as acquiring land for the dams and 
revising spatial plans to accommodate them. Others require specific rules for framing 
or regulating resource exchanges. Here, resources refer to money, ideas, sites and 
authority. 
 
i. Coordination problems in technical work 
This chapter is mainly concerned with coordination between the organisations 
involved in implementing the decision to build the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam. 
The main requirement for the development of the dams is land. However, before the 
land is acquired, the site needed to be accommodated in the spatial plan in order to 
provide a legal basis for land acquisition. Because the spatial plan of the regency of 
Bogor did not accommodate the dams, it needed to be revised first. Similarly, before 
land is acquired, the government needed to launch a public campaign to discuss the 
implication of the dams for the local community. Since the site was still not 
determined, the government had difficulties defining the physical border of the site for 
land acquisition and these kinds of campaigns. The site also needed to be subject to a 
feasibility study, needed to define the site of the dams in the spatial plan. When the 
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spatial plan for the regency of Bogor needed to be revised – which took additional time 
– the land acquisition budget that had been allocated in Jakarta’s budget could not be 
used. The provincial government of Jakarta then withdrew the budget. These 
processes are linked to one another and created uncertainty and delayed construction. 
Delays like this increase the risk of flooding. 
  
Here, spatial planning plays a crucial role because it becomes a legal base for land 
development. The decision to build the dams led the regency government of Bogor to 
revise its spatial plan, for central government to revise the metropolitan spatial plan 
and the provincial government of West Java to revise its spatial plan. The spatial plan 
not only gives guidance for the future, but it is needed to legalize and to control land 
development. However, finally, after it was decided that two smaller dams would be 
built, these needed to be accommodated into the spatial plans. This was necessary 
because it would give the legal basis to conduct an environmental impact assessment 
and to issue permits for land acquisition. This is strongly connected with coordination 
mechanisms that require revision of the spatial plans. Formally, the revision of the 
spatial plans involved a number of steps: reviewing the spatial plan, preparing a new 
draft of the spatial plan and deliberating it technically and politically. The spatial plan 
has a crucial role in coordination mechanisms; where it corresponds with the 
development plan or where the development plan matches with the spatial plan, 
the construction process will be smooth. Otherwise, the spatial plan will be perceived 
as an obstacle. In the revision process, organisations involved face uncertainties, 
which can generate potential transaction costs (see Appendix 4.6). 
  
ii. Coordination problems in administrative processes 
This chapter also found three organisational uncertainties, which were caused by 
inappropriate and conflicting regulations used to manage resource sharing among the 
organisations involved in building the dams. Those three organisational uncertainties 
would potentially increase the time and costs involved.  
 
The three organisational uncertainties are: 
 First, defining ownership of the dams. Uncertainty arose over whether they 
would be owned by the provincial government of Jakarta, by the Ministry of 
Public Works or by the regency government of Bogor. This problem resulted 
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from resource sharing, given that Jakarta shared money for land acquisition, 
the Ministry of Public Works contributed money for construction and the 
regency of Bogor allowed its land to be used. Each party has a reason to claim 
the dams as their own. However, based on existing regulations, the owner of 
public goods is determined by the labour division, regulated by Law of Local 
Polity (Law Number 32 of 2004) and its derived regulations (i.e. Government 
Regulation Number 38 of 2007), which state that the dam is owned by the 
central government. The implication was that if the dam was owned by the 
central government, central government should finance it. The existing 
regulations do not recognize collective asset owners for a public good financed 
from public budgets. Debates about who the asset owner would be required 
great effort and time. Another concern related to the asset ownership status 
concerns the annual report, which is issued by the Supreme Board of Finance 
Audit (SBFA, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). The SBFA releases the annual 
report on financial accountability for each public agency involved in the 
administration of assets. Asset ownership administration is based on the 
ownership status. Inappropriate administrate asset ownership will 
generate inappropriate financial reports. Inappropriate financial reporting 
means that an organisation is less acountable or not accountable at all.  This 
was also a crucial issue, since the ownership status contributed to other 
organisational uncertainties, as described below. 
 Second, organisational uncertainty over who would act as the executor for land 
acquisition. This is an implication of difficulties deciding ownership of the dam. 
Based on existing regulations, the executor for land acquisition was the owner 
of the budget. However, it was not clear whether that meant the budget for land 
acquisition or the budget for construction. However, based on a collective 
decision, the regency government of Bogor would contribute to land 
acquisition, but this does not comply with the regulation because the budget for 
the land acquisition came from the provincial government of Jakarta. Debates 
over defining who would acquire land thus also required additional effort and 
time. 
 Third, organisational uncertainty to determine the organisation who would 
receive the budget from Jakarta. This could have been the regency government 
of Bogor, where the dams are located, or the Ministry of Public Works, which 
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has authority for building them. One difficulty with transferring Jakarta’s 
budget to the regency government of Bogor was that there was no existing 
regulation to manage this kind of inter-territory budget transfer. The 
regulations only manage two kinds of budget transfer: grants or financial 
assistance. According to the Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 32/2011 
and a Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 14/2016, a grant can only be 
applied for transfer from the principal region to a new region. Based on a 
Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 13/2006 and a Circular Letter of the 
Minister of Home Affairs No. 900/2007 financial assistance can be applied for 
only in the case of a transfer from the provincial government to its subordinates 
(i.e. municipalities and regencies). In the case of the Ciawi dam and the 
Sukamahi dam, the regency of Bogor is not a new region and is not a sub-
ordinate of Jakarta. However, transferring Jakarta’s budget to the Ministry of 
Public Works would also require a change in regulations, since existing 
regulations stated that the provincial government in Jakarta can only assist 
the Ministry of Public Works financially as long as the dams are located in 
Jakarta. So, a financial transfer from Jakarta for land acquisition for the dams 
to the Ministry of Public Works or to the regency of Bogor faces a regulatory 
hurdle. Overcoming this organisational uncertainty also required extra time, 
cost and effort. 
  
Administrative control instruments work for organisations who develop a single-
owner public project, but here, the existing regulations do not manage resource 
exchanges associated with a joint project. The organisational uncertainties that exist 
potentially increase the cost, effort and time required, implying a delay to 
construction. Delays of this kind would increase the risk of floods in Jakarta. The time 
from the collective decision being made to build the dams to the start of development 
was almost three years (January 2014-November 2016). 
  
Debates, discussion and other efforts to address these organisational uncertainties 
ended when the central government decided to take over all costs associated with 
the project and land acquisition, through Presidential Regulation No. 3/2016. The 
central government put an end to the complex processes and procedures associated 
with resource sharing between the organisations involved. This central government 
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intervention addressed dilemmas associated with cooperation between multiple 
organisations and accelerated development of the project. The Minister of Public 
Works could start to acquire land, thus superseding the role formerly played by the 
regency government of Bogor role and the provincial government of Jakarta. 
  
The government’s decision to take on the cost of the project overcame organisational 
uncertainties. This intervention meant that one organisation was able to take 
overcome organisational processes that were previously spread across a number of 
institutions. Administrative processes now become smoother (i.e. continuous), since 
there was a shift from incentive instruments to administrative control instruments; 
there was a shift from informal-discontinuous to informal-continuous mechanisms. 
This intervention also shifted the prototype of metropolitan planning in the JMR from 




According to our analysis, the existing coordination capacity of the metropolitan 
spatial plan can be classified as a type of master-plan and the existing coordination 
mechanism of the dam development can be classified as a type of informal-continuous 
mechanism. The main instruments and organisational uncertainties associated with 
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Table 4.2 allows us to see that the coordination arrangement for metropolitan 
planning in the JMR until 2016 can be classified as prototype of metropolitan planning 
C, given that it relies upon the use of a type of master plan and the informal-
discontinuous mechanism. Prototype C, which uses administrative control 
instruments to encourage coordination capacity and uses incentive intensity 
instruments to encourage coordination mechanisms, brings about organisational 
uncertainties. They are:  
1. With regards to coordination capacity, the type of master plan designed for the 
metropolitan spatial plan relies on a hierarchical plan and a regulatory system, 
but cannot fully manage fragmentation of policies, plans and strategies 
amongst authorities in the JMR and cannot adapt to change quickly enough. 
The organisations involved need other forums to address regional problems. 
Other forums, such as coordination meetings, require additional effort, 
implying higher transaction costs.  
2. When it comes to coordination mechanisms, the lack of ownership over the 
joint project (which resulted from resource sharing amongst the organisations 
involved in the dams) led to unclear actions. This increased organisational 
uncertainty, given difficulties defining legal arrangements for financial 
transfers amongst public entities. To address these organisational 
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uncertainties, the organisations involved needed to hold coordination 
meetings, which required additional effort.  
  
These organisational uncertainties, which cannot be addressed by existing 
instruments, led to delays in the dam’s development. Those organisational 
uncertainties contributed to a reduction in effective coordination for metropolitan 
planning in the JMR. It was 16 years between the dam initially being proposed (in 
2001) to the first construction starting (in 2017) (in 2014, after 13 years, the decision 
was made to build the dams). This implies ineffective coordination, which needs to be 
improved going forward. The intervention of central government to take on the overall 
cost of the dams project did promote more effective coordination; it bought about a 
shift from Prototype C to Prototype B. However, it may have been insufficient in 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
  
  
5.1      Introduction 
  
This dissertation has attempted to aid understanding on the institutional 
arrangements underpinning metropolitan planning in the JMR and understand how 
we can enhance effective coordination amongst the organisations involved. This is 
important, since the current JMR has more constituents than the original JMR 
established in 1975. In 1975, it had six constituents, including two provinces, Jakarta 
and West Java. Since 2008, the JMR has twelve constituents, including three 
provinces, Jakarta, West Java and Banten. As the number of constituents increases, so 
does the likelihood of coordination problems. Moreover, since 2001, Indonesia has 
applied a new policy of decentralization and local autonomy, which has given more 
authority to provincial and local governments. The JMR has been more fragmented, 
meaning that each local entity has more power. This study found that the Metropolitan 
Power Diffusion Index (MPDI) increased from 1,76 in 1994 (before decentralisation) 
to 2,57 in 2012 (see Appendix 1.1). This shows that currently, the JMR is more 
fragmented. However, it also implies that acute problems, such as flooding, need to be 
solved together through effective coordination. Ineffective coordination generates 
delays, cancellations or postponements to metropolitan transportation infrastructures 
and services and to effective flood control infrastructures. These delays, cancellations 
and postponements add to the suffering faced by citizens, lead to a lower quality of life 
and have an impact on the regional economy and sustainable development. Effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR is thus needed to create coherent 
plans, policies and strategies and to accelerate infrastructure and service development.  
 
The core of metropolitan planning is coordination, which involves different 
organisations and authorities (such as local, provincial/state or central/the federal 
governments) and urban territories (such as municipalities, boroughs, regencies, 
cantons or communes) in a metropolitan region (Alexander, 2002; Roberts, et al, 
1999). Since each has different strategies, policies, plans, capacities and rules that may 
not be coherent with one another, it can be very difficult to create a unitary plan or 
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joint project. Projects may therefore not be implement or realised (for example Feiock, 
20013; McCarthy, 2011). These difficulties bring about additional costs and require 
additional time and effort for, say, information gathering, coordination meetings, 
bargaining, enforcement and monitoring (Feiock, 2009). This extra cost, time and 
effort show that the organisations involved face barriers to engage in trouble-free 
resource exchange. A concern for this research was to identify how to establish 
coordination arrangements among the organisations involved in a metropolitan 
region that exert little effort, cost and time to create coherent plans, policies or 
strategies for the entire metropolitan region and to realize those into joint projects, 
common regulation or collective action. Although this research focuses on the Jakarta 
Metropolitan Region (JMR), coordination problems in metropolitan planning occur 
in other metropolitan regions around the world (see Chapter 2). 
  
To analyse coordination problems in metropolitan regions, this research focuses on 
the form of governance (governance structure), an approach rooted in the Theory of 
Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985, 1996). Based on this perspective, 
organisations involved coordinate to exchange their resources within a particular 
arrangement that they have agreed upon and accepted, whether through hierarchical, 
market-based or hybrid forms of governance. The arrangement uses specific 
instruments; hierarchy uses administrative control instruments, market-based 
approaches apply incentive intensity instruments and hybrid forms used mixed 
instruments. When they face barriers to coordination that generate extra time, costs 
and efforts, based on the theory of TCE, they need to change the form of governance 
used (Williamson, 1985, 1996). Changing the form of governance also means changing 
the particular instruments used. This research argues that coordination problems have 
resulted in an inappropriate form of governance used for coordination arrangements. 
Appropriate forms of governance and specific instruments will reduce the additional 
time, cost and effort required.  
  
5.2      Research background 
  
This research was designed to answer a central research question concerning 
metropolitan planning in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region (JMR):  
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“How can effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR be 
explained and its effectiveness be improved?”  
  
The main research question is operationalized through four sub-research questions: 
 
1. When effective coordination for metropolitan planning changes dynamically at 
different times in the same metropolitan region and there is “no one size fits all” 
between metropolitan regions, what forms of governance are used and what 
shifts in their application are evident in metropolitan planning? 
2. What is organisation’s preferred approach to the governing the JMR in the 
context of coordinated metropolitan planning? 
3. How can the coordination capacity of a metropolitan plan in the JMR be 
explained with reference to the form of governance adopted? 
4. How can coordination mechanisms used for developing JMR regional 
infrastructure projects, be explained with reference to forms of governance? 
  
These four sub-research questions are designed to tease out an answer to the main 
research question and to formulate recommendations that can enhance effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR and solve regional problems, such 
as traffic jams and acute floods. The emphasis is on effective coordination during both 
the plan making and implementation phases. Effective coordination for metropolitan 
planning in the JMR is crucial; Jakarta needed 24 years to start work on a rapid 
transport system, for example. The JMR took 13 years before it decided to build the 
Ciawi and Sukamahi dams. Acceleration can be achieved when the coordination 
arrangements applied adopt the appropriate form of governance to manage resource 
exchange.   
  
 5.3      Research Findings 
  
A number of findings have been identified.  
  
5.3.1 The framework of metropolitan planning: the scientific contribution 
For the first sub-research question, this research showed that institutional 
arrangements for metropolitan planning are different from one another in the 
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metropolitan region and also different over time, even in the same metropolitan region 
(presented at Chapter 2). So, metropolitan planning isn’t just “one size fits all”, but it 
also changes dynamically. These two characteristics of metropolitan planning are a 
crucial concern that influences this research and the quest for effective coordination.  
 
Effective coordination for metropolitan planning was analysed along three lines. The 
first focused on effective coordination to govern a metropolitan region. Here, academic 
debates include the localism, regionalism and new regionalism approaches; which 
approach is preferred by organisations involved? The second focused on effective 
coordination to create coherent metropolitan policies, plans or strategies. Here, 
academic debates focus upon the type of plan that can be applied for the entire 
metropolitan region, whether in terms of a master plan (or blueprint, or coordinative 
planning), a (traditional) strategic plan or a new strategic plan (master-strategic plan, 
or strategic-master plan, programme-based plan, or strategic project). The third 
focused on effective coordination to implement metropolitan plans, policies or 
strategies. Rarely does academic research discusses the implementation of 
metropolitan plans, policies or strategies in-depth, but much of the existing 
literature recognizes that implementation of these are the most difficult part in 
metropolitan planning (e.g McCarthy, 2011). 
  
This research showed that those differences and academic debates actually 
demonstrate different forms of governance, rooted in the theory of Transaction Cost 
Economics (Williamson, 1985, 1991, 1996, 1998), which focused upon how 
organisations involved coordinate to manage resource exchanges. With those three 
forms of governance in mind, this research developed three mechanisms for 
implementation of a metropolitan policy, plan or strategy. Furthermore, this 
interpretation led this research to develop a comprehensive framework of 
metropolitan planning, containing three forms of governance: hierarchical, hybrid and 
market-based forms. As presented in Chapter 2, this research developed a 
comprehensive framework of metropolitan planning, which laid out nine prototypes 
of metropolitan planning. Each of those prototypes corresponds to a form of 
governance used by the organisations involved to coordinate and develop coherent 
metropolitan policies, plans or strategies and to coordinate their implementation. 
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This comprehensive framework of metropolitan planning is the scientific contribution 
of this research. Using the comprehensive framework of metropolitan planning, we 
will be able to demonstrate differing forms of effective coordination for metropolitan 
planning in different places and at different times. As we saw in Chapter 2, this 
research identified other instances where policy was not “one size fits all” and where it 
was subject to dynamic change, namely Greater London, Amsterdam Metropolitan 
Region and Portland Metropolitan Region.  
   
5.3.2  The preferred metropolitan governance approach used in the JMR 
In answer to the second sub-research question, this research showed that metropolitan 
planning in the JMR uses a decentralized system and inter-local government 
cooperation supported by central government and private entities (see 
Chapter 3). There is a preference of the organisations involved to govern the JMR 
through multi-organisation cooperation because such cooperation does not lead to a 
reduction in authority. The preference for inter-local government cooperation also 
shows that they accept this metropolitan governance approach given that it creates a 
particular coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning in the JMR. This 
approach is more widely preferred than the “Megapolitan” concept, which 
consolidates the JMR horizontally. Even though this was expected to be more effective 
when implementing metropolitan plans, policies or strategies in the JMR, the 
organisations involved avoided it. Moreover, the idea that was supposed to be 
accommodated in a new law for the Special Region of Jakarta was rejected by the 
central government.  
  
Chapter 3 demonstrates a crucial factor in the provision of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
from Jakarta to its surrounding districts, designed to serve commuters and to address 
traffic jams. Provincial and local governments surrounding Jakarta preferred to 
cooperate rather than form a metropolitan regional government in order to solve 
metropolitan regional problems. Inter-local government cooperation is chosen to 
provide and produce metropolitan regional infrastructures and services in the JMR. 
Here, the role of the central government is also crucial. The central government for 
example, supported the construction of a special road for the BRT that connected 
Jakarta to surrounding districts.  
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5.3.3 Coordination capacity of the metropolitan spatial plan of the JMR 
When it comes to the third sub-question, this research shows that existing 
metropolitan spatial planning uses a hierarchical form of governance, or type of 
master plan, to manage spatial plans produced by the provincial and district 
governments that form the JMR (see Chapter 4). Based on existing regulations, the 
spatial plans of the provinces of Jakarta, West Java and Banten and the spatial plans 
of all districts should follow and accommodate the contents of the metropolitan spatial 
plan. The challenge for the metropolitan spatial plan is thus to manage the 
fragmentation of policies, plans and strategies. However, even though administrative 
control instruments are applied, there were some deviations between spatial plans 
when it came to how to mitigate floods in Jakarta by developing dams in territory 
upstream of Jakarta. That deviation highlights the difficulties in creating a coherent 
plan for the JMR. Those spatial plans also couldn’t become a main reference for the 
organisations involved to guide a collective decision whether to build or not to build 
the dams. Plus, existing regulations that were applied could not manage 
the development of the dams; existing regulations didn’t give flexibility for spatial 
plans to adapt to dynamic changes in ideas and demands. 
  
The organisations involved, particularly those in Jakarta, established other fora 
outside of the metropolitan spatial plan to discuss the dams. Jakarta needed the 
support of other territories upstream. Other forums included the submission of an 
annual proposal from the province of Jakarta to the Ministry of Public Works, meeting 
the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, creating a consensus between the 
Governor of Jakarta and the Governor of West Java and using forums managed by 
BKSP Jabodetabekpunjur (the regional agency of the JMR) to mitigate floods in 
Jakarta and to encourage inter-local government cooperation. A collective decision to 
build the dams was finally taken in a meeting facilitated by the BKSP 
Jabodetabekpunjur involving the organisations concerned. The type of master plan 
used though couldn’t fully control and manage the demands by members of the JMR 
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5.3.4 Coordination mechanisms to implement a joint-project for the JMR 
When it came to the fourth sub-research question, this research showed that existing 
coordination mechanisms to implement the dam projects relied upon a hybrid form of 
governance. More specifically, it relied upon a type of informal-continuous 
mechanism (discussed in Chapter 4). This hybrid form of governance manifests itself 
in the main instruments used to manage resource exchanges among the organisations 
involved in the construction of the dams. The main instruments used are mixed 
instruments, incentive intensity instruments and administrative control instruments. 
This type of informal-continuous mechanism was first implemented in September 
2016, almost three years after the collective decision was made to build the dams and 
when central government (through the the Ministry of Public Works) took over whole 
cost of the dams (including land acquisition and construction costs). Previously, it was 
expected that the dams would be financed jointly by the central government and 
provincial government of Jakarta. This cooperation didn’t pan out smoothly, because 
existing regulations did not support this kind of resource sharing.  
  
Central government’s decision to take over costs of the dam in September 2016 
reduced the organisational uncertainties that had previously existed. Central 
government intervention also used administrative control instruments, namely budget 
interventions. Previously, administrative control instruments used between January 
2014 to September 2016 were regulations be applied to each of the organisations 
involved. Each organisation has specific regulations that govern how they exchange 
resources with one another. However, existing regulations were not appropriate for 
joint projects that required resource sharing, such as the two-dam project. 
Inappropriate regulations thus bought about organisational uncertainties, such as a 
lack of clarity over the administrative status of the budget transfer from Jakarta to 
Bogor or to the Ministry of Public Works, a lack of clarity over who is responsible for 
land acquisition or a lack of clarity about who would be the collective owner of the joint 
project. Those organisational uncertainties required extra time, cost and effort for the 
organisations involved. To accelerate the development of the dams, in September 
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 5.4      Conclusion 
  
The main research question asked “to what extent can effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning in the JMR be explained and improved?” This research has 
shown that metropolitan planning in the JMR uses Prototype B (see Figure 5.1). This 
prototype uses a master plan to manage coordination capacity and uses the 
informal-continuous mechanism to manage coordination mechanisms. This 
prototype has been used since September 2016, when the central government took 
over land acquisition costs from the provincial government of Jakarta. Previously, 
Jakarta promised to pay land acquisition costs to the regency of Bogor, but this plan 
was cancelled, since existing regulation did not allow for this kind of arrangement. 
Prior to this intervention, the coordination arrangement for metropolitan planning in 
the JMR corresponded to Prototype C (see Figure 5.1). Prototype C means that the 
coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning uses a master plan to manage 
coordination capacity and an informal-discontinuous mechanism for the coordination 
mechanism. Since the organisations involved faced some coordination problems, 
which required additional cost, effort and time, Prototype C changed to Prototype B.  
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Institutional Arrangement of Metropolitan Planning 
Figure 5.1 
Institutional arrangement of metropolitan planning in the JMR and shifts of prototype 









Prototype C, which relied on incentives for coordination mechanism, was not sufficient 
for the organisations involved to implement the collective decision to build the dams. 
They spent almost three years to start land acquisition and dam construction because 
this prototype C contained inherent uncertainties. Those uncertainties, such as an 
unclear ownership status of collective asset of the dams, made it difficult for them to 
take actions. However, when they shifted to Prototype B, which used mixed incentive 
instruments and administrative control, provided more certainties. Then, they could 
begin development of the dams. 
 
Even though Prototype B succeeded in reducing organisational uncertainties, time, 
effort and cost, it also had some weaknesses. As identified in previous chapters, the 
type of master plan used to stimulate coordination capacity does not adequately 
A recommended prototype 
Source: author’s analysis 
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address fragmentation and adaptation problems. Another crucial issue is the preferred 
institutional setting to govern the JMR, that is, inter-local government cooperation 
supported by the central government and private entities. As is the case in other 
metropolitan regions in the word, this metropolitan governance approach is weak, 
given that every organisation can easily enter and exit any collective agreements. No 
one organisation can force another to follow through on the agreements made. This 
can generate difficulties, particularly when seeking to address metropolitan regional 
problems requiring collective action. However, as mentioned by Williamson (1996), 
the acceptance of organisations involved is fundamental to creating coordination on a 
more operational level. In the case of the JMR, multi-organisation cooperation is a 
key. Based on this configuration, metropolitan planning in the JMR still needs 
improvement to enhance effective coordination within the context of inter-local 
government cooperation, supported by central government and private entities.  
  
Drastic improvement for the institutional setting of the JMR is also possible. Chapter 
2 discussed the lessons learns from the dynamic shifts to metropolitan planning in 
metropolitan regions around the world. It is possible in metropolitan planning to shift 
from a cooperation approach to an integration approach or vice versa. In the case of 
the JMR, drastic improvement is needed to integrate the JMR horizontally and to 
establish a unitary metropolitan regional government. It requires more effort, because 
it demands the amendment of relevant laws and even the Constitution. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, the idea to integrate the JMR generated discussion, debate and political 
tension. It is possible that similar ideas will be realised in the future, as long as the 
organisations involved accept them.   
  
This dissertation assesses transaction costs through an indication of time and efforts 
needed by the organisations involved to coordinate: to make collective decisions or to 
create a coherent metropolitan plan and to implement those. Circumstances like 
extensive time investments and elaborate efforts by the organisations involved 
indicate that high transaction costs exist. To reduce those high transaction costs, they 
would need to change to another form of governance which utilizes other available 
instruments, or creating new instruments. Here, the option to change is to use a 
different form of governance with particular instruments to solve uncertainties. 
However, the option chosen by the organisations involved should be supported by the 
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institutional setting of metropolitan region. The existing institutional setting of a 
metropolitan region influences any decision about acceptable arrangements for 
coordination. The chosen form of governance for coordination should be selected to 
fit this institutional setting of metropolitan region. A particular form of governance 




5.5      Improvements proposed 
  
The conclusion to the research mentioned that metropolitan planning in the JMR 
currently uses Prototype B as its coordination arrangement. This is supported by 
the institutional setting of the JMR, namely inter-local government cooperation 
supported by the central government and private entities (see Chapters 3 and 4). Even 
though Prototype B has succeeded in ending the organisational uncertainties that 
previously occurred in coordination mechanisms, it has bought about other 
organisational uncertainties with respect to coordination capacity (see Chapter 4). 
Organisational uncertainties associated with the master plan have resulted from 
fragmentation of the organisations involved in the JMR. Prototype B requires that 
central government ministries or agencies should have adequate financial capacity to 
finance projects agreed upon by the JMR. When resources, including financial 
resources, are limited, the central government will have difficulty financing projects. 
In the case of the two dams, a lack of financial support from the central government 
would be addressed by the provincial government in Jakarta, but existing regulations 
prevented this taking place.  To avoid this problem in the future and to enhance 
effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR, this research proposes 
shifting the existing prototype, from Prototype B to Prototype E (see Figure 5.1). 
Prototype E is chosen through analysis of the remediableness criterion. This analysis 
is presented in Appendixes 5.1 and 5.2.  Improvements concern not just the 
coordination arrangement, but also the institutional setting in the metropolitan region 
(i.e. metropolitan governance). Those improvements are presented in the sub-sections 
below.  
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5.5.1 Improvements to the institutional setting of the JMR: the 
preference for the metropolitan governance approach 
In order to enhance effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR, this 
section proposes possible improvements. Improvements are proposed to enhance 
effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR by creating coherence 
between the institutional setting in the metropolitan region and coordination 
arrangements for metropolitan planning. In the case of the JMR, Chapter 3 
demonstrates that the organisations involved prefer to govern the JMR through inter-
local government cooperation supported by the central government and private 
entities. This metropolitan governance of the JMR is facilitated by BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur, a regional agency of the JMR. BKSP Jabodetabekjur is accepted 
politically by the organisations involved (Firman, 2008). The preference of the 
organisations involved in the metropolitan governance approach and existence of the 
BKSP Jabodetabekjur are crucial to establishing the institutional setting in the JMR. 
This is discussed by Williamson (1996), who argued that even though a type of 
coordination may not be efficient, it can be persistent for a long time because the 
organisations involved accept and support it. In the case of the JMR, even though the 
cooperation between the BKSP Jabodetabekjur and other organisations is deemed 
ineffective, the organisations involved accept and support the existence of this regional 
agency and this metropolitan governance approach (see Chapter 3).  The preference of 
the organisations involved in governing the JMR, through inter-local government 
cooperation supported by the central government and private entities, is fundamental 
to creating an effective coordination arrangement for metropolitan planning in the 
JMR. Following this, improvements to enhance effective coordination are also based 
on the preference for cooperation.  
  
Here, provincial and local government constituents of the JMR are encouraged to 
engage in more closed cooperation. The current practice of inter-local government 
cooperation is weak because there is no sanction or incentive for them to follow any 
joint-agreement; no one organisation can force another to follow. So, one 
improvement that is required is to search for and to apply other instruments that can 
encourage closer cooperation. With that in mind, this research proposes the use of 
incentive intensity instruments. The incentive intensity instruments that are proposed 
are:  
Page 177 of 246 
 
1. Annual grants from the province of Jakarta to surrounding districts are framed 
as an incentive to implement Jakarta’ strategies and to obtain support from its 
neighbouring cities to solve Jakarta’s problems. However, Jakarta’s strategies 
didn’t have a systematic framework to finance projects and locations/sites. The 
central government can remedy this situation by encouraging Jakarta to use the 
metropolitan spatial plan of Jabodetabekpunjur as their platform to plan and to 
disperse grants to the surrounding districts. 
2. The central government can enhance inter-local government cooperation in the 
JMR by offering incentives for districts that support development within the 
context of the metropolitan and regional perspective. For example, central 
government can provide incentives for the Bogor regency if they can safeguard 
and preserve their conservation areas and protected forests. The incentive is 
required to guide development in the regency of Bogor and to substitute ant 
potential loss of revenues it faces. When the regency of Bogor, which is located 
upstream of Jakarta, opts to respond to the incentives rather than conserve and 
protect areas, Jakarta will be safer from the risk of floods. 
  
 
5.5.2 Improvements to coordination arrangements for metropolitan 
planning in the JMR 
Improving coordination arrangements for metropolitan planning means to identify a 
better prototype according to the framework of metropolitan planning developed in 
Chapter 2. To identify a better prototype, three stages are undertaken (i) to identify 
and to analyse possible instruments used in each type of metropolitan spatial plan and 
when plans are implemented, whether relying upon administrative control, incentive 
intensity, or both (see Appendixes 5.1 and 5.2), (ii) to identify and to analyse those 
types using three remediableness criterion (see Appendixes 5.1 and 5.2) and (iii) to 
identify which prototype of metropolitan planning is better than that which exists 
currently. Identification and analysis is conducted for all prototypes of metropolitan 
planning provided by the framework of metropolitan planning developed in Chapter 
2, which each prototype has similar chance to be proposed as a better prototype.  
  
In the third stage, all prototypes are able to be described and to be implemented, but 
they have different net gain. Bigger net gain indicates a better prototype. This section 
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selects a type of coordination capacity underpinning the metropolitan spatial plan and 
a type of coordination mechanism directed at plan implementation. Each type has the 
potential to reduce existing uncertainties. By rethinking metropolitan planning for the 
JMR, based on the remediableness criterion (see Appendixes 5.1 and 5.2), this section 
proposes enhancing effective coordination by establishing a type of master-strategic 
plan to bolster coordination capacity and a type of informal-continuous mechanism to 
bolster coordination mechanisms. This proposed alternative relates to prototype E 
(see Figure 5.1). 
 
 
5.6      Policy implications and recommendations 
  
This section discusses the policy implications that result from Prototype B, which 
stresses a preference for a metropolitan governance approach to inter-local 
government cooperation supported by central government and private entities. 
Improvements and policy recommendations required for improvements in 
implementation are also proposed. This analysis is conducted to enhance effective 
coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR. The analysis is conducted using 
the form of governance (governance structure) perspective, rooted in the theory of 
Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985, 1996).  
  
5.6.1 Policy implications 
In this sub-section, this research will discuss the policy implications of: (1) the current 
institutional arrangement for metropolitan planning in the JMR and (2) the 
institutional arrangement underpinning metropolitan planning proposed for the JMR. 
These will be discussed with reference to the institutional setting in the metropolitan 
region, coordination capacity and coordination mechanisms.  
 
a. Institutional setting of metropolitan region 
The current institutional arrangement for metropolitan planning in the JMR has a 
preference for inter-local government cooperation supported by central government 
and local entities. This preference implies that under existing laws and the constitution 
and organisations involved should prioritize cooperation when creating and 
implementing coherent plans, policies or strategies and during their implementation. 
Central government supports inter-local government cooperation by providing 
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infrastructure and services. Private entities support as contractors. Based on this 
preference, it is best to avoid a policy that integrates local government horizontally. 
  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the BKSP Jabodetabekjur has a crucial role to play 
in maintaining and facilitating communication and coordination amongst the 
organisations involved by allowing for a collective commitment to to be made. Even 
though this agency is perceived to be ineffective in implementing plans, policies and 
strategies because of its limited power, whether in the case of metropolitan 
transportation (Chapter 3) and the case of the two dams project (Chapter 4), it played 
an effective role in facilitating governors, regents and mayors when consolidating and 
taking collective decisions. So, to be consistent, a policy to increase the power for the 
BKSP Jabodetabekjur may also be avoided. This will better enhance its capacity to 
facilitate and to consolidate collective decisions and commitments by governors, 
regents and mayors.  
  
As suggested in Section 5.5, improvements to institutional settings involve using the 
metropolitan spatial plan of the Jabodetabekpunjur as a platform for Jakarta to plan 
and to disburse grants to its surrounding districts and to provide an incentive for 
constituents of the JMR to conform with plans, policies or strategies of the JMR. The 
implication of these improvements is that the central government can’t just oversee 
behaviour, but should actively manage existing arrangements and begin to take 
control of grants from the province of Jakarta in order to create closer and more 
coherent inter-local government cooperation in the JMR. Another policy implication 
is that central government should try to formulate a policy to provide grants to create 
plans, policies or strategies that are uniform across constituent members of the JMR. 
To allow plans, policies and strategies to conform, central government can also use the 
metropolitan spatial plan of the Jabodetabekpunjur. 
 
b. Coordination capacity underpinning the metropolitan spatial plan 
As mentioned previously, the existing coordination capacity of metropolitan planning 
also has weaknesses, namely its capacity to address fragmentation and adaptation. The 
metropolitan spatial plan should thus be complemented by other regulations that 
address fragmentation and adaptation.  
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In the previous section, improvements to solve those were proposed. Regulations 
related to developing and arranging the metropolitan spatial plan and provincial and 
local spatial plans should be revised. The regulations rely on administrative control 
and are not adequate in managing fragmentation and demands for adaptation. 
Another implication is that the metropolitan spatial plan should be developed so that 
it involves private entities and others. The revision will be to Law No. 26 of 2007 on 
Spatial Planning and the Presidential Decree No. 54 of 2008 on the Spatial Plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur.  
 
c. Coordination mechanisms to implement joint-projects 
The decision to take over all the costs associated with the dams meant the prototype 
for metropolitan planning in the JMR shifted from Prototype C to Prototype B (see 
Figure 5.1). This had two policy implications. The first concerns the way that 
metropolitan regional problems in the JMR were dealt with; provincial and local 
government can only help to finance the central government projects as long the 
projects are located in the provincial or local government territory. The second is that 
the central government should have adequate financial capacity to support inter-local 
government cooperation in the JMR by developing regional infrastructures and 
services. These two implications do not favour the JMR. The JMR will have difficulty 
in developing its metropolitan regional infrastructures and services and addressing 
regional problems when those projects are financed only by central government. 
However, provincial government does have budget capacity, but isn’t allowed to offer 
support. 
  
5.6.2  Policy recommendations 
A number of policy recommendations are developed in order to respond to the analysis 
above (see also Appendixes 5.1 and 5.2). We saw that prototype E has the potential to 
enhance effective coordination for metropolitan planning in the JMR (see Figure 5.1). 
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a. Institutional settings of the JMR: to keep the existing setting or to 
shift it to become more integrated  
As discussed in Chapter 3, this research recommended keeping the existing 
institutional setting governing the JMR, i.e. the decentralized system that encourages 
inter-local government cooperation and which is supported by central government 
and private entities. There are a number of reasons for this (1) the organisations 
involved prefer to govern the JMR, because this institutional setting does not reduce 
the autonomy of provincial and local governments, (2) central government is still able 
to frame the JMR’s policies, plans or strategies and to support in their implementation, 
(3) the existing regional agency, the BKSP Jabodetabekjur, still functions to 
consolidate the political support of provincial and local governments, and (4) to 
manage regional political cohesiveness. To support inter-local government 
cooperation, the policy recommendation is that capacity building should be 
encouraged for the BKSP Jabodetabekpunjur. Capacity building includes 
communication training, contract writing training and collaborative governance 
workshops and training. 
  
To create closer cooperation among provincial and local governments involved, the 
central government can actively formulate and use various incentives. Central 
government can issue decrees from the Minister of Home Affairs to encourage the 
provincial government in Jakarta to incorporate grants to surrounding districts into 
the metropolitan spatial plan of the Jabodetabekpunjur. Moreover, to create 
conformity among the organisations involved, the central government can enhance 
conformity by providing incentives. The central government, through revision of the 
Law of Financial Balance between the Central Government and Local Polities, can 
establish an incentive scheme.  
  
However, it is important to note that it is possible that the institutional setting in the 
metropolitan region will shift so that it becomes more integrated. As has been 
discussed in Chapter 2, other metropolitan regions around the world change from a 
fragmented institutional setting to a more integrated, metropolitan one, or vice versa 
(as was the case in Greater London, Amsterdam or Portland). With that in mind, the 
JMR may also have a chance to change the institutional setting in the metropolitan 
region. The integration of the JMR will require a shift in political support from the 
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organisations involved and will require the amendment of existing laws, namely the 
Law of Local Polity, the Law of Jakarta as the Capital City and laws on the 
establishment of autonomous relevant provinces and districts in the JMR. These new 
laws will bring both benefits and drawbacks and increase transaction costs, such as 
those that result from the intensive coordination meetings and bargaining that would 
take place. Success or failure in this regard will depend on the acceptance or reluctance 
of the organisations involved.  
 
b. Coordination capacity: to shift from a master plan to a master-
strategic plan 
This new type of the metropolitan spatial plan is designed to cope with fragmentation 
and dynamic changes in metropolitan regions, including adaptation to new challenges 
and new opportunities, which requires flexibility as well as certainty. This research 
recommends developing a policy, one that would create a new type of metropolitan 
spatial plan.  This new type should be designed to encourage flexibility and certainty 
and should be a master-strategic plan. Master-strategic plans are associated with 
hybrid forms of governance and rely on mixed instruments, namely administrative 
control and incentive intensity.  
  
i. To address fragmentation 
The type of master-strategic plan is formulated into smaller areas and contain 
contents that are rigid (e.g. a master plan) and some that are more flexible (e.g. a 
strategic plan). The rigid contents could concern, for example, conservation and 
protected forests, heritage areas, military areas, irrigated-technical farming areas, 
airports, seaports, infrastructure networks, flood control structural measurements, 
energy plants, regional water drinking processing plants, regional solid waste 
plants and other public projects. These contents should be formulated as part of 
the master plan. The rigid contents formulated in the master plan should be 
designed to cope with fragmentation in the metropolitan region generated by 
different local governments. Central government should clearly define those areas 
to avoid misleading those involved. Central government should also provide 
particular rules of the game, including rule enforcement, to safeguard those areas. 
This rule of the game mainly relies on administrative control instruments 
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consisting of commands, sanctions and compensation. These rigid contents should 
be formulated in the master plan. Given that they form part of the master plan, 
these will have to be accommodated in local spatial plans. These rigid contents have 
a planning period of twenty years and can be reviewed every five years. The review 
is conducted by central government. 
 
On the other hand, flexible contents are formulated in areas that are likely to 
change dynamically through land development. These areas need more flexibility 
and should include incentives to successfully develop particular functions, such as 
Transit-Oriented Development (see for example Tan, Janssen-Jansen and 
Bertolini, 2013). Due to the fact that they are dynamic, this research suggests that 
these areas are included in some strategic spatial plans as part of the metropolitan 
spatial plan for the JMR. These strategic spatial plans are designed to cover one or 
more territory and are designed to correspond to the administration period of the 
elected head of local or provincial government. The local strategic spatial plan is 
not formulated to have 20 years following current development plan period. The 
period of the local strategic spatial plan is the same as for the local development 
plan: five years. This new arrangement also matches perfectly with the 
administration period of a governor, regent or mayor, which is also five years. 
Other incentives can be created so that actors feel involved in major events and so 
that financial incentives or disincentive for land development control are put in 
place. These strategic areas are designed to be dynamic areas that match as locus 
areas of the realization of vision, mission and priority programmes offered 
during the campaigns of governors, mayors and regents. Financial incentive can be 
created through revision to the Law of Financial Balance between the Central 
Governments and Local Polities, which provides incentives for provincial and local 
governments to conform to national plans, policies or strategies for metropolitan 
regions, such as to save conservation areas or to provide sufficient park and ride 
areas.  
 
ii. To address adaptation  
As mentioned above, when the metropolitan spatial plan contains a number of 
smaller plans, whether master plans or strategic plans, the revision process become 
easier. The important difference between this arrangement and the current 
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metropolitan planning system is that these smaller parts are not determined by 
administrative territory, but based on content that is administrated territorially. 
The implication is that each district may also have a number of smaller spatial 
plans. The district government has autonomous authority to coordinate, formulate, 
deliberate and enact the plan, particularly in strategic areas, i.e. areas that change 
dynamically. However, when central government focuses upon strategic areas, 
which may comprise several autonomous provinces, it needs to coordinate plan 
formulation mechanisms. Similarly, the provincial government who has provincial 
concerns for the strategic areas, which may consist of several autonomous districts 
within provincial territory, the provincial government leads to coordinate plan 
formulation. The revision does not need to change the whole metropolitan spatial 
plan, but instead is only conducted for specific plans that need to be revised. 
Moreover, the revision can be conducted anytime there is a new national priority 
that has not previously been planned for in spatial plans.  
  
In summary, the policy recommendations are presented in Table 5.1. 



































The policy recommendations to enhance effective coordination for the metropolitan 
spatial plan of the JMR 
  
Concern 
Type of master-strategic plan 




the creation of a single 
metropolitan spatial plan 
for the JMR (provincial 
and local government do 
not need to develop their 
own spatial plan), but 
one which consists of 
smaller master plans and 
smaller strategic plans.  
 To provide certainty with 
rigid contents that 
cannot be changed 
through normal 
procedures, such as 
existing conservation 
areas and protected 
forests, military facilities, 
airports, seaports and 
technical irrigation. 
  
 Process to develop the 
metropolitan spatial 
plan can maximize 
incentive instruments, 
such as encouraging 
involvement in major 
events and providing 
financial incentives to 
keep Jakarta as the 
capital city. 
 Incentive instruments      








      The smaller master plans 
and smaller strategic plans 
are not determined based on 
territory but based on 
content. 
 Using incentives to 
control land 
development, 
 Existing spatial plans can 
be revised to adjust to 
new strategic national 
projects (which are 
enacted through the 
presidential decree) 
 
   
c. Coordination mechanisms: establishing new regulation for 
financial assistance 
As mentioned previously, intervention from the central government to take over 
the cost of land acquisition from the budget of the provincial government of Jakarta 
served to end debate and discussion about how to administer the budget transfer from 
the provincial government of Jakarta, whether to the Ministry of Public Works or to 
the regency government of Bogor. This intervention means that the coordination 
mechanism became much smoother. This continuous process accelerated the dam 
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construction process. However, this intervention implies that central government 
should have financial capacity. When the central government does not have financial 
capacity, it can develop schemes involving other actors through private-public 
partnerships and co-production.  
  
For public goods such as dams, which do not always make a profit, private companies 
may not be interested in investing. The central government should therefore search 
for other funding sources. When the provincial government of Jakarta was willing to 
provide funds for land acquisition for the dams, it was a breakthrough. Regulatory 
barriers meant that resource sharing couldn’t be realized and needed to be overcome. 
The solution was to create a much smoother processes through to use another 
administrative control instrument that involved provincial and local governments. 
This research proposes that regulation governing budgetary assistance from provincial 
and local governments to central government ministries or agencies should be revised. 
Revision is needed because budgetary assistance is not only offered within a provincial 
or local government exclusively and in other territories. In the case of the dams, 
located in the regency of Bogor, based on the existing regulation, the provincial 
government of Jakarta was not allowed to share its budget with the Ministry of Public 
Works to finance land acquisition. Revision can enhance the financial capacity of the 
ministries or agencies to support metropolitan planning in the JMR. 
  
 
5.7  Summary 
  
A summary of the research findings, alternative improvements for the JMR, policy 
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Table 5.2 





























1.      Enhance the 
capacity of the 
BKSP 
Jabodetabekjur 
to facilitate and 










 Not to give 
additional 










2.      To frame 






1.    The central 
government actively 
seeks to encourage 
the grant is framed 




To issue The Decree of 
the Minister of Home 
Affairs to manage 
Jakarta’s grant to its 
surrounding districts 
3.      Providing 
incentives for 
local government 
to ensure that 
plans, policies or 
strategies 
conform to the 
the national and 
metropolitan 
perspective 




To revise the Law of 
Financial Balance 
between the Central 
Government and Local 
Polities to provide 
incentives to 
provincial and local 
governments to 
conform to national 
and metropolitan 












capacity (the type of 








To create policies, 
plans or strategies for 
the entire JMR that 
are rigid in some 
areas, but which are 
more flexible in others. 
  
Development of spatial 
structure formulated 
through minuted 
meetings and which 
have a legal status 
(presidential decree).  
  

















To create an incentive 
system, the central 
government 
rearranges the period 
of the provincial/local 
spatial plan so that it 
matches with 
the period of governor, 



















financial capacity to 
finance projects for 
the JMR. 
1.     To enhance 





2.    To revise 
regulation on budget 
assistance to allow for 
provincial and local 
government to support 
the central 
government financially 
to construct projects, 







 5.8      Research agenda(s) 
  
The new framework of metropolitan planning developed in this research stimulates 
further research. This research agenda is developed to meet the high demand for 
multi-organisation coordination. Multi-organisation coordination can be realized not 
only by collective decisions and the political will of decision makers or political 
actors but needs the support of institutions in which it is to be implemented. Having 
applied the framework of metropolitan planning, we can talk of four research agendas 
that open up:  
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a. Identifying the prototype of metropolitan planning in other 
metropolitan regions, such as those in Indonesia, ASEAN countries, Asia or 
other regions around the world. This is relevant to ongoing discussions on 
metropolitan governance and planning, such as those from Salet, Thornley and 
Kreukels (2003), Hults and van Monfort (2007) and Xu and Yeh (2011). It also 
will enrich the metropolitan planning literature, particularly that which 
discusses institutional developments for metropolitan planning and effective 
coordination from the perspective of the form of governance. These various 
institutional developments can be represented using various prototypes of 
metropolitan planning developed in this research. This research agenda is 
important because we may recognize particular patterns that will stimulate the 
creation of new knowledge, for example, we may notice a relationship between 
a prototype of metropolitan planning and degree of institutional development 
in a country. 
b. Identifying more and varied operational instruments for prototypes 
of metropolitan planning. These operational instruments are crucial. A 
focus on the form of governance and transaction costs can be a useful tool to 
enhance effective coordination for metropolitan planning, such as creating new 
incentives or creating new regulations in order to reduce sources of transaction 
costs. This type of research can also connect with ongoing discussions, such as 
that of Leshinsky and Legacy (2016), Macintosh (2013) and Darmoyono (2019). 
This future research will enrich various operational instruments that are 
suitable for hierarchy, market or hybrid form of governance. From 
the perspective of the form of governance and transaction costs, operational 
instruments found will be classified into certain prototypes for metropolitan 
planning. New operational instruments uncovered by this future research will 
complement those in Table 2.8 in Chapter 2.  
c. Deploying the framework and its prototypes in the context of other 
issues, particularly those which are cross-cutting and which cross-political 
boundaries, such as those that fit within the regional development agenda, or 
those that are associated with the development of tourist areas, public-private 
partnerships, hazard and disaster mitigation, regional environmental 
development, river basin development, regional resilience and soon. These 
issues involve multiple organisations coordinating and working under a 
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particular form of governance. Thus, it can be predicted that the framework of 
metropolitan planning developed in this research can be used elsewhere.  
d. Developing a new framework of metropolitan planning covering 
more detailed institutional settings in the metropolitan region. This 
current research was limited in so much as it only discussed various 
coordination arrangements of metropolitan planning using nine prototypes. 
Further research can seek more sensitive institutional design (see for example 
Darmoyono, 2019) and construct a more detailed systematic arrangement of 
multi-organisation coordination in institutional settings in the metropolitan 
region, which would be connected closely to the framework of metropolitan 
planning developed in this work. The further development of this new 
framework may perhaps lead to 81 dynamic prototypes of metropolitan 
planning.  
  
Overall, this dissertation has discussed a crucial issue, multi-organisation 
coordination in metropolitan regions, and sought to identify a variety of institutional 
arrangements for metropolitan planning and ongoing policy research and practices on 
effective coordination. Through a focus on the form of governance, rooted in the theory 
of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985, 1996), we were able to analyse the 
instruments and form of governance most appropriate to application in the multiple 
organisations working together in Indonesian metropolitan regions. Using this 
perspective, central government and constituent authorities of metropolitan regions 
can develop new instruments to enhance effective coordination and rely upon 
incentive intensity based or mixed instruments, mainly to encourage private 
companies and citizens to become more deeply involved using various arrangements, 
such as networking or co-production, to enhance effective coordination for 
metropolitan planning. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Horizontal Fragmentation in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region 
 
The JMR does not have a metropolitan government. It consists of the Capital Special Region of Jakarta and 9 autonomous districts as part of 
the Province of West Java and the Province of Banten.  Since this region was declared officially as a metropolitan region, known as Jabotabek, 
in 1976, there was fragmentation of local government in this region and then more increasing after the reform in 1998 and the new policy of 
decentralization and local autonomy implemented in 2001. This new decentralization stimulates proliferation (Firman, 2009).  In JMR, a 
number of member increases from 6 (six) members to 12 (twelve) members (Table 1). It is a type of fragmentation which Dolan (1990) defines 
this fragmentation as increased number of local government in a region. 
 
Table 1 
Increased Local Government Fragmentation in the JMR 1976 – 2008 (still exist in 2016) 
No. 
Local Governments in 
the JMR 
 
Milestone of Local Government Fragmentation in the JMR 
 
1976 1993 1996 1999 2000 2006 2008 
1 The Province of Special 
Region of Jakarta 
V     
 
 
2 The Province of West Java V       
3 The Province of Banten     V**   
4 the Municipality of Depok    V*    
5 the Municipality of Bogor V       
6 the Municipality of Bekasi   V*     
7 the Regency of Bogor V       
8 the Regency of Bekasi V       
9 the Regency of Cianjur      V***  
10 the Municipality of 
Tangerang 
 V*    
 
 
11 the Municipality of 
Tangerang Selatan 
      V** 
12 the Regency of Tangerang V       
Source:  
Note:  
* empowered political status from administrative district to autonomous district, 
** the result of proliferation 
*** involved due to environmental reason (the highest upper stream area in the JMR) 
 
Fragmentation in the JMR is not only from number of local governments, but also in politics. A calculation made by author through 
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index (MPDI), which was introduced by Hamilton, et al,. (2004), indicates that political fragmentation in the 
JMR increases from 1,76 in 1994 to 2,57 in 2012 (Figure 1). According to Miller (2002) classification, fragmentation in the JMR can be 
classified as slightly centralized. It means that there is an organization which quiet has dominant role in the JMR. In the case of the JMR, that 
organization is the Provincial Government of Capital Special Region of Jakarta. 
 
Figure 1 
Political Fragmentation in the JMR 1994-2012 
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Appendix 2.2 
Metropolitan Planning in Greater London and Its Dynamic Shifts 
No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 

















 Enactment and 
implementation of the 
London Government 
Act 1963 (Collins, 
1994), 
 Based on the London 
Government Act 1963, 
the Greater London 
Council (GLC) was 
established in 1965 
(Collins, 1994; Rao, 
2002), 
 Enactment and 
implementation of the 
Town and Country 
Planning Act 1968 
(Hagman, 1971; Field, 
1983; Trevors, 2007), 
 Based on the Town and 
Country Act 1968, the 
Greater London 
Development Plan 
(GLDP) was developed 
(Haywood, 1998), 
 Enactment and 
implementation of the 
Town and Country 
Planning Act 1971 
(Field, 1983), 





 The GLDP was 





 Loss direction 
(Haywood, 
1998) 










Strategic plan  Loss direction 
of the GLDP 
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No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 























tion’ era in 
1986-1999 
 GLC was abolished in 
1986 through the Local 
Government Act 1985 
(Thornley, 1998), 
 The abolishment of 
GLC generated 
fragmentation, 
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No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 






















Based on the Greater 
London Authority Act 
1999, the British 
government established 
the Greater London 
Authority (GLA) in 1999 
(Travers, 2002), 
 








1999. It is a 
responsibility of 




 Mayor has some 
















their local plan 
(Pilgrim, 2006) 
Strategic-master plan Projects in SDS 
should be 
accommodated in 
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Appendix 2.3 
Metropolitan Planning in Amsterdam Metropolitan Area and Its Dynamic Shifts 
No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 


























information exchange and 
consultation (under the 
law of 1950 (Wet voor 
Gemeenschappelijke 
Regeling-WGR)) 
(Alexander, 2002 and 
2006; Klusman and 
Teunissen, 2003) 
 



































 Amendment of the 
Basic Enabling Law 
1950 
 The ROA did not 
provide rules for 
metropolitan planning 
in the City Region of 
Amsterdam 
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No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 



























Based on the Framework 
Law (Kaderwet) in 1993 










Strategic plan The City-Region of 
Amsterdam has 
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Appendix 2.4 
Metropolitan Planning in Metro Portland and Its Dynamic Shifts 
No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 



















































 Each local 
government 










Voluntary cooperation “Acknowledgement 
politics”, to create 
a coherent plan for 
the metropolitan, 
the state can 
forestall local land 
use authority and 
withhold grants 
(Knaap, 1994, p. 
4). 























(in transition) (Gibson and 
Abbott, 2002; Cotugno 
and seltzer, 2011) 
 Through the 
Oregon Land 





for land use 
planning 
 Master plan The JPATC has 
financial power to 
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No. Period 
Institutional setting of 
the metropolitan 
region 
Coordination arrangement of metropolitan planning 










































Utilizing Home Rule, 
through Metro Charter 
1992, Portland people 
created the Metropolitan 
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collaborative 







Master-strategic plan  The Metro issued 
Urban Growth 
Management 
Functional Plan to 
safeguard 
implementation of 
the Metro 2040 
Growth Concept 
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Regional  R11 
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1. Do you know a collective decision made by some actors to build the Ciawi dam? 
 
2. Are you involved in the process to prepare the decision or to prepare for its 
implementation? 
 
3. Could you please tell me on process to prepare the Ciawi dam implementation which 
your organisation is involved? 
 
4. Could you please tell me on difficulties during the preparation of the Ciawi dam 
development? 
 
5. Could you please tell me on role of the BKSP Jabodetabekpunjur on the preparation 













List of Online Newspapers 
 
 
A. Data source for analysis of coordination capacity 
 
No. Source  
1. Tempo.co, February 23, 2006: 
https://metro.tempo.co/read/news/2006/02/23/05774376/daerah-tolak-tata-ruang-masuk-ruu-ibukota  
Accessed at September 22, 2016 13:00 CEST 
2. Kompas.com (January 15, 2008) 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2008/01/15/17143367/Jakarta.Tetap.Ngotot.Soal.Waduk.Ciawi 
accessed August 30, 2014 22:39 CEST 
3. Thejakartapost.com, August 7, 2008 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/07/jakarta-west-java-build-dam-ease-floods.html 
Accessed August 21, 2015 10:11 CEST 
4. Republika.co.id, September 26 2008 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/trendtek/sains/08/09/26/5085-pembangunan-waduk-ciawi-segera-terealiasi 
Accessed at September 23 2016 15:11 CEST 
5. Republika.co.id, September 26 2008 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/trendtek/sains/08/09/26/5085-pembangunan-waduk-ciawi-segera-terealiasi 
Accessed at September 23 2016 15:11 CEST 
6. Kompas.com, March 30, 2015 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2015/03/30/19253271/Jalan.Tak.Berujung.untuk.Meramu.Satu.Jabodetab
ek?utm_source=WP&utm_medium=box&utm_campaign=Kknwp 
Accessed March 30 2015 15:20 CET 
7. Tempo.co,  November, 21 2013 
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/21/231531390/dituding-ahok-nur-mahmudi-urus-jakarta-saja 
Accessed September 27 2016 10:10 CEST 
8. Tempo.co,  November, 21 2013 
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/21/231531390/dituding-ahok-nur-mahmudi-urus-jakarta-saja 
Accessed September 27 2016 10:10 CEST 
9. Tempo.co, November 22, 2013 
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2013/11/22/231531683/ahok-nur-mahmudi-adu-mulut-soal-banjir 
Accessed at September 27, 2013 10:05 CEST 
10. Kompas.com, January 25 2014 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/01/25/1458267/Rano.Karno.Wilayah.Kami.Jangan.Jadi.Korban. 
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B. Data source for analysis of coordination mechanism 
 
No. Source 
1. Kompas.com, February 21, 2011 
http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2011/02/21/12020120/presiden.kenyang.dengan.pepesan.kosong?utm_
source=RD&utm_medium=box&utm_campaign=Kaitrd 
Accessed at September 15 2016 23:32 CEST 
2. Kompas.com, February 25, 2015 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/02/25/22071591/Soal.Transportasi.Massal.Jokowi.Sindir.Kota.Besar.Terl
alu.Banyak.Rencana.tapi.Tanpa.Hasil 
Accessed at February 25 2015 17:17 CET 
3. Kompas.com, January 8, 2009 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2009/01/08/21171114/Penanganan.Banjir.Jakarta.Terkendala.Dana.sejak.
Zaman.Belanda. 
Accessed at March 2 2015 11:34 CET 
4. Detik.com, January 9 2013 
http://news.detik.com/berita/2137826/atasi-banjir-jakarta-waduk-baru-bakal-dibangun-di-ciawi 
Accessed at August 4 2015 15:38 CEST 
5. Kompas.com, January 16, 2013 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2013/01/16/23070728/Jokowi.Dorong.Percepatan.Pembangunan.Waduk.
Ciawi 
Accessed February 5 2015 16:58 
6. Kompas.com January 19, 2013  
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/01/19/083455539/Waduk-Ciawi-Dinilai-Tak-Bisa-Atasi-Banjir-Jakarta 
Accessed at January 6, 2015 17:27 CET 
7. Kompas.com January 19, 2013  
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/01/19/083455539/Waduk-Ciawi-Dinilai-Tak-Bisa-Atasi-Banjir-Jakarta 
Accessed at January 6, 2015 17:27 CET 
8. Tempo.co, February 25, 2013 
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/02/25/087463557/Kementerian-PU-Ubah-Desain-Waduk-Ciawi 
Accessed at January 6 2015 17:30 CET 
9. Kompas.com (January 21, 2014) 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/01/21/0912184/Jokowi.Jangan.Cuma.Ropat-
repet.Saja.tapi.Enggak.Action. 
Accessed: March 2, 2015 CET 
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10. Kompas.com, January 27, 2014 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/01/27/1823310/Kepada.Jokowi.Bupati.Bogor.Klaim.Warganya.Tak.T
olak.Pembuatan.Waduk 
Accessed at March 2 2015 16:58 CET 
11. Kompas.com (February 4, 2014)  
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/04/1337024/Bupati.Bogor.Cuma.Pak.Jokowi.yang.Berani.Ambil.
Risiko. 
 Accessed at March 2, 2015  
12. Transbogor.co, February 4, 2014  
http://transbogor.co/read/447/04/2/2014/warga-pilih-perang-soal-pembebasan-waduk-ciawi#.UwXdCOLYNZk 
Accessed at February 20, 2014 11:50 CET 
13. Kompas.com, February 20, 2014 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/20/1844218/Tak.Mau.Diperas.Warga.Jokowi.Mungkin.Batalkan.
Waduk.Ciawi 
Accessed March 2 2015 17:25 CET 
14. Kompas.com February 21, 2014 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/21/1724454/Jokowi.Minta.Bupati.Bogor.Bujuk.Warga.soal.Ganti.
Rugi.Tanah 
accessed March 2 2015 17:23 CET 
15. Kompas.com February, 24 2014 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/24/1200523/Jokowi.Soal.Tanah.untuk.Waduk.Itu.Urusan.Bupati.
Bogor 
accessed March 2 2015 17:21 CET 
16. Kompas.com, February 24, 2014 
http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/24/1452381/Basuki.Minta.Bantuan.Deddy.Mizwar.Lobi.Warga.Ci
awi 
Accessed March 2 2015 17:17 CET 
17. Kompas.com, February 24, 2014  
http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/24/1412159/Menteri.PU.Waduk.Ciawi.Kemahalan.Tidak.Bisa.
Dibangun 













List of Regulations  
 
No. Indonesian Translated 
1. UU No. 32 tahun 2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah The Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local Polity 
2. UU No. 25 tahun 2004 tentang Sistem Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional 
The Law No. 25 of 2004 on the National Development 
Planning System 
3. UU No. 26 tahun 2007 tentang Penataan Ruang The Law No. 26 of 2007 on Spatial Planning 
4. UU No. 17 tahun 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara The Law No. 17 of 2003 on State Finance 
5. UU No. 33 tahun 2004 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan 
antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Pemerintahan Daerah 
The Law No. 33 of 2004 on the Finance Balance between 
the Central Government and the Local Polities 
6. UU No. 2 tahun 2012 tentang Pengadaan Tanah bagi 
Pembangunan untuk Kepentingan Umum  
The Law No. 2 of 2012 on Land Acquisition on 
Development for Public Interest 
7. Peraturan Presiden No. 54 tahun 2008 tentang Penataan 
Ruang Kawasan Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, 
Puncak, Cianjur 
Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2008 on Metropolitan 
Spatial Planning of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, 
Bekasi, Puncak, Cianjur 
8. Peraturan Menteri Pekerjaan Umum No. 11 tahun 2009 
tentang Pedoman Persetujuan Substansi dalam Penetapan 
Rancangan Peraturan Daerah tentang Rencana Tata Ruang 
Wilayah Provinsi dan Rencana Tata Ruang Kabupaten/Kota, 
beserta Rencana Rincinya.  
The Decree of the Minister of Public Works No. 11 of 2009 
on Guidance to Approve the Contents of Draft of Local 
Government Regulation on Spatial Plan of the Province and 
the Spatial Plan of Regency/Municipality and Its Detail 
9. Peraturan Daerah No. 22 tahun 2010 tentang Tata Ruang 
Provinsi Jawa Barat 2009-2029 
The Local Government Regulation No. 22 of 2010 on 
Spatial Plan of the Province of West Java 2009-2029 
10. Peraturan Daerah No. 19 tahun 2008 tentang Tata Ruang 
Kabupaten Bogor 2005-2025 
The Local Government Regulation No. 19 of 2008 on 
Spatial Plan of the Regency of Bogor 2005-2025 
11. Keputusan Presiden No. 79 tahun 1985 tentang Penetapan 
Rencana Tata Ruang Kawasan Puncak 
The Presidential Decree No. 79 of 1985 on the 
Establishment of Spatial Plan of Puncak.  
12. Keputusan Presiden No. 114 tahun 1999 tentang Rencana 
Tata Ruang Bogor-Puncak-Cianjur 
The Presidential Decree No. 114 of 1999 on the Spatial Plan 
of Bogor-Puncak-Cianjur. 
13. Keputusan Presiden No. 48 tahun 1983 tentang Penangan 
Khusus Penataan Ruang danPenertiban serta Pengendalian 
Pembangunan pada Kawasan Pariwisata Puncak dan Wilayah 
Jalur Jalan Jakarta-Bogor-Puncak-Cianjur di Luar Wilayah 
Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, Kotamadya Bogor, Kota 
Administratif Depok, Kota Cianjur dan Kota Cibinong 
Presidential Decree No. 48 of 1983 on the Special 
Treatment of Spatial Plan, Order and Control on 
Development in Puncak Area and in Street Areas of 
Jakarta-Bogor-Puncak-Cianjur beyond of the area of 
Jakarta, Municipality of Bogor, Administrative City of 




This research also collected the draft of the Memorandum of Understanding and the draft of the 
Memorandum of Agreement prepared by the BKSP Jabodetabekjur to enhance the commitment of 
organisations involved to develop the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam.  
 




List of Official Studies 
 
1. Laporan Perkiraan Kerusakan dan Kerugian Pasca Bencana Banjir awal Februari 
2007 di Wilayah Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, dan Bekasi), 
Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan 
Pembanguna Nasional, 2007. (The Report of The Prediction of Damage and Loss 
Post-Flood in Early February 2007 in the region of Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, 
Depok, Tangerang, dan Bekasi), the Ministry of National Development Planning/the 
National Development Planning Agency, 2007). 
 
2. Laporan Akhir Peninjauan Kembali Peraturan Presiden Nomor 54 Tahun 2008 
Tentang Penataan Ruang Kawasan Jabodetabekpunjur, Direktorat Jenderal 
Penataan Ruang, Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum, 2013. (The Final Report on 
Review of Presidential Regulation Number 54 year 2008 on Spatial Plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur, Directorate General of Spatial Planning, the Ministry of Public 
Works, 2013).  
 
3. Pokok-pokok Review Perpres 54/2008 RTR Kawasan Perkotaan 
Jabodetabekpunjur, Direktorat Jenderal Penataan Ruang, Kementerian 
Pekerjaan Umum, 2013. (The Major Points of the Review of the Presidential 
Regulation 54/2008 RTR (Spatial Plan) of Urban Area of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur, Directorate General of Spatial Planning, the Ministry of 
Public Works, 2013).  
 
4. The Study on Comprehensive River Water Management Plan in 
JABODETABEK, March 1997, JICA 
 
5. Jakarta Drainage and Flood Control Project, the Directorate General of Water 
Resource Development, the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works and Power 
and Directorate of International Technical Assistant, the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, prepared by the Indonesian Flood Control Project and 
NEDECO Netherlands, 1972.   
 












Analysis of Potential Transaction Cost when Uncertainties Exist 
 
 
A. In Existing Coordination Capacity of the Metropolitan Spatial Plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur to Mitigate Floods 
No. Source of Transaction Costs Occurred and Potential Transaction Cost 
1. Different strategies in the 
metropolitan spatial plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur for two 
neighborhood territories (the 
province of Jakarta and the 
municipality of Depok) to manage 
conservation area 
Coordination cost: 
 Coordination meetings to formulate strategy of catchment area 
which are accepted by both local governments. 
2. Different values on minimum land 
wide for landed-housing.  
Coordination cost: 
 Coordination meetings to  
Negotiation cost: 
 To define land building coverage coefficient and to approve the 
spatial plan of both local governments in around border area 
Information cost: 
 Researches  
3. Fragmentation Coordination cost: 
 Coordination meetings to find a coherence perspective 
4. Different scales of map on the 
spatial plans 
Information cost: 
 To produce maps with single scale for all spatial plans 
5. Deliberation process of the 
metropolitan spatial plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur 
accommodating the Ciawi dam. 
Coordination cost: 
 Coordination meetings to accommodate the Ciawi dam in spatial 
plans 
Information cost: 
 Researches related to the Ciawi dam: design, location, impact and 
anticipation for hazards and disasters 
6. Deliberation process of the revision 
some spatial plans: the  
metropolitan spatial plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur, the spatial plan 
of the regency of Bogor and the 
spatial plan of the province of West 
Java accommodating the Ciawi 
dam. 
Coordination cost: 
 Coordination meetings to revise spatial plans technically, 
 Coordination meetings to revise spatial plans politically involving 
the local parliament of the regency of Bogor (for spatial plan of 
Bogor) and the local parliament of the province of West Java (for 
spatial plan of West Java) 
 
Information cost: 
To review existing spatial plan 
7. The Ciawi dam, which is located in 
the regency of Bog0r, was perceived 
by the government of the regency of 
Bogor as the interest of the 
governor of Jakarta. 
Coordination cost: 
 Coordination meetings to make sure validity of information on the 





B. In Existing Coordination Mechanism of the Ciawi dam and the Sukamahi dam 
Provision when Uncertainties Exist 
Process Source of transaction 
costs 
Occurred and potential transaction costs 
1. Response for a proposal 
of Jakarta to build the dam  
(i) Need to fill in lack of 
financial capacity 
Coordination cost: 
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Process Source of transaction 
costs 
Occurred and potential transaction costs 
 (i) Coordination meetings to fill in lack of finance 
capacity to build the dam. Source of finance can be 
through the national budget or loan from 
international agencies. 
(ii) Need to address reluctance 
from donor to finance a dam 
Coordination cost: 
 (ii) Coordination meeting to fill in pre-requisite and 
other requirements 
(iii) Need to address different 
perspective on money value 
Coordination cost: 
 (iii) Coordination meetings to find a coherence 
perspective 
Information cost: 
 (iv) FS for additional functions 
2. Proposed the 
‘Megapolitan’ concept 
(iv) Need to address different 
perspective on political value 
Coordination cost: 
 (v) Coordination meetings for deliberation process for 
the new law. 
 (vi) Coordination meetings to find a coherence 
perspective on  benefit of the ‘Megapolitan’ concept 
3. The metropolitan spatial 
plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur 
 (v) Need to address 
different perspective on 
money value 
 (vi) Need to address 
different perspective on 
political value 
Coordination cost: 
 (vii) Coordination meetings to accommodate the dam 
in the metropolitan spatial plan of the 
Jabodetabekpunjur 
 (viii) FS for additional functions 
 
4. inter-local government 
cooperation supported by 
the central government 
 (vii) Need to make sure 





 (ix) Coordination meeting to find a coherence 
perspective. 
 (x) Coordination meeting to establish new regulation 
to accommodate collective asset ownership status. 
5. Feasibility Study (viii) Require new FS  Information cost: 
 (xi) Develop new FS 
6. Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
(ix) Require the new spatial 
plan accommodating the 
dams 
Information cost: 
 (xii) Develop new spatial planning 
7. Detailed-Engineering 
Design 
 (x) Require new DEDs 
 
Information cost: 
 (xiii) Research on geology,  
 (xiv) Research on morphology, 
 (xv) Research on model of the dam and its 
construction, 
8. Memorandum of 
Agreement (MoA) 
(xi) Does not have sufficient 
support due to many occurred 
uncertainties 
Coordination cost: 
 (xvi) Coordination meetings inviting actors involved 
to sign the MoA, 
9. the Ciawi dam 
preparation team 
(xii) Its existence is not sustain Coordination cost: 
 (xvii) Its existence was predicted only for 2014 
10. the land acquisition 
team 
 (xiii). Require new DEDs, 
 (xiv) Need to address land 
price speculation, 
 (xv) Need to obtain 
collective asset ownership 
status 
 (xvi) Need a permit for 
land acquisition which the 
permit requires (xvii) IEA 




 (xviii) To find the new DEDs 
 (xix) To find IEA 
 (xx) To find new spatial plans 




 (xxi) To reduce land price speculation (opportunism), 
 
Coordination cost: 
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Process Source of transaction 
costs 
Occurred and potential transaction costs 
 (xxii) To establish a specific arrangement for land 
acquisition 
11. Revision of spatial plans  (xix) Need new DEDs to 
identify certain the dams’ 
site 
 (xx) Need the review of 
existing spatial plan 
 (xxi) Need the draft of 
new spatial plan 
 (xxii) Need deliberation 
process technically and 
politically, 
Information cost: 
 (xxiii) To find new DEDs 
 (xxiv) To review existing spatial plan 
 (xxv) To prepare the draft of new spatial plan 
 
Coordination meetings: 
 (xxvi) Coordination meetings with stakeholders, 
 (xxvii) Technical deliberation process to upper 
government, 
 (xxviii) Political deliberation process to be approved 
by local parliament, 
12. Budgeting process for 
land acquisition 
 (xxiii) Need deliberation 
process administratively 
and politically (here, 
(xxiv) collective asset 
ownership status was 
possible considered), 
Coordination cost: 
 (xxix) Coordination meeting to deliberate 
administratively, 
 (xxx) Coordination meeting to deliberate politically to 
get the approval from local parliament 
 
Information cost: 
 (xxxi) To obtain clarification and certain status 
on how to manage and to administrate 
transferred budget to other autonomous local 
government 
13. Budget allocation for 
land acquisition 
(xxv) Need to define site which 
requires (xxvi) the new spatial 
plan (revised) 
Information cost: 
 (xxxii) To find new spatial plan, 
 (xxxiii) To find certain site for land acquisition 
 (xxxiv) To calculate total cost of land acquisition 
14. Financial transfer status 
of land acquisition budget 
 (xxvii) Need to address 
unclear status on 
performance of agency,  
 (xxviii) Need to address 
unclear legal status 
(collective asset 
ownership asset status) 
Agency cost: 
 (xxxv) To clarify and to convince status of transferred 
budget and its implication to unit’s performance, 
 
Information cost: 
 (xxxvi) To find clarification on collective asset 
ownership asset status, 
 
15. budgeting process for 
construction 
 (xxix) Need deliberation 
process administratively 
and politically (here, 
(xxx) collective asset 
ownership status was 
possible considered), 
 (xxxi) Need acquired-
land which it requires 
(xxxii) the new spatial 
plan (revised) first 
Coordination cost: 
 (xxxvii) Coordination meeting to deliberate 
administratively, 
 (xxxviii) Coordination meeting to deliberate 
politically to get the approval from local parliament 
 
Information cost: 
 (xxxix) Evidence of acquired-land in the site 
 (xl) New spatial plan, 
 (xli) Information on collective asset ownership status  
16. profit sharing among 
organisations involved 
(xxxiii) Need to define 
collective asset ownership 
status 
Coordination cost: 
 (xlii) Coordination meetings to find a coherence 
perspective. 
 (xliii) Coordination meetings to establish new 
regulation to accommodate collective asset ownership 
status. 
17. maintenance cost post-
construction 
(xxxiv) Need to define 
collective asset ownership 
status 
Coordination cost: 
 (xliv) Coordination meetings to find a coherence 
perspective. 
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Process Source of transaction 
costs 
Occurred and potential transaction costs 
 (xlv) Coordination meetings to establish new 
regulation to accommodate collective asset ownership 
status. 
18. the dam ownership 
post-construction 
(xxxv) Need to define 
collective asset ownership 
status 
Coordination cost: 
 (xlvi) Coordination meetings to find a coherence 
perspective. 
 (xlvii) Coordination meetings to establish new 
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 Appendix 5.1 
Assessment of Possible Improvements for Coordination Capacity of the Metropolitan Spatial Plan Using the Remediableness Criterion 
No. Option 
Possible instrument be applied Remediableness Criterion 
Administrative 
control Incentive intensity Description Implementation Gain  
1. Strategic 
plan 





processes which do 




District government has 
more freedom and autonomy 
to prepare its local spatial 
plan, 
The central government can 
provide financial incentives 
to safeguard protected areas 
and to encourage economic 




market form of 
governance, 
It could be implemented, but two 
laws need to be amended first: the 
law of spatial planning and the law of 
finance balance between the central 
government and local polities. 
Creating more fragmentation in the regional 
strategy. 
No control from the central government can 
stimulate the social horizontal dilemma. 
Local government can be more individualist, 
which may threaten attempts to solve floods. 
Reducing the number of steps involved in 
deliberation processes, which will have two 
implications: offering certainty or uncertainty 
in land-use planning 
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No. Option 
Possible instrument be applied Remediableness Criterion 
Administrative 







particularly for rigid 
contents. A 
regulation process 




District governments have 
less freedom and autonomy 
to prepare a local spatial plan 
containing rigid contents 
formulated in the 
metropolitan spatial plan. 
District governments have 
more freedom to prepare 
their spatial plans for a 
strategic area. 
 
The central government can 
provide financial and non-
financial incentives to 
safeguard conservation and 
protected areas and to 
encourage economic growth 




hybrid form of 
governance. 
It could be implemented, but the law 
of spatial planning and the law of 
finance balance between the central 
government and local polities need 
amending. 
Reducing fragmentation in the regional 
strategy. 
 
Providing flexibility and room to adapt to 
new challenges and new opportunities 
Control from the central government 
reducing horizontal social dilemmas. 
Local government can be more individualist, 
but still controlled by central government, 
Reducing the number of steps involved in 
deliberation processes, which can provide 
certainty 
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No. Option 
Possible instrument be applied Remediableness Criterion 
Administrative 
control Incentive intensity Description Implementation Gain  













It could be implemented to provide 
certainty, but it may reduce flexibility 
to adapt new challenges and new 
opportunities. 
It needs law enforcement and 
implementation 
Able to reduce fragmentation, 
Needs additional time and costs to prepare, 
deliberate and enact the metropolitan spatial 
plan, 
 
Difficult to adapt to new challenges and new 
opportunities. 
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Appendix 5.2 
Assessment of Possible Improvements To Coordination Mechanisms through Remediableness Criterion 
No. Option 
Possible instrument be applied Remediableness Criterion 




Establish a formal rule for 
collective decisions, 
Establish joint ownership 
status of collective assets or 
take over investment as the 
owner of authority to produce 
certain projects. 
Enforcing rule of the law for 
land-use control, 
Establish a new rule that the 
national strategic projects 
have priority when 
conflicting with contents of 






hierarchical form of 
governance. 
Can be implemented, but 
it needs the amendment 
of several laws first: the 
law of local polity and the 
law of spatial planning, 
Should define a formal 
platform of metropolitan 
region first.  
To accelerate collective decision making 
processes 
To safeguard collective action, 
To give certainty for legal permits, 
It needs a higher capacity of the strategic 
projects owner, 
New rule has potential to conflict with 
other rules, generating new transaction 
costs. 
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No. Option 
Possible instrument be applied Remediableness Criterion 






ownership asset status, 
Establish a rule that spatial 
plans of district strategic 
areas are enacted through 
technical deliberation, 
including approval from the 
central government, to cope 
with dynamic changes and to 
create certainty and legal 
permits. 
Provide flexibility, connecting 
to the spatial plan, for 
cooperation, collaboration and 
collective action to obtain 
incentives, such as a political 
bargain and perceived by the 
actor/organisation as being in 
the public interest. 
District government has more 
freedom to prepare its spatial 
plan of district strategic area to 





associated with a 
hybrid form of 
governance, 
Can be implemented, but 
it needs the amendment 
of two laws first:  the law 
of local polity and the law 
of spatial plan. 
To provide room for democratization: 
free choice for collective decisions 
It manages fragmentation and provides 
room for cooperation, collaboration and 
dynamic changes 
To safeguard collective action. 
It promises to provide spatial planning 
more quickly to give certainty for legal 
permits; to enhance adaptation capacity 







Less rules to promote 
collective action; most rules 
to regulate and promote 
inward looking perspectives, 
focusing on individual 
performance 
Collective action is 
encouraged/stimulated by a 
motivation to obtain potential 
incentives, such as political 
bargaining and being perceived 




associated with the 
market form of 
governance 
Enhancing individual 
performance to solve 
metropolitan problems.  
However, it needs bigger 
individual capacity. 
Individual performance may be better at 
reducing complicated uncertainty 
compared to collective action (i.e. an 
asset problem), 
Needs extra effort to enhance individual 
capacity. 
Increase fragmentation, social dilemma 
and free riding. 
 
